Though Truxtun's ship initially held an advantageous position in the wind known as the weather gauge, she was over- armed, and as a result her leeward side heeled so much that the gunports on that side of the vessel could not be opened. Truxtun decided to cede the weather gauge to the French by sailing around L'Insurgentes leeward side and bringing Constellation near the French frigate's port side. In such a position Constellation was disadvantaged by the wind, but was able to avoid some of the heeling effect on her guns.Toll 2006, p. 117.
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The wind was from the south, giving Pelican the weather gauge (i.e. the windward position). Allen sailed westward on the port tack (i.e., with the wind to port) and opposed his port side battery to Pelican's starboard battery.
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Hood's fleet was seen bearing toward them around 08:00 but deGrasse held the weather gauge. At about 09:20, Hood was joined by Prince William, a 64-gun ship that had been at St. Lucia. The two fleets continued to push for advantageous positions.
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Cooper, 1856 p.270Crawford, 2009 p.639 The following day at 12:30 PM Java hoisted her colors and ensign with Constitution hoisting her colors in reply. With the dispositions of each ship confirmed, Java with the weather gauge to her advantage came about to position herself to rake Constitution.
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The seas around the north and west of Europe experienced stronger and less predictable weather. The weather gauge, the advantage of having a following wind, was an important factor in naval battles, particularly to the attackers. Typically westerlies (winds blowing from west to east) dominated Europe, giving naval powers to the west an advantage.Fernández-Armesto (1999), p.
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Gauge and gage are often used as alternative spellings. To the extent that there is a difference, a weather gauge can be a form of meteorological instrumentation for measuring weather quantitatively, such as a rain gauge, thermometer, anemometer, or barometer. A gage is a challenge, and hence an entry into battle, though the word is more commonly embedded in the word engage.
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However, De Ruyter did not budge. When however the squadron at last returned to the main allied line, joining Rupert's squadron, the Dutch started to move, but surprisingly in the direction of the enemy. This forced Rupert to attack immediately to prevent the Dutch from gaining the weather gauge, before he could form a proper keel line. The battle began at noon and lasted for nine hours.
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The weather gage (sometimes spelled weather gauge) is the advantageous position of a fighting sailing vessel relative to another. It is also known as "nautical gauge" as it is related to the sea shore. The concept is from the Age of Sail and is now antique. A ship at sea is said to possess the weather gage if it is in any position upwind of the other vessel.
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After closing to within gunshot of the cutter by 10.30am, a large sail was observed standing off the land. Whilst Cleopatra was taking the cutter, Apollo went to investigate the large sail. The two ships closed, tacking about to gain the weather gauge, and eventually opened fire. Apollos opponent was the 26-gun French privateer Stanislaus, and after a period of tacking, the two engaged in broadsides while running for Ostend.
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252 His intention was to break the English line in three places simultaneously rather than fight in line ahead.Van Foreest and Weber, p. 18 When the English fleet approached, sailing in a south-easterly direction, the Dutch had the weather gauge and sailed in line abreast in a northerly direction before forming line rather obliquely to the English fleet, so that only the Dutch rear and English van were initially within range of each other.
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On 15 June a cutter was sighted while cruising in the North Sea and Murray was sent to investigate it. After closing to within gunshot of the cutter by 10.30am, a large sail was observed standing off the land. The two ships closed, tacking about to gain the weather gauge, and eventually opening fire. Apollos opponent was the 26-gun French privateer Stanislaus, and after a period of tacking, the two engaged in broadsides while running for Ostend.
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In the early morning of 25 July, the Dutch fleet of 88 ships discovered the English fleet of 89 ships near North Foreland, sailing to the north. De Ruyter gave orders for a chase and the Dutch fleet pursued the English from the southeast in a leeward position, as the wind blew from the northwest. Suddenly, the wind turned to the northeast. The English commander, Prince Rupert of the Rhine, then turned sharply east to regain the weather gauge.
