107 Sentences With "indeterminism" | Random Sentence Generator

The spacetime foam proposal fits nicely with the intrinsic uncertainty and indeterminism of the quantum world.

The MIT experiments offer further evidence against an old anti-quantum mechanical idea positing that the seeming indeterminism of a superposition (alive and dead, etc.) isn't real.

A distinction is generally made between indeterminism and the mere inability to measure the variables (limits of precision). This is especially the case for physical indeterminism (as proposed by various interpretations of quantum mechanics). Yet some philosophers have argued that indeterminism and unpredictability are synonymous.

Indeterminism has been promoted by the French biologist Jacques Monod's essay "Chance and Necessity". The physicist-chemist Ilya Prigogine argued for indeterminism in complex systems.

In 1968, Margenau was invited to give the Wimmer Lecture at St. Vincent College in Latrobe, Pennsylvania. His topic was Scientific Indeterminism and Human Freedom. Margenau embraced indeterminism as the first step toward a solution of the problem of human freedom.Scientific Indeterminism and Human Freedom, The Archabbey Press (1968) p.

Against Einstein and others who advocated determinism, indeterminism—as championed by the English astronomer Sir Arthur Eddington—says that a physical object has an ontologically undetermined component that is not due to the epistemological limitations of physicists' understanding. The uncertainty principle, then, would not necessarily be due to hidden variables but to an indeterminism in nature itself. Determinism and indeterminism are examined in Causality and Chance in Modern Physics by David Bohm. He speculates that, since determinism can emerge from underlying indeterminism (via the law of large numbers), and that indeterminism can emerge from determinism (for instance, from classical chaos), the universe could be conceived of as having alternating layers of causality and chaos.

Heisenberg's uncertainty principle and the "Born rule", proposed by Max Born, are often starting points in support of the indeterministic nature of the universe.The Born rule itself does not imply whether the observed indeterminism is due to the object, to the measurement system, or both. The ensemble interpretation by Born does not require fundamental indeterminism and lack of causality. Indeterminism is also asserted by Sir Arthur Eddington, and Murray Gell-Mann.

A first common objection to event-causal accounts is that the indeterminism could be destructive and could therefore diminish control by the agent rather than provide it (related to the problem of origination). A second common objection to these models is that it is questionable whether such indeterminism could add any value to deliberation over that which is already present in a deterministic world. Deliberative indeterminism asserts that the indeterminism is confined to an earlier stage in the decision process. This is intended to provide an indeterminate set of possibilities to choose from, while not risking the introduction of luck (random decision making).

Against Albert Einstein and others who advocated determinism, indeterminism—championed by Eddington—says that a physical object has an ontologically undetermined component that is not due to the epistemological limitations of physicists' understanding. The uncertainty principle in quantum mechanics, then, would not necessarily be due to hidden variables but to an indeterminism in nature itself.

Technically, counterfactual definiteness is lacking. A notable consequence of quantum indeterminism is the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, which prevents the simultaneous accurate measurement of all a particle's properties.

In the introduction, Nozick assumes "orthodox quantum mechanics" and draws inferences from it about indeterminism and nonlocality. He deprecates Bohm's formulation and ignores other no- collapse theories.

" Where, then, is to be found disagreement between Bohr and Einstein on the statistical interpretation? Not in the basic link between theory and experiment; they agree on the Born "statistical" interpretation". They disagree on the metaphysical question of the determinism or indeterminism of evolution of the natural world. Einstein believed in determinism while Bohr (and it seems many physicists) believed in indeterminism; the context is atomic and sub-atomic physics.

Quantum mechanics poses a serious challenge to this view. Fundamental debate continues over whether the physical universe is likely to be deterministic. Although the scientific method cannot be used to rule out indeterminism with respect to violations of causal closure, it can be used to identify indeterminism in natural law. Interpretations of quantum mechanics at present are both deterministic and indeterministic, and are being constrained by ongoing experimentation.

Indeterminism is the idea that events (or certain events, or events of certain types) are not caused, or not caused deterministically. It is the opposite of determinism and related to chance. It is highly relevant to the philosophical problem of free will, particularly in the form of metaphysical libertarianism. In science, most specifically quantum theory in physics, indeterminism is the belief that no event is certain and the entire outcome of anything is probabilistic.

The ability to effectively judge the different possible outcomes is rock hard proof that moral responsibility exists and should be kept in check, and it lines up perfectly with indeterminism.

