44 Sentences With "obiter dictum" | Random Sentence Generator

Its obiter dictum on politics—whether far right or far left, everyone is equally questionable—in this US election year rings particularly false.

'The State (Furey) v Minister of Defence' also involved an army member being dismissed from service. De Roiste had relied on the obiter dictum set out in Furey. Obiter dictum is a Latin phrase meaning 'by the way'. It is an opinion or non-necessary remark made by a judge.

However, such comments were not necessary for the decision in the case, and in law were only obiter dictum and not binding on subsequent courts.

But, explained Neuberger J, it would probably be otherwise if a withdrawal was communicated before a notice was given (or deemed given), applying Holwell Securities Ltd v Hughes. This was just, however, ‘no more than a tentative view' -- an obiter dictum (other words and side-opinions of the court).

Edlin (2008) p.7 If Coke intended the former, he may have later changed his view.Martin (2007) p.42 The statement by Coke is sometimes considered to be an obiter dictum (a statement made 'by the way'), rather than part of the ratio decidendi (rationale for the decision) of the case.

35.1; Grotius Inleiding 3.14.23; Westinghouse at 574C-D. This basic principle of the common law of sale has, however, been called into question in a strenuous obiter dictum in the case of NBS Boland Bank v One Berg River Drive; Deeb v ABSA Bank; Friedman v Standard Bank.1999 (4) SA 928 (SCA).

706, para. 14. On 1 August 2012, the High Court dismissed her application. Dissatisfied, she appealed to the Court of Appeal which dismissed her appeal on 5 July 2013. However, in an obiter dictum, the Court of Appeal agreed with her interpretation of Article 49(1) of the Constitution rather than the Prime Minister's interpretation.

"This was wholly aside from the question in judgment, and from the course of reasoning bearing upon that question." and later cases as a passing remark (obiter dictum) lacking any force as a controlling precedent. As to whether the Wong Kim Ark decision was correct on this point or not, modern scholars are divided.Epps (2010), pp. 348–349.

Nevertheless, Major confirmed that the theatre must monitor the patron's alcohol consumption based on the amount served and not solely on the patron's visible condition. In an obiter dictum, Major mused that even if there was a breach of the standard of care, it was not clear if a warning by Mayfield would have resulted in a different choice of driver.

The complainant produced a number of young men who were prepared to testify that they were disappointed that the complainant had not been available as a prostitute. Miles declined to award any damages.“Obiter Dictum”, Newsletter Edition. Australian Capital Territory Young Lawyers Association No: 13 Autumn 2005 Miles led an inquiry into the fitness to be tried of David Harold Eastman.

The heavy reliance on Lord Penzance's definition of marriage has been criticised on two distinct grounds. First, the original statement was an obiter dictum, meaning it did not establish a binding precedent. Second, this dictum was a defence of marriage and not a definition of it.Rebecca Probert, "Hyde v Hyde: Defining or Defending Marriage", Child and Family Law Quarterly, vol. 9. no.

There could be an action in the tort of deceit, but not s.332. Because there was no allegation of fraud on Barnett directors, the parent could be no accessory. In an obiter dictum, Hoffmann J also looked at one of the liquidator's arguments. This was that the Rumasa's letter of comfort, for financial support over the years, should make the parent liable for Barnett's debts.

The Parsis and Iranis are considered legally distinct. A 1909 obiter dictum relating to the Indian Zoroastrians observed that Iranis (of the now defunct Bombay Presidency) were not obliged to uphold the decisions of the then regulatory Parsi Panchayat. Some of the Irani community speaks an ethnolect called Zoroastrian Dari. However, the two communities increasingly intermarry and are said to have been "integrated well" with each other.

In 1997, the Federal Court cited the decision with approval as part of an obiter dictum in R. Rama Chandran v. The Industrial Court of Malaysia. However, when ruling directly on the interpretation of Article 5 in 2002, the Federal Court held in Pihak Berkuasa Negeri Sabah v. Sugumar Balakrishnan & Another that a generous reading of the term "personal liberty" in Article 5 was in error.