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This is usually attributed to the fact that De With in the battle council in the morning of the second day had called all Zealandic captains cowards and had warned them that in Holland there was still sufficient wood left to erect gallows for any of them. The situation had become hopeless for the Dutch who now had 49 ships left in their fleet while the English fleet had during the night been reinforced to 84, yet De With still wanted to make a last effort. On his directions the Dutch fleet, now positioned to the southeast of the English force, sailed farther south in the hope of gaining the weather gauge. This design failed however: first some ships, with difficulty beating up the wind, coursed too far to the west and were badly mauled by the fire of the English rear; and hardly had the Dutch fleet moved to its intended position when it all proved to have been in vain because the wind turned to the northeast, giving the English the weather gauge again.
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Immediately, Tromp set the signal for a general attack and began the offensive with the wind in his favour as he had the weather gauge. An illustration of the battle Tromp's flagship, Brederode, met Blake's flagship, Triumph, immediately, sending a broadside at mere metres distance. Turning around, without having received a response from English gunners, he put a second broadside in Triumph's other side, and finally then delivered a third after turning around again. Blake subsequently veered away and decided to fight at long range.
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The Honourable Charles Knowles Esq Vice Admiral of the Blue Squadron of His Majesty's fleet. After having his ships refitted Knowles sailed on a cruise, hoping to intercept a Spanish treasure fleet off Cuba. On 30 September he fell in with HMS Lenox, under Captain Charles Holmes, who reported that he had encountered a Spanish fleet some days earlier. The fleet was sighted the next morning but confusion over signals and a struggle to keep the weather gauge meant that the British fleet failed to attack in an organised manner.
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Barnett 1991, p. 292. Suffolk and Norfolk tried to engage Bismarck during the action but both were out of range and had an insufficient speed advantage over Bismarck to rapidly close the range.Bonomi, The Battle of the Denmark StraitNaval Staff History, German Capital Ships and Raiders in WW2, Battle Summary No. 5, p8. The Germans also had the weather gauge, meaning that the British ships were steaming into the wind, spray drenching the lenses of Prince of Wales "A" turret's Barr and Stroud coincidence rangefinder and both British ships' "B" turret rangefinders.
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Unaware of the events that had taken place at Quebec, Admiral Roquement made the decision to bypass the English at Tadoussac under the cover of fog and if necessary fight their way through. Kirke's force on the other hand was larger and better equipped, and also had the advantage of being upstream from Roquement. On July 17 the two forces sighted each other and began to manoeuvre into position. Roquement, with both the current and the weather gauge against him, could not make a move to pass Kirke, and realized he had to fight.
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The French main force of d'Estrées, both frightened and delighted by what it saw as a brilliant manoeuvre, disengaged slowly to the northwest to keep the weather gauge, but like Rupert didn't use this position to attack. This caused De Ruyter to comment: "The De Zeven Provinciën can still inspire awe among its enemies". The Dutch centre now moved in opposite tack behind the enemy rear. Spragge understood that if De Ruyter reached the southern edge of the basin his force would be trapped between the Dutch centre and rear.
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Around 1100, Grasse's van began firing at long range, with no effect. Saint-Hippolyte's division then set sail, leaving the harbour of Fort-Royal and making their junction with Grasse. By 1230 the two fleets were aligned, but Grasse refused to take advantage of the weather gauge to close with Hood, despite Hood's efforts to bring the French to him, as doing so entailed risking his transports. The fleets then exchanged cannonades and broadsides for the next hour; at long range, the damage incurred was modest, although , Russell and required repairs.
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After having his ships refitted Knowles sailed on a cruise, hoping to intercept the Spanish treasure fleet off Cuba. On 30 September he fell in with HMS Lenox, under Captain Charles Holmes, who reported that he had encountered a Spanish fleet some days earlier. The fleet was sighted the next morning but confusion over signals and a struggle to keep the weather gauge meant that the British fleet failed to attack in an organised manner. Though the Battle of Havana ended with the capture of one Spanish ship and another being badly damaged, it was not the major British victory hoped for.