He writes, "There are seemingly unanswerable arguments that (if they are indeed unanswerable) demonstrate that free will is incompatible with determinism. And there are seemingly unanswerable arguments that ... demonstrate that free will is incompatible with indeterminism. But if free will is incompatible both with determinism and indeterminism, the concept 'free will' is incoherent, and the thing free will does not exist." In his book Material Beings,(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995) Van Inwagen argues that all material objects are either elementary particles or living organisms.

This includes interactionist dualism, which claims that some non-physical mind, will, or soul overrides physical causality. Physical determinism implies there is only one possible future and is therefore not compatible with libertarian free will. As consequent of incompatibilism, metaphysical libertarian explanations that do not involve dispensing with physicalism require physical indeterminism, such as probabilistic subatomic particle behavior – theory unknown to many of the early writers on free will. Incompatibilist theories can be categorised based on the type of indeterminism they require; uncaused events, non-deterministically caused events, and agent/substance-caused events.

Event-causal accounts of incompatibilist free will typically rely upon physicalist models of mind (like those of the compatibilist), yet they presuppose physical indeterminism, in which certain indeterministic events are said to be caused by the agent. A number of event-causal accounts of free will have been created, referenced here as deliberative indeterminism, centred accounts, and efforts of will theory. The first two accounts do not require free will to be a fundamental constituent of the universe. Ordinary randomness is appealed to as supplying the "elbow room" that libertarians believe necessary.

Event-causal accounts of incompatibilist free will typically rely upon physicalist models of mind (like those of the compatibilist), yet they presuppose physical indeterminism, in which certain indeterministic events are said to be caused by the agent. A number of event- causal accounts of free will have been created, referenced here as deliberative indeterminism, centred accounts, and efforts of will theory. The first two accounts do not require free will to be a fundamental constituent of the universe. Ordinary randomness is appealed to as supplying the "elbow room" that libertarians believe necessary.

Negation–Affirmation (Double Negation) 8\. Complementarity–Mutual Exclusiveness 9\. Comparison–Imparison (No Comparison?) 10\. Determinism–Indeterminism (Probability, Selection, Choice) Over time, the level of abstraction and sophistication in the application of these patterns became more and more complex.

Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics, New Haven: Yale University Press. and Arthur Eddington (1939).Arthur Eddington (1939), The Philosophy of Physical Science, Cambridge University Press. Recently, OSR has been called "the most fashionable ontological framework for modern physics".

Moreover, he did not accept incompatibilism as formulated below; he did not believe that the indeterminism of human actions was a prerequisite of moral responsibility. In his work Pragmatism, he wrote that "instinct and utility between them can safely be trusted to carry on the social business of punishment and praise" regardless of metaphysical theories.James, W. (1907) Pragmatism (1979 edition). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press He did believe that indeterminism is important as a "doctrine of relief" – it allows for the view that, although the world may be in many respects a bad place, it may, through individuals' actions, become a better one.

As such destiny does not appear as the only player, but rather chance or indeterminism plays equal part in his doctrine. He thus subscribed to niyativada (fatalism) only in the sense that he thought that some future events like salvation for all were strictly determined.

Both determinism and indeterminism are threats to such freedom. To abandon these notions of freedom would be to abandon moral responsibility. On the one side, we have our intuitions; on the other, the scientific facts. The "new" problem is how to resolve this conflict.

These considerations show that, since substantialism allows the construction of holes, that the universe must, on that view, be indeterministic. Which, Earman argues, is a case against substantialism, as the case between determinism or indeterminism should be a question of physics, not of our commitment to substantialism.

And where is this good God?In Ecce Homo, "Why I am so wise", 3, tr. Duncan Large he repeated after Stendhal: "God's only excuse is that he doesn't exist." Due to the lack of free will the theodicee (defence of divine goodness) based on indeterminism becomes void.

Although it was once thought by scientists that any indeterminism in quantum mechanics occurred at too small a scale to influence biological or neurological systems, there is indication that nervous systems are influenced by quantum indeterminism due to chaos theory. It is unclear what implications this has for the problem of free will given various possible reactions to the problem in the first place. Many biologists do not grant determinism: Christof Koch, for instance, argues against it, and in favour of libertarian free will, by making arguments based on generative processes (emergence). Other proponents of emergentist or generative philosophy, cognitive sciences, and evolutionary psychology, argue that a certain form of determinism (not necessarily causal) is true.