However, in June 2007, the Enlarged Board of Appeal of the EPO in cases G 1/05 and G 1/06 accepted, by way of obiter dictum,T 1391/07, reasons 2.5. "the Enlarged Board of Appeal has recently endorsed by way of obiter dictum in decisions G 1/05 and G 1/06 the practice of the EPO in this respect (see point 13.4 of the reasons: "The Board accepts that the principle of prohibition of double patenting exists...") that :"the principle of prohibition of double patenting exists on the basis that an applicant has no legitimate interest in proceedings leading to the grant of a second patent for the same subject-matter if he already possesses one granted patent therefor.Decision G 1/05 of the Enlarged Board of Appeal of the EPO, Reasons 13.4. (see also OJ EPO 2008, 271 and 307).

Although this analysis was sufficient to dispose of the appeal, Lord Collins added some additional obiter dictum comments in relation to the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The Court of Appeal had held that "the BVI was clearly the appropriate forum for trial as a preliminary issue of the questions arising between the members and alleged members of Nilon."At paragraph 56. Lord Collins indicated his disagreement with that statement.

Nevertheless, the Court upheld sec. 14 of R.A. 9006 on the ground, among others, that Congress merely recognized the substantial distinction between elective and appointive officials when it imposed the resign-to-run rule only on the latter. According to Justice Nachura, since the primary issue in that case was whether sec. 14 was an invalid rider, the discussion on substantial distinction was merely incidental and nothing but an obiter dictum.

Another obiter dictum of the Court concerns Article 8 of the EU Fundamental Rights Charter: > Regard being had to Article 8 of the Charter, therefore, the Court would no > longer consider that the right to marry enshrined in Article 12 must in all > circumstances be limited to marriage between two persons of the opposite > sex. Consequently, it cannot be said that Article 12 is inapplicable to the > applicants' complaintpara 61 of the Judgment Judge Malinverni in his concurrence has objected to this obiter dictum: > Article 12 is inapplicable to persons of the same sex. Admittedly, in > guaranteeing the right to marry, Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental > Rights of the European Union deliberately omitted any reference to men and > women, since it provides that “the right to marry and to found a family > shall be guaranteed in accordance with the national laws governing the > exercise of these rights”. In my opinion, however, no inferences can be > drawn from this as regards the interpretation of Article 12 of our > Convention.

Lord Reid also made obiter dictum comments about the nature of parliamentary sovereignty and constitutional conventions in the United Kingdom: Lord Pearce gave a dissenting judgment, in which he concluded that the detention orders should be upheld under the doctrine of necessity. Although he agreed that the United Kingdom retained full sovereignty over Southern Rhodesia, acts done by the de facto government of the territory should be recognized if such acts are necessary for "the ordinary orderly running of the country".

Harvest All Investment Limited, et al., G.R. No. 224834, March 15, 2017, where the Supreme Court declared that an action calling for Stockholders' Meeting is incapable of pecuniary estimation, and the pronouncement in the case of Lu v. Lu Ym, 658 Phil.156 (2011) that an intra-corporate controversy always involves a property in litigation and that there can be no case of intra-corporate controversy where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated is but an obiter dictum.

The original majority agreed that these fears are equally applicable to elected and appointive officials alike, thus, treating the one differently from the other should fail the test of equal protection. The original decision also noted that the substantial distinction between elective and appointive government officials laid down in the case of Fariñas v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 147387, December 10, 2003) cannot be used to justify the different treatment of the two classes of officials because that "doctrine" was a mere obiter dictum.

A group of shareholders sued, and the Michigan Supreme Court said in an obiter dictum that a "business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end." However, in the case itself a damages claim against Ford did not succeed, and since then Michigan law has been changed.Michigan Business Corporation Act §§251 and 541a(1)(c), and see Churella v Pioneer State Mutual Insurance Co, 671 NW2d 125 (2003) distinguishing Dodge.

In this case, in Van Heerden DCJ's obiter dictum, he noted that it is conceivable, albeit unlikely, that a stipulation may be so worded that an absolute discretion to fix a prestation is conferred on one of the parties. In these circumstances, it is unnecessary to express a view as to whether such a stipulation will be invalid as being in conflict with public policy, or whether the fixing of the prestation may only be assailed when it is done in bad faith. See also the case of Benlou Properties v Vector Graphics.