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The Dutch main fleet came too late, mainly due to coordination problems between the five Dutch admiralties, to prevent a joining of the English and French fleets. It followed the Allied fleet to the north, which, unaware of this, put in at Solebay to refit. On 7 June the Allies were caught by surprise and got into disarray when the Dutch fleet, having the weather gauge, suddenly appeared on the horizon in the early morning. The French fleet, whether through accident or design, steered south followed by Banckert's fifteen ships and limited its action to long-distance fire.
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Grasse ordered his fleet to prepare for action on the morning of 29 April, and sailed for Fort Royal with the convoy ships hugging the coast and the armed ships in battle line. The French spotted Hood's fleet bearing towards them around 0800, but Grasse held the advantageous weather gauge from an East- North-East wind. At about 0920, Hood was joined by the Prince William, a 64-gun ship that had been at St. Lucia. The two fleets continued to push for advantageous positions, however Hood's leeward position meant he was unable to prevent Grasse from bringing the convoy to the harbour, and Grasse's fleet and the four blockaded ships soon met.
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Reggio realized the convoy he had sighted was in actuality the British Jamaican squadron. Immediately he signalled his command to steer to leeward to facilitate the formation of a line ahead bringing him to almost the same course as Knowles. The result of this however meant that he had lost the weather gauge whilst Knowles on the other hand was in a favourable position to obtain it.Richmond pp 135-37 Knowles gave the signal for the ships in his line to "lead large" with the Spanish on a more convergent course.Tunstall pp 101-03 With the afternoon change in the wind the two leading ships and HMS Warwick in Knowles' line drifted within long range of Reggio's centre which then opened fire on them.
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259 Despite having possibly as few as 32 and certainly not more than 35 ships to fight as many as 48 English ones, de Ruyter had regained the weather gauge while Albemarle and Rupert were attacking Tromp. During the late morning and early afternoon, the two fleets passed and repassed each other. Albemarle made no attempt to keep de Vries from joining the main Dutch fleet, which he did around noon. During the successive passes, the English fleet with superior numbers and heavier guns attempted to close with the Dutch, but de Ruyter prudently kept his ships at such a distance that, on some passes, the English ships, some with their magazines depleted by the previous days’ fighting, withheld their fire.
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Contarini, with 22 sailing ships, left Porto Poro on 28 July and arrived at Port Gavrion, on the west coast of Andros, on 3 August, while a galley force, under , went to Kekhrios, on mainland Greece, ready for an attack on Thebes. On 6 August the Muslim fleet of 20 Ottoman and 15 African ships was sighted north of Andros. It sailed around to Gavrion and tried to tempt Contarini out, but the wind was from the north (possibly this should be south), and Contarini had orders not to engage unless he had the weather gauge, and even after the Ottomans sent galliots in and landed troops all he did was send a small craft to drive them off. The Ottomans left and anchored to the west.
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On the morning of the next day both forces transpired to be still close to each other and De Ruyter hoped by aggressively pursuing to capture some stragglers; several English ships were in tow and might well be abandoned if he pressed hard enough. However Ayscue, fearing for his reputation, on 17 August convinced the English council of war to again give battle if necessary and brought his entire force safely back to Plymouth on 18 August. De Ruyter then sent two warships to escort the merchant fleet through the Channel to the Atlantic. For a while he considered trying to attack the enemy fleet at anchorage in Plymouth Sound, but in the end decided against it as he did not have the weather gauge.
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Knowles action off Havana by Thomas Craskell On the morning of 1 October 1748 the Havana Squadron under the command of Admiral Don Andres Reggio was sailing North in a disorganized formation off of Havana. Reggio sighted what he believed to be a Spanish convoy and thus with the intention of offering escort to this "squadron" he signalled his command to bear directly on a course to intercept it. Around the same time Admiral Sir Charles Henry Knowles, commanding the British Jamaican squadron, sighted a formation of vessels on a course directly towards him and immediately signalled his own squadron to form line ahead bearing North. His intention was to put sufficient distance between himself and the Havana Squadron which would enable him to gain the weather gauge and close in.