It is evident that observation may disturb the outcome of the observation itself, rendering limited our ability to identify causality. Niels Bohr, one of the main architects of quantum theory, suggested, however, that no connection could be made between indeterminism of nature and freedom of will. Full text on line at us.archive.org.

Determinism is the philosophical view that all events are determined completely by previously existing causes. Deterministic theories throughout the history of philosophy have sprung from diverse and sometimes overlapping motives and considerations. The opposite of determinism is some kind of indeterminism (otherwise called nondeterminism) or randomness. Determinism is often contrasted with free will.

The task of the metaphysical libertarian is to reconcile free will with indeterminism Libertarianism is one of the main philosophical positions related to the problems of free will and determinism which are part of the larger domain of metaphysics.Strawson, Galen (1998, 2004). Free will . In E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

He calls such hypothetical particles "space invaders". John D. Norton has suggested another indeterministic scenario, known as Norton's Dome, where a particle is initially situated on the exact apex of a dome.Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Causal Determinism Branching space-time is a theory uniting indeterminism and the special theory of relativity. The idea was originated by Nuel Belnap.

In Substance and Function (1910), he writes about late nineteenth-century developments in physics including relativity theory and the foundations of mathematics. In Einstein's Theory of Relativity (1921) he defended the claim that modern physics supports a neo- Kantian conception of knowledge. He also wrote a book about Quantum mechanics called Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics (1936).

"Essay, 16 The Consequence Argument and the Mind Argument are the two horns in the classic dilemma and standard argument against free will. If determinism is true, our actions are not free. If indeterminism is true, our actions are random and our will can not be morally responsible for them. Van Inwagen concludes that "Free Will Remains a Mystery.

Graves has a bachelor's degree in liberal arts from St. John's College, Annapolis, Maryland. She did graduate work in philosophy at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. She co-authored "Is indeterminism the source of the statistical character of evolutionary theory?" in the Philosophy of Science and wrote "Transgressive traditions and art definitions" for the Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism.

Fate generally implies there is a set course that cannot be deviated from, and over which one has no control. Fate is related to determinism, but makes no specific claim of physical determinism. Even with physical indeterminism an event could still be fated externally (see for instance theological determinism). Destiny likewise is related to determinism, but makes no specific claim of physical determinism.

He maintains that incompatibilism is false because, even if indeterminism is true, incompatibilists have not provided, and cannot provide, an adequate account of origination. He rejects compatibilism because it, like incompatibilism, assumes a single, fundamental notion of freedom. There are really two notions of freedom: voluntary action and origination. Both notions are required to explain freedom of will and responsibility.

Mark Balaguer, in his book Free Will as an Open Scientific ProblemNotre Dame Reviews: Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem argues similarly to Kane. He believes that, conceptually, free will requires indeterminism, and the question of whether the brain behaves indeterministically is open to further empirical research. He has also written on this matter "A Scientifically Reputable Version of Indeterministic Libertarian Free Will".

Instead, due to sensitivity to initial conditions, unstable systems can only be explained statistically, that is, in terms of probability. Prigogine asserts that Newtonian physics has now been "extended" three times, first with the use of the wave function in quantum mechanics, then with the introduction of spacetime in general relativity and finally with the recognition of indeterminism in the study of unstable systems.

Yet another variation operates diachronically. Emergentists of this type believe that genuinely novel properties can come into being, without being accountable in terms of the preceding history of the universe. (Contrast with indeterminism where it is only the arrangement or configuration of matter that is unaccountable). These evolution-inspired theories often have a theological aspect, as in the process philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne.

Henosis, or primordial unity, is rational and deterministic, emanating from indeterminism an uncaused cause. Each individual as a microcosm reflects the gradual ordering of the universe referred to as the macrocosm. In mimicking the demiurge (divine mind), one unites with The One or Monad. Thus the process of unification, of "The Being" and "The One," is called henosis, the culmination of which is deification.

Ben-Menahem addresses several controversial issues in the history and philosophy of quantum mechanics. She analyses the relation between quantum nonlocality and indeterminism, arguing that the payoff relation between these characteristics secures the compatibility of quantum mechanics with the special theory of relativity. She takes issue with the common understanding of the PBR theorem and with the received account of Schrödinger's position and the Bohr-Einstein controversy.

This will require us to modify our theories, but not abandon them. For example, at the start of the 20th century physics was largely deterministic. But when scientists began studying the quantum mechanics they realized that indeterminism and chance play a role in our universe. Both classical physics and quantum mechanics are correct and work well within their own bailiwick, and continue to be taught to students.