At the end of the war the flats became fully let, and the claimants demanded the return to payment of full rent. Denning J held that they were entitled to this from the last two quarters of 1945. Denning mentioned in an obiter dictum that had the plaintiffs tried to be reimbursed for the full amount they would have been estopped from doing so even though no consideration was present. This is because the plaintiff represented that he would accept half the rent and the defendant acted upon this.

Justice Louise Charron emphasized in her opinion that the majority would not consider constitutional issues but rather just the statutes and whether the municipality should have used French in the courts, and she found against Charlebois. Charron noted that in terms of constitutional law and section 16 of the Charter, municipalities were deemed institutions by the Court of Appeal.Para. 14. However, she decided that the Court of Appeal's decision related more to section 18 of the Charter and the commentary on section 16 and institutions was thus obiter dictum. She thus turned back to the definition of an institution according to statutes.Para. 15.

Norman Varner The opinion attracted attention for also rejecting a request to refer to Varner with feminine pronouns, and going at length into perceived problems with granting such a request. Judge James L. Dennis, a Clinton appointee, dissented and wrote that Duncan misconstrued the motion. In Dennis's view, it was merely a polite request that this specific proceeding use Varner's pronouns, usually granted as a courtesy; not an overarching demand requiring six pages of obiter dictum about the threat of courts being forced to use custom pronouns everywhere. Dennis also wrote that there was no need to rule on the matter at all.

As of 2009, the High Court's decision in Taw Cheng Kong was the only case in Singapore where a statutory provision had been struck down as unconstitutional.. In Chng Suan Tze v. Minister for Home Affairs [1988] 2 S.L.R.(R.) 525 at 551, para. 79, the Court of Appeal held that sections 8 and 10 of the were inconsistent with Articles 12 and 93 of the Constitution, but this was, strictly speaking, an obiter dictum as the case was not decided on this point. Although overturned on appeal, the case illustrates the power that the judiciary wields and its role in safeguarding the Constitution.

After the retirement of Justice Minita Chico-Nazario (who agreed with the Nachura decision) and the appointment of Justices Jose Perez and Jose C. Mendoza (who both agreed to Puno's opinion), the Supreme Court resolved to reverse the original decision and adopt the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Reynato Puno. In opposition to the Justice Nachura’s original ponencia, Justice Reynato Puno made a very exhaustive discussion on the implications of the original ruling. The new Decision stressed that the doctrine of substantial distinction in Fariñas was not an obiter dictum because the seemingly unfair treatment caused by the repeal of sec. 67 and retention of sec.

In the United States legal system, the 1873 U.S. Supreme Court case Taylor v. Taintor, 16 Wall (83 U.S. 366, 21 L.Ed. 287), is cited as having established that the person into whose custody an accused is remanded as part of the accuser's bail has sweeping rights to that person. Though this may have been accurate at the time the decision was reached, the portion cited was obiter dictum and has no binding precedential value. As of 2008, four states, Illinois, Kentucky, Oregon, and Wisconsin prohibited the practice, as they have abolished commercial bail bonds and banned the commercial bail bonds industry within their borders.

The particular pages of the Parke Davis opinion that the Leegin dissent cites include those in which the Parke Davis Court had found that Parke Davis had put together a horizontal combination or conspiracy among those to whom it sold its products, as in Interstate Circuit, Inc., v. United States.. The majority opinion, however, says nothing about overruling Parke Davis. Furthermore, the majority opinion observed, in obiter dictum, that a vertical arrangement may organize a horizontal cartel: > A horizontal cartel among competing manufacturers or competing retailers > that decreases output or reduces competition in order to increase price is, > and ought to be, per se unlawful.

Vellama d/o Marie Muthu v. Attorney-General was a 2013 decision of the Court of Appeal of Singapore which held that Article 49(1) of the Constitution requires the Prime Minister to call a by-election when a casual vacancy arises in a Single Member Constituency ("SMC"), though the election need only be called within a reasonable time. The holding was an obiter dictum, that is, not required for the decision in the case and therefore not a binding precedent, though it may be persuasive in future cases. This was because the Court dismissed the appeal on the ground that the appellant, Madam Vellama, lacked standing.

