The archaeological evidence of such cities is best preserved, and has been most thoroughly delved, at El Lahun, Deir el-Medina, and Amarna, though some averment of urban planning exists at other sites as well.
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This led to the general adoption of assumpsit – proceeding originally upon a fictitious averment of a promise by the defendant – as a means of recovering debts. Where a penalty was created by statute, it became a common form to insert a proviso that no wager of law was to be allowed in an action for the penalty. Wager of law was finally abolished in 1833 (3 & 4 William IV. c. 42).
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The petition must be supported by an affidavit sworn by or on behalf of the petitioner. Practice varies and occasionally the affidavit will duplicate all of the information contained in the petition. Usually, this is unnecessary and the supporting affidavit can simply contain an averment that all information in the petition is correct and all relevant documentation in support of the information provided in the petition can be exhibited.
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No wager of law was allowed in assumpsit, even though the cause of action were a simple debt. This led to the general adoption of assumpsit - proceeding originally upon a fictitious averment of a promise by the defendant - as a means of recovering debts. Where a penalty was created by statute, it became a common form to insert a proviso that no wager of law was to be allowed in an action for the penalty. Wager of law was finally abolished in 18 33 (3 & 4 William IV. c. 42).
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In addition, the onus of proof at the trial is usually borne by the plaintiff, in terms of the rule that "he who makes the averment or asserts the claim must prove it," whereas during the provisional-sentence procedure the onus is on the defendant to satisfy the court that he will succeed in the principal case. The defendant may therefore find that a trial gives him an advantage over the plaintiff. Nevertheless, in practice, few defendants continue to the principal case. The vast majority of provisional- sentence orders therefore become final judgments.
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On 26 March 2006, the Indian Enforcement Directorate (ED) announced that it had finally tracked a sum of eighty million rupees, transferred from London-based Non-resident Indian businessman Aditya Khanna's bank account to his own NRI account in a Delhi bank, and later withdrawn from this account to be allegedly distributed among Indian beneficiaries of the scam. An old family connection between this businessman (Aditya Khanna) and Natwar Singh's family was dredged up. In August the same year, the Justice Pathak committee, which was investigating the case, released its judgment accepting this averment. The committee found that Andaleeb Sehgal, a friend of Jagat Singh, and Aditya Khanna, a relative of Natwar Singh, received financial payoffs by procuring oil coupons based on recommendations given by Natwar Singh.
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There had been no averment in Singh's affidavit that he had complied with the requirements of section 7(1); the affidavit was incomplete, as none of the annexures referred to therein had been attached. The court, therefore, could not assess the veracity of the allegations, whether Singh had a substantial and peculiar interest, and whether such interest arose out of some personal injury. Therefore, the court held that Singh had failed to discharge the onus of proving that he was a private person falling within the ambit of section 7(1). The court held further that the unrestricted meaning of a "private person" contended for by Singh was inconsistent with the recognition that private prosecutions were unusual; it was also a departure from the basic law that criminal prosecutions must be conducted by a public prosecutor.
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In pursuing the fusion of law and equity which was the dominant legal idea of law reformers of that period, the framers of the first set of rules devised a system which they thought would meet the defects of both systems, and be appropriate for both the common-law and the chancery divisions. In a normal case, the plaintiff delivered his statement of claim, in which he was to set forth concisely the facts on which he relied, and the relief which he asked. The defendant then delivered his statement of defence, in which he was to say whether he admitted or denied the plaintiff's facts (every averment not traversed being taken to be admitted), and any additional facts and legal defences on which he relied. The plaintiff might then reply, and the defendant rejoin, and so on until the pleaders had exhausted themselves.
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At the end of July 2019, a group of 78 parliamentarians, led by Scottish National Party (SNP) justice spokeswoman Joanna Cherry and barrister Jolyon Maugham , had made an application for judicial review to the Outer House of Scotland's highest court, the Court of Session in Edinburgh. The application was made to the court in Scotland because it sat during the summer—unlike its English counterpart—and was made in anticipation of a public u-turn on the matter from the government. The litigants sought a ruling that prorogation to avoid parliamentary scrutiny would be unconstitutional and unlawful. The government averred that the petition was "hypothetical and premature" and "that there was no reasonable or even hypothetical apprehension" that the government intended to advise that the Queen prorogue Parliament in order to prevent parliamentary scrutiny of its Brexit plans, and confirmed that averment on 23 August and 27 August.
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The plaintiff and the defendant bear distinct and separate onuses of proof in respect of different issues at the provisional-sentence stage. Initially, the plaintiff need not prove anything; he may prima facie discharge the primary onus by the mere averment in the summons that the plaintiff is the holder of a liquid document bearing the defendant's signature or that of an authorised agent of the defendant. If the defendant disputes the validity of the liquid document, by denying the authenticity of the signature or the agent's signature or authority, or by averring that a simple condition must be fulfilled before payment can take place, the onus lies with the plaintiff to prove, on a balance of probabilities, the validity of the document or the fulfilment of the simple condition. The reason why the onus lies with the plaintiff here is that the plaintiff's right to have provisional sentence granted is founded entirely on the presumption of the authenticity and legal validity of the liquid document.
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On appeal, the court held as follows: > A real, genuine and bona fide dispute of fact can exist only where the court > is satisfied that the party who purports to raise the dispute has in his > affidavit seriously and unambiguously addressed the fact said to be > disputed. There will of course be instances where a bare denial meets the > requirement because there is no other way open to the disputing party and > nothing more can therefore be expected of him. But even that may not be > sufficient if the fact averred lies purely within the knowledge of the > averring party and no basis is laid for disputing the veracity or accuracy > of the averment. When the facts averred are such that the disputing party > must necessarily possess knowledge of them and be able to provide an answer > (or countervailing evidence) if they be not true or accurate but, instead of > doing so, rests his case on a bare or ambiguous denial the court will > generally have difficulty in finding that the test is satisfied.
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