Tse argues that the human brain realizes both types (3) and (2) free will, whereas other animals, such as a tiger, realize type (2) only. As such, Tse is an incompatibilist regarding definitions (2) and (3), and a compatibilist regarding definition (1). He believes indeterminism is the case, so falls in the camp of Free Will Libertarianism along with philosophers such as Robert Kane.

Free volition is regarded as a particular kind of complex, high-level process with an element of indeterminism. An example of this kind of approach has been developed by Robert Kane, where he hypothesizes that, Although at the time quantum mechanics (and physical indeterminism) was only in the initial stages of acceptance, in his book Miracles: A preliminary study C. S. Lewis stated the logical possibility that if the physical world were proved indeterministic this would provide an entry point to describe an action of a non-physical entity on physical reality. Indeterministic physical models (particularly those involving quantum indeterminacy) introduce random occurrences at an atomic or subatomic level. These events might affect brain activity, and could seemingly allow incompatibilist free will if the apparent indeterminacy of some mental processes (for instance, subjective perceptions of control in conscious volition) map to the underlying indeterminacy of the physical construct.

This argument can be traced back to David Hume. If physical indeterminism is true, then those events that are not determined are scientifically described as probabilistic or random. It is therefore argued that it is doubtful that one can praise or blame someone for performing an action generated randomly by his nervous system (without there being any non-physical agency responsible for the observed probabilistic outcome).Hume, D. (1740).

Even with physical indeterminism an event could still be destined to occur. Destiny implies there is a set course that cannot be deviated from, but does not of itself make any claim with respect to the setting of that course (i.e., it does not necessarily conflict with incompatibilist free will). Free will if existent could be the mechanism by which that destined outcome is chosen (determined to represent destiny).

Instability resists standard deterministic explanation. Instead, due to sensitivity to initial conditions, unstable systems can only be explained statistically, that is, in terms of probability. Prigogine asserts that Newtonian physics has now been "extended" three times: first with the introduction of spacetime in general relativity, then with the use of the wave function in quantum mechanics, and finally with the recognition of indeterminism in the study of unstable systems (chaos theory).

As mentioned above, Einstein's position underwent significant modifications over the course of the years. In the first stage, Einstein refused to accept quantum indeterminism and sought to demonstrate that the principle of indeterminacy could be violated, suggesting ingenious thought experiments which should permit the accurate determination of incompatible variables, such as position and velocity, or to explicitly reveal simultaneously the wave and the particle aspects of the same process.

Tychism () is a thesis proposed by the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce that holds that absolute chance, or indeterminism, is a real factor operative in the universe. This doctrine forms a central part of Peirce's comprehensive evolutionary cosmology. It may be considered both the direct opposite of Albert Einstein's oft quoted dictum that: "God does not play dice with the universe" and an early philosophical anticipation of Werner Heisenberg's uncertainty principle.

An example of this approach is that of Robert Kane, where he hypothesizes that "in each case, the indeterminism is functioning as a hindrance or obstacle to her realizing one of her purposes – a hindrance or obstacle in the form of resistance within her will which must be overcome by effort." According to Robert Kane such "ultimate responsibility" is a required condition for free will. An important factor in such a theory is that the agent cannot be reduced to physical neuronal events, but rather mental processes are said to provide an equally valid account of the determination of outcome as their physical processes (see non-reductive physicalism). Although at the time quantum mechanics (and physical indeterminism) was only in the initial stages of acceptance, in his book Miracles: A preliminary study C.S. Lewis stated the logical possibility that if the physical world were proved indeterministic this would provide an entry point to describe an action of a non-physical entity on physical reality.

Since the growth of human knowledge is a causal factor in the evolution of human history, and since "no society can predict, scientifically, its own future states of knowledge",The Poverty of Historicism, p. 21 it follows, he argued, that there can be no predictive science of human history. For Popper, metaphysical and historical indeterminism go hand in hand. In his early years Popper was impressed by Marxism, whether of Communists or socialists.

Philippa Foot is one who misquoted Hobart's title, but who had the same misgivings about determinism. In 1957 she wrote an article in The Philosophical Review entitled "Free Will As Involving Determinism." Nevertheless, she criticized arguments that free will requires indeterminism, and in particular the idea that one could not be held responsible for "chance" actions chosen for no particular reason. Her article begins with the observation that determinism has become widely accepted as compatible with free will.