At the same time, Southern Democrats characterized Republicans as lawless rebels, provoking disunion by their unwillingness to accept the Supreme Court's decision as the law of the land. Many northern opponents of slavery offered a legalistic argument for refusing to recognize the Dred Scott decision as binding. As they noted, the Supreme Court's decision began with the proposition that the federal courts did not have jurisdiction to hear Scott's case because he was not a citizen of Missouri. Therefore, the opponents argued, the remainder of the decision concerning the Missouri Compromise was unnecessary and beyond the Supreme Court's power to decide and so was a passing remark rather than an authoritative interpretation of the law (obiter dictum).

It does not form the legal judgment. It is of persuasive authority that may be used in other cases. McCarthy J delivered the obiter dictum in 'The State (Furey) v Minister of Defence': "... I see no logical reason why delay, however long, should, of itself, disentitle to certiorari any applicant for the remedy who can demonstrate that a public wrong has been done to him - that, for instance, a conviction was obtained without jurisdiction, or that, otherwise, the State has wronged him and that the wrong continues to mark his life." One may consider that this is a fair evaluation, as a wrongful conviction, despite how long a delay, should be dealt with sufficiently.

In a 1929 case, Higgins, then a Justice of the High Court, suggested (as obiter dictum) that a person could lawfully object to compulsory voting on the grounds of religious belief. However, in 1943, the court continued the narrow approach it took in Krygger v Williams, upholding war-time regulations that caused the Adelaide branch of the Jehovah's Witnesses to be dissolved and have its property acquired by the Commonwealth government. The government had declared the branch to be an organisation whose activities were "prejudicial to the defence of the Commonwealth": one of the branch's professed beliefs was that the government was an "organ of Satan". Chief Justice John Latham held that the Constitution permitted the court to "reconcile religious freedom with ordered government".

An oft-quoted legal definition of Parsi is based on a 1909 ruling (since nullified) that not only stipulated that a person could not become a Parsi by converting to the Zoroastrian faith but also noted: This definition was overturned several times. The equality principles of the Indian Constitution void the patrilineal restrictions expressed in the third clause. The second clause was contested and overturned in 1948. On appeal in 1950, the 1948 ruling was upheld and the entire 1909 definition was deemed an obiter dictum – a collateral opinion and not legally binding (re-affirmed in 1966).) There is a growing voice within the community that if indeed equality must be re-established then the only acceptable solution is to allow a child to be initiated into the faith only if both parents are Parsi.

The rule against reflective loss broadly provides that the proper claimant for a wrong done to a company is the company itself, and that a shareholder does not enjoy a separate cause of action for the diminution in the value of their shares or the failure to receive dividends as a result. The shareholder's loss is merely a "reflection" of the loss suffered by the company itself. However the case law evolved to raise the possibility that the rule against reflective loss should extend more widely, beyond shareholders’ claims to claims by other parties. In Johnson v Gore Wood [2002] 2 AC 1, Lord Millett made some obiter dictum comments that the rule would apply to claims brought by the claimant shareholder in his capacity as employee, rather than his capacity as shareholder.

Aldred's Case (1610) 9 Co Rep 57b; (1610) 77 ER 816, [1558–1774] All ER Rep 622, is an English land law and tort law case on nuisance. The case can be seen as the birth of the ordinary man having a cause of action in certain types of environmental law against his immediate neighbour. The case confirmed a legal right to abate relatively extreme noise and smell, provided it cannot be justified as being protected by way of an easement have arisen such as from the passing of time (an easement by prescription) or custom on the piece of land in question. The judge recited the separate law, in an obiter dictum in an old Latin maxim in the English common law, that there is no right to a view.

In an obiter dictum in Nadarajah v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (2005), Lord Justice Laws set out a more structured form of merits-based review.. He expanded the categorical approach in ex parte Coughlan into a continuum based on proportionality, suggesting that in order for a public body's decision to resile from a legitimate expectation to be lawful, it must be "a proportionate response to a legitimate aim pursued by the public body in the public interest".Nadarajah, para. 68. By advocating proportionality in the court's approach towards protecting substantive legitimate expectations, Lord Justice Laws effectively paralleled the approach used by the UK courts when considering whether an interference with a right subject to qualifications protected by the European Convention on Human Rights is lawful.