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She sank two, but a third, Vrede, commanded by Jan Daniëlszoon van den Rijn, its approach shielded by Vice-Admiral Isaac Sweers's Oliphant, set her on fire. She burnt with great loss of life; Sandwich himself and his son-in-law Philip Carteret drowned trying to escape when his sloop collapsed under the weight of panicked sailors jumping in; his body washed ashore, only recognisable by the scorched clothing still showing the shield of the Order of the Garter. During the battle the wind shifted, giving the English the weather gauge, and in the late afternoon the Dutch withdrew. Losses were heavy on both sides: one Dutch ship, the Jozua, was destroyed and another, the Stavoren, captured, a third Dutch ship had an accident during repairs immediately after the battle and blew up.
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When the fleets finally met on 28 September, the United Provinces had 62 ships and about 1,900 cannon and 7,000 men; the Commonwealth of England 68 ships under General at Sea Robert Blake with about 2,400 cannon and 10,000 men. The van of the Dutch fleet was to be commanded by Michiel de Ruyter, the centre by De With himself and the rear by temporary Rear-Admiral Gideon de Wildt of the Admiralty of Amsterdam. On the morning of 28 September the Dutch fleet, approaching from the east, had the previous evening been again scattered by a gale and was still dispersed when around noon it saw Blake coming out in force from the south. Having the weather gauge because of a south-south-western breeze, Blake intended to exploit this excellent opportunity for a direct attack on the disordered Dutch.
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He immediately broke formation to tack to the southwest also, narrowly escaping to the west with his flotilla, but leaving the flotillas of Ossorey and Kempthorne behind with that of de Grancey in a slower turn in the same direction. Banckert now united his squadron with the Dutch centre by making a similar but larger turn, sailing behind De Ruyter. The Dutch supreme commander had thus gained an excellent position: the enemy fleet was now divided in four uncoordinated parts and he could attack the confused enemy rear with a numerical superiority having the weather gauge. At that moment he had no knowledge of Tromp's situation however and typically decided not to take any unnecessary risks but to join Tromp with the remainder of the Dutch fleet instead, saying: "First things first; it's better to help friends than to harm enemies".
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The French aimed to bring the convoy into Messina intact and to preserve their fleet as a fighting force whereas the Dutch wished to prevent the fleet and convoy reaching Messina or to do as much damage to them as possible. Although ship numbers on both sides were similar, the French fleet was more powerful, with 1,500 guns against 1,200 for the Dutch On 7 January, de Ruyter had held the weather gauge, but either he did not attack on that day, or Duquesne foiled his attack by remaining out of range. However, during the night the wind veered to a west-southwesterly direction and, as both fleets were heading almost due south, it now favoured the French. The wind had also strengthened overnight, so the Spanish galleys had taken refuge in the lee of the Lipari Islands: Duquesne therefore sent the convoy ahead and prepared to attack the Dutch.
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Before he could attack the enemy line, it became apparent to de Ruyter that Tromp and seven or eight ships of the rear squadron had not gained the weather gauge and were now isolated to the leeward side of the English red squadron without support, and under attack from ships of that squadron under vice admiral Sir Joseph Jordan. It is unclear whether Tromp had not had seen De Ruyter's signal flags or had decided not to follow his orders, but within minutes six of his major ships, including his replacement flagship Provincie Utrecht had suffered major damage to their masts and were vulnerable to English fireships, which managed to burn his former flagship Liefde. The Spieghel, on which Vice-Admiral Abraham van der Hulst was killed by a musket shot, was attacked by three English ships of the red squadron and left disabled.Fox, pp.