Philosophical questions and also points of contact with literary fields, such as Gertrude Stein and Franz Kafka but also John Cage and Morton Feldman foreshadow the territories Tomas Schmit has dealt with in the area of language and signs. They are: indeterminism, chaos and order, aleatory principle and open form. Altogether, the works of Tomas Schmit comprise more posed questions than given answers. The conversations well reflect this open form, which shows the state of flux of things.

Non-causal accounts of incompatibilist free will do not require a free action to be caused by either an agent or a physical event. They either rely upon a world that is not causally closed, or physical indeterminism. Non-causal accounts often claim that each intentional action requires a choice or volition – a willing, trying, or endeavoring on behalf of the agent (such as the cognitive component of lifting one's arm). Such intentional actions are interpreted as free actions.

In his essay "Determinism, Indeterminism, and Libertarianism", Broad argued for non-occurrent causation as "literally determined by the agent or self." The agent could be considered as a substance or continuant, and not by a total cause which contains as factors events in and dispositions of the agent. Thus, our efforts would be completely determined, but their causes would not be prior events. New series of events would then originate, which he called "continuants," which are essentially causa sui.

In his later years, his work concentrated on the fundamental role of indeterminism in nonlinear systems on both the classical and quantum level. Prigogine and coworkers proposed a Liouville space extension of quantum mechanics. A Liouville space is the vector space formed by the set of (self- adjoint) linear operators, equipped with an inner product, that act on a Hilbert space.Gregg Jaeger: Quantum Information: An Overview, Springer, 2007, , Chapter B.3 "Lioville space and open quantum systems", p.

To cut it short, if it was always that "we choose a chance", then there would be determinism (for "we", "we ourselves" means: our will and its filtering and determining capabilities). And since it happens otherwise ("a chance chooses us"), then there is indeterminism. But the latter case means we have no will in a topic, i.e. it is at that time morally indifferent to us, adiaphora, not opposed to anything (and therefore even more there is no guilt).

This literary meaning of indeterminacy is often associated with deconstruction, the post-structuralist theory propounded by Jacques Derrida, and is best described as "a philosophically sceptical approach to the possibility of coherent meaning in language". (Baldick 2008, p. 1 of 1) However, Royle (1995, p. 46) quotes Derrida as saying "I do not believe I have ever spoken of 'indeterminacy', whether in regard to 'meaning' or anything else... deconstruction should never lead either to relativism or to any sort of indeterminism".

Specifically, indeterminism does not say that no events are guaranteed or connected to previous events; instead, it says that some events are not guaranteed – some events are up to chance. In James’ model of free will, choice is deterministic, determined by the person making it, and it “follows casually from one’s character, values, and especially feelings and desires at the moment of decision.” Chance, on the other hand, is indeterministic, and pertains to possibilities that could happen but are not guaranteed.

The first part of the book goes through the familiar territory of the scientist's 'Standard Model' of the universe from the Big Bang to the development of human life on Earth. Whilst discussing these the book gives an overview of quantum theory and indeterminism, which Polkinghorn believes represent a challenge to metaphysical naturalism. The book asserts that aspects of human experiences cannot be reduced to physics and biology. The remaining chapters consider core Christian beliefs, New Testament history and how they fit into this perspective.

In 1982 at Stanford Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences, and in 1996 at Leipzig, Centrum für Höhere Studien with Heirich Wansing. He was a founding member of the Society for Exact Philosophy, which collaborated with Canadians such as Mario Bunge. Belnap has served as referee for many academic papers.N. Belnap (2014) "Biographical Interview", pages 377 to 409 in Belnap on Indeterminism and Free Action, Thomas Müller editor, Springer books He was elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2008.

Current physical theories cannot resolve the question of whether determinism is true of the world, being very far from a potential Theory of Everything, and open to many different interpretations. Assuming that an indeterministic interpretation of quantum mechanics is correct, one may still object that such indeterminism is for all practical purposes confined to microscopic phenomena. This is not always the case: many macroscopic phenomena are based on quantum effects. For instance, some hardware random number generators work by amplifying quantum effects into practically usable signals.

A more significant question is whether the indeterminism of quantum mechanics allows for the traditional idea of free will (based on a perception of free will). If a person's action is, however, only a result of complete quantum randomness, mental processes as experienced have no influence on the probabilistic outcomes (such as volition). According to many interpretations, non-determinism enables free will to exist, while others assert the opposite (because the action was not controllable by the physical being who claims to possess the free will).

Kane responds that the difference between causal indeterminism and compatibilism is "ultimate control — the originative control exercised by agents when it is 'up to them' which of a set of possible choices or actions will now occur, and up to no one and nothing else over which the agents themselves do not also have control".Kane: "Free Will" in Free Will, p. 243. UR assures that the sufficient conditions for one's actions do not lie before one's own birth. In his book defending compatibilism, Freedom Evolves, Daniel Dennett spends a chapter criticising Kane's theory.

115 Compton welcomed the rise of indeterminism in 20th century science, writing: > In my own thinking on this vital subject I am in a much more satisfied state > of mind than I could have been at any earlier stage of science. If the > statements of the laws of physics were assumed correct, one would have had > to suppose (as did most philosophers) that the feeling of freedom is > illusory, or if [free] choice were considered effective, that the laws of > physics ... [were] unreliable. The dilemma has been an uncomfortable > one.

In his essay Of Clouds and Clocks, included in his book Objective Knowledge, Popper contrasted "clouds", his metaphor for indeterministic systems, with "clocks", meaning deterministic ones. He sided with indeterminism, writing > I believe Peirce was right in holding that all clocks are clouds to some > considerable degree — even the most precise of clocks. This, I think, is the > most important inversion of the mistaken determinist view that all clouds > are clocksPopper, K: Of Clouds and Cuckoos, included in Objective Knowledge, > revised, 1978, p215. Popper was also a promoter of propensity probability.

The Journal of Philosophy: Time and Physical Geometry Depending on your philosophy of mathematics, since special relativity is a continuous mathematical model, the experimental confirmation of predicted effects described by the possibly fictional and conceptually-reliable-and-informative theory have implications for an ontology of time, which touches on the metaphysics of time which is intimately tied up with notions of causality and reasoning about cause and effect. Markosian, Ed. (2014). Sanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Time. . And the (for now) indeterminism of quantum physics suggests the possibility of free will in a deterministic reality.

Einstein also believed that underlying quantum mechanics must be a theory that thoroughly and directly expresses the rule against action at a distance; in other words, he insisted on the principle of locality. He considered, but rejected on theoretical grounds, a particular proposal for hidden variables to obviate the indeterminism or acausality of quantum mechanical measurement. He believed that quantum mechanics was a currently valid but not a permanently definitive theory for quantum phenomena. He thought its future replacement would require profound conceptual advances, and would not come quickly or easily.

9 Deterministic economic models have been extensively formalized; they assume full knowledge of inputs, outputs, and existing technologies. (...) Predispositioning (...) exhibits less complete linkages between system's elements than programming but more complete than chaos.” Katsenelinboigen, Aron. The Concept of Indeterminism and Its Applications: Economics, Social Systems, Ethics, Artificial Intelligence, and Aesthetics Praeger: Westport, Connecticut, 1997}} Methods like programming and randomness are well-known and developed while the methodology for the intermediate stages lying between complete chaos and complete order as well as their philosophical conceptualization have never been discussed explicitly and no methods of their measurements were elaborated.

Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York: The Free Press, 1978), 23. As a human being's actions cannot always be predicted, the same can be said of where a tree's roots will grow, or how an electron will move, or whether it will rain tomorrow. Moreover, inability to predict an electron's movement (for instance) is not due to faulty understanding or inadequate technology; rather, the fundamental creativity/freedom of all entities means that there will always remain phenomena that are unpredictable.Charles Hartshorne, "Freedom Requires Indeterminism and Universal Causality", The Journal of Philosophy 55 (1958): 794.

I could have willed whichever > way I pleased. I had the power to will otherwise, there was nothing to > prevent my doing so, and I should have done so if I had wanted.Mind, p.9 Hobart finds fault with the indeterminist's position, but he gives the typical overstatement by a determinist critic, that any chance will be the direct cause of our actions, which of course would clearly be a loss of freedom and responsibility > Indeterminism maintains that we need not be impelled to action by our > wishes, that our active will need not be determined by them.

If x is a sufficient cause of y, then the presence of y implies that x may have preceded it. (However, another cause z may alternatively cause y. Thus the presence of y does not imply the presence of x, or z, or any other suspect.) It is possible for everything to have a necessary cause, even while indeterminism holds and the future is open, because a necessary condition does not lead to a single inevitable effect. Indeterministic (or probabilistic) causation is a proposed possibility, such that "everything has a cause" is not a clear statement of determinism.

Popper, 1978, citing, Henry Pemberton's A View of Sir Isaac Newton's Philosophy Classical chaos is not usually considered an example of indeterminism, as it can occur in deterministic systems such as the three-body problem. John Earman has argued that most physical theories are indeterministic.Earman, J. Determinism: What We Have Learned, and What We Still Don't KnowThe Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Causal Determinism For instance, Newtonian physics admits solutions where particles accelerate continuously, heading out towards infinity. By the time reversibility of the laws in question, particles could also head inwards, unprompted by any pre-existing state.

The selection process is deterministic, although it may be based on earlier preferences established by the same process. Deliberative indeterminism has been referenced by Daniel Dennett and John Martin Fischer. An obvious objection to such a view is that an agent cannot be assigned ownership over their decisions (or preferences used to make those decisions) to any greater degree than that of a compatibilist model. Centred accounts propose that for any given decision between two possibilities, the strength of reason will be considered for each option, yet there is still a probability the weaker candidate will be chosen.

An obvious objection to such a view is that decisions are explicitly left up to chance, and origination or responsibility cannot be assigned for any given decision. Efforts of will theory is related to the role of will power in decision making. It suggests that the indeterminacy of agent volition processes could map to the indeterminacy of certain physical events – and the outcomes of these events could therefore be considered caused by the agent. Models of volition have been constructed in which it is seen as a particular kind of complex, high-level process with an element of physical indeterminism.

Therefore, the consequences of those things (including our present acts) are not up to us."Essay, v Van Inwagen also added what he called the Mind Argument (after the philosophical journal Mind, where such arguments often appeared). "The Mind argument proceeds by identifying indeterminism with chance and by arguing that an act that occurs by chance, if an event that occurs by chance can be called an act, cannot be under the control of its alleged agent and hence cannot have been performed freely. Proponents of [this argument] conclude, therefore, that free will is not only compatible with determinism but entails determinism.

This relationship, however, requires a causative role over probabilities that is questionable, and it is far from established that brain activity responsible for human action can be affected by such events. Secondarily, these incompatibilist models are dependent upon the relationship between action and conscious volition, as studied in the neuroscience of free will. It is evident that observation may disturb the outcome of the observation itself, rendering limited our ability to identify causality. Niels Bohr, one of the main architects of quantum theory, suggested, however, that no connection could be made between indeterminism of nature and freedom of will.

The selection process is deterministic, although it may be based on earlier preferences established by the same process. Deliberative indeterminism has been referenced by Daniel Dennett and John Martin Fischer. An obvious objection to such a view is that an agent cannot be assigned ownership over their decisions (or preferences used to make those decisions) to any greater degree than that of a compatibilist model. Centred accounts propose that for any given decision between two possibilities, the strength of reason will be considered for each option, yet there is still a probability the weaker candidate will be chosen.

An obvious objection to such a view is that decisions are explicitly left up to chance, and origination or responsibility cannot be assigned for any given decision. Efforts of will theory is related to the role of will power in decision making. It suggests that the indeterminacy of agent volition processes could map to the indeterminacy of certain physical events – and the outcomes of these events could therefore be considered caused by the agent. Models of volition have been constructed in which it is seen as a particular kind of complex, high- level process with an element of physical indeterminism.

Kane responds that the difference between causal indeterminism and compatibilism is "ultimate control—the originative control exercised by agents when it is 'up to them' which of a set of possible choices or actions will now occur, and up to no one and nothing else over which the agents themselves do not also have control".Kane: "Free Will" in Free Will, p. 243. UR assures that the sufficient conditions for one's actions do not lie before one's own birth. Galen Strawson holds that there is a fundamental sense in which free will is impossible, whether determinism is true or not.

With use of this function d we can construct two mathematical models, where the second is generated by applying d to proper elements of the first, such that the two models are identical prior to the time t=0, where t is a time function created by a foliation of spacetime, but differ after t=0. These considerations show that, since substantivalism allows the construction of holes, that the universe must, on that view, be indeterministic. Which, Earman argues, is a case against substantivalism, as the case between determinism or indeterminism should be a question of physics, not of our commitment to substantivalism.

Decoding Reality: The Universe as Quantum Information is a popular science book by Vlatko Vedral published by Oxford University Press in 2010. Vedral examines information theory and proposes information as the most fundamental building block of reality. He argues what a useful framework this is for viewing all natural and physical phenomena. In building out this framework the books touches upon the origin of information, the idea of entropy, the roots of this thinking in thermodynamics, the replication of DNA, development of social networks, quantum behaviour at the micro and macro level, and the very role of indeterminism in the universe.

At the time C. S. Lewis wrote Miracles, quantum mechanics (and physical indeterminism) was only in the initial stages of acceptance, but still Lewis stated the logical possibility that, if the physical world was proved to be indeterministic, this would provide an entry (interaction) point into the traditionally viewed closed system, where a scientifically described physically probable/improbable event could be philosophically described as an action of a non-physical entity on physical reality. He states, however, that none of the arguments in his book will rely on this. Although some interpretations of quantum mechanics consider wave function collapse to be indeterminate, in others this event is defined and deterministic.

James called compatibilism a "quagmire of evasion," just as the ideas of Thomas Hobbes and David Hume—that free will was simply freedom from external coercion—were called a "wretched subterfuge" by Immanuel Kant. Indeterminism is “the belief in freedom [which] holds that there is some degree of possibility that is not necessitated by the rest of reality.”Pomerleau, Wayne P. “William James (1842-1910).” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "William James" Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy Article. The word “some” in this definition is crucial in James’ argument because it leaves room for a higher power, as it does not require that all events be random.

APS was founded in 1988 by a group of researchers and scientifically-oriented practitioners who were interested in advancing scientific psychology and its representation at the national and international level. This group felt that the American Psychological Association (APA) was not adequately supporting scientific research because it focused on the practitioner/clinician side of psychology, and had effectively "become a guild". Tensions between the scientists and the practitioners escalated. The two groups had contrasting beliefs about such divisive issues as scientific versus human values, determinism versus indeterminism, objectivism versus intuitionism, laboratory investigations versus field studies, nomothetic versus idiographic explanations, and elementism versus holism (Simonton, 2000).Simonton, D. K. (2000).

Nomological determinism, generally synonymous with physical determinism (its opposite being physical indeterminism), the most common form of causal determinism, is the notion that the past and the present dictate the future entirely and necessarily by rigid natural laws, that every occurrence results inevitably from prior events. Nomological determinism is sometimes illustrated by the thought experiment of Laplace's demon. Laplace posited that an omniscient observer knowing with infinite precision all the positions and velocities of every particle in the universe could predict the future entirely. For a discussion, see Another view of determinism is discussed by Nomological determinism is sometimes called scientific determinism, although that is a misnomer.

The three incompatibilist positions, on the other hand, deny this possibility. The hard incompatibilists hold that free will is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism, the libertarianists that determinism does not hold, and free will might exist, and the hard determinists that determinism does hold and free will does not exist. The Dutch philosopher Baruch Spinoza was a determinist thinker, and argued that human freedom can be achieved through knowledge of the causes that determine our desire and affections. He defined human servitude as the state of bondage of the man who is aware of his own desires, but ignorant of the causes that determined him.

An example of this approach is that of Robert Kane, where he hypothesizes that "in each case, the indeterminism is functioning as a hindrance or obstacle to her realizing one of her purposes – a hindrance or obstacle in the form of resistance within her will which must be overcome by effort." According to Robert Kane such "ultimate responsibility" is a required condition for free will. An important factor in such a theory is that the agent cannot be reduced to physical neuronal events, but rather mental processes are said to provide an equally valid account of the determination of outcome as their physical processes (see non-reductive physicalism).

Per its mathematical formulation, quantum mechanics is non-deterministic, meaning that it generally does not predict the outcome of any measurement with certainty. Instead, it indicates what the probabilities of the outcomes are, with the indeterminism of observable quantities constrained by the uncertainty principle. The question arises whether there might be some deeper reality hidden beneath quantum mechanics, to be described by a more fundamental theory that can always predict the outcome of each measurement with certainty: if the exact properties of every subatomic particle were known the entire system could be modeled exactly using deterministic physics similar to classical physics. In other words, it is conceivable that quantum mechanics is an incomplete description of nature.

Charlie Dunbar Broad (30 December 1887 – 11 March 1971), usually cited as C. D. Broad, was an English epistemologist, historian of philosophy, philosopher of science, moral philosopher, and writer on the philosophical aspects of psychical research. He was known for his thorough and dispassionate examinations of arguments in such works as Scientific Thought (1923), The Mind and Its Place in Nature (1925), and Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy (2 vols., 1933–1938). Broad's essay on "Determinism, Indeterminism, and Libertarianism" in Ethics and the History of Philosophy