Basic Law Committee member Elsie Leung would later criticise the court for its approach to interpreting the Basic Law. Po Jen Yap of the University of Hong Kong also criticised the CFA for effectively treating the NPCSC interpretation as having a judicial rather than statutory character, as though it were a ruling by a higher court, and in his opinion misusing this characterisation to treat the preamble of the interpretation as a mere obiter dictum. Conversely, the Court of Final Appeal was criticised from another direction by Ling Bing of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, who felt that the court's statement that "the power of the Standing Committee extends to every provision in the Basic Law and is not limited to the excluded provisions referred to in art. 158(3)" overstated the NPCSC's BL 158 authority to interpret the Basic Law.

The word was first recorded at the Conference on War and National Responsibility in Washington DC in 1970, where Arthur Galston proposed a new international agreement to ban ecocide.Article published in New York Times, 26 February 1970; quote in Weisberg, Barry Ecocide in Indochina (1970) Canfield Press, San Francisco OCLC 135562 Galston was an American biologist who identified the defoliant effects of a chemical later developed into Agent Orange. Subsequently, a bioethicist, he was the first in 1970 to name massive damage and destruction of ecosystems as ecocide. In an obiter dictum in the 1970 Barcelona Traction case judgement, the International Court of Justice identified a category of international obligations called erga omnes, namely obligations owed by states to the international community as a whole, intended to protect and promote the basic values and common interests of all.

He then went on to consider the position in relation to the postal rule generally (which he referred to as "the roundabout path to the same result"). In relation to this he concluded based upon earlier authorities that although the postal acceptance rule was a rule of general application, it did not apply when there are express terms in the offer which exclude, and this includes excluding it by implication where the offer specifies that acceptance must reach the offeror. The Court also suggested obiter dictum that the rule ought not to apply in cases where its application would produce manifest inconvenience and absurdity. More broadly, the Court states that the rule does not apply if when looking at all the circumstances, it is apparent that the parties could not have intended a binding agreement until notice of acceptance was communicated to the offeror.

The legal expression "semble" indicates that the point to which it refers is uncertain or represents only the judge's opinion. In a law report, the expression precedes a proposition of law which is an obiter dictum by the judge, or a suggestion by the reporter. For example, in the headnote(at page 576 E-F) for House of Lords' decision in Hedley Byrne v Heller,[1963] 2 All All ER 575 the reporter uses the term semble when summarising certain remarks of Lords Reid, Morris, and Hodson on a point which did not arise for decision in the case; semble indicates that this may be the law, but it falls to a future case to decide authoritatively. In Simpkins v Pays [1955],'Simpkins v Pays' [1955] 1 WLR 975 Queen's Bench Division Sellers J, having made an award to the plaintiff, suggested "semble" that an equal award was due to the defendant's granddaughter, even though she was not party to the action.

Joachimson v Swiss Bank Corporation [1921] 3 KB 110 is a judicial decision of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales in relation to the fundamental nature of the legal relationship between banker and customer. Together with Foley v Hill (1848) 2 HLC 28 it forms part of the foundational cases relating to English banking law and the nature of a bank's relationship with its customer in relation to the account. The point decided in the case was that a customer does not have a right of action against its bank for repayment of sums until the customer makes a demand (and accordingly, for the purposes of limitation periods, that time does not run until such a demand is made). However, the reason the decision is considered so important is for the influential comments made by way of obiter dictum by Atkin LJ in relation to the nature of the banker-customer relationship.

The court also delivered an opinion that colonial legislatures did not have the power to pass laws with extraterritorial effect:[1891] A.C. 455 at 458; cited in Mohr 2005 p.90 :Their Lordships think it right to add that they are of the opinion that if the wider construction had been applied to the statute, and it was supposed that it was intended thereby to comprehend cases so wide as those insisted on at the bar, it would have been beyond the competence of the Colony to enact such a law. Their jurisdiction is confined within their own territories, and the maxim which has been more than once quoted, 'Extra territorium jus dicenti impune non paretur,' would be applicable to such a case. The question was already uncertain prior to this, and as an obiter dictum the opinion was not binding; nevertheless it had a chilling effect on Dominion legislatures' willingness to pass extraterritorial laws until the Statute of Westminster 1931 explicitly stated that they had the power to do so.