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After a delay of two months on the Spanish coast waiting for the supplies and a supporting squadron promised by the Spanish authorities, De Ruyter sailed for Sicily at the year end with only one Spanish ship added to his fleet of 18 Dutch warships. When he arrived in Sicily in early January 1676, most of the larger French warships were absent from Messina with Duquesne, who was escorting a reprovisioning convoy to Sicily, and only some smaller French ships remained at Messina. However, de Ruyter was unable to attack the city because of contrary winds and, on 7 January 1676, while cruising near the Lipari Islands and accompanied by several Spanish galleys, he encountered the French fleet led by Duquesne the convoy. Although both fleets had similar numbers of ships, the French fleet was more powerful, with 1,500 guns against 1,200 for the Dutch and no fighting took place on 7 January, when De ruyter held the weather gauge.
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In the morning of 2 September he spotted the enemy fleet off Novorossiysk but at the same time a messenger brought him the order to abandon the attack in view of the force imbalance: Van Kinsbergen's original two ketches had only been reinforced by a single frigate of 32 cannon and a fireship, while the Turkish fleet numbered four ships-of-the-line, seven frigates and six transports with five thousand men infantry. Determined to give battle anyway, van Kinsbergen declared in front of his officers that such an order could not possibly be authentic, arrested the messenger and pursued the attack. Conforming to the standard tactics of the day, the Turkish fleet sailed in a formal line-of-battle. Van Kinsbergen realized that doing likewise would only result in the quick annihilation of his flotilla and therefore applied a modern concentration of forces: using the weather gauge he frontally attacked the leading Turkish vessel, causing the following Turkish ships to break formation.
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Ayscue's ships were on average more heavily armed, but extremely disorganised because the fastest vessels, among them Ayscue's flagship the George and the Vanguard of his vice-admiral William Haddock, had broken formation in the hope of catching, during a running battle, straggling Dutch merchantmen; they were now unable to form a line of battle and fully exploit their advantage in firepower over the Dutch. The Dutch squadron however, sailing to the northwest, was in a rough defensive leeward line formation, with the Frisian acting Rear-Admiral Joris Pieterszoon van den Broeck commanding the van, De Ruyter himself commanding the centre and Hollandic Rear-Admiral Jan Aertsen Verhoeff commanding the rear. Around 16:00 the Dutch fleet and seven forward English vessels met and almost immediately passed through each other – both sides afterwards claiming to have "broken the enemy line". Having thus gained the weather gauge the Dutch at once exploited this by turning and attacking from the north.
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Delta Cancri was involved in the first recorded occultation by Jupiter: Delta Cancri also marks the famous open star cluster Praesepe (or the Beehive Cluster, also known as Messier 44). In ancient times M44 was used as a weather gauge as the following Greek rhyme from Aratos' Prognostica reveals: The meaning of this verse is that if Asellus Borealis or Gamma CancrisKaler, 2009: is hidden by clouds, the wind will be from the south and that situation will be reversed if Asellus Australis is obscured. There is some doubt however as to the accuracy of this as Allen notes: "Our modern Weather Bureau would probably tell us that if one of these stars were thus concealed, the other also would be." (Allen, 1898) But Delta Cancri also acts as more than just a dubious weather guide: it is a reliable signpost for finding the vividly red star X Cancri as Patrick Moore notes in his guidebook Stars of the Southern Skies: Delta Cancri also marks the radiant of the Delta Cancrids meteor shower.
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Movements of the squadrons of Perry and Barclay on the morning of 10 September On the morning of 10 September, the Americans saw Barclay's vessels heading for them, and got under way from their anchorage at Put-in-Bay. The wind was light. Barclay initially held the weather gauge, but the wind shifted and allowed Perry to close and attack. Both squadrons were in line of battle, with their heaviest vessels near the centre of the line. The first shot was fired, from Detroit, at 11:45.Ernest A. Cruikshank, The Contest for Command of Lake Erie, 1812–13, in Zaslow 1964, p. 98 Perry hoped to get his two largest brigs, his flagship and , into carronade range quickly, but in the light wind his vessels were making very little speed and Lawrence was battered by the assortment of long guns mounted in Detroit for at least 20 minutes before being able to reply effectively. When Lawrence was finally within carronade range at 12:45, her fire was not as effective as Perry hoped, her gunners apparently having overloaded the carronades with shot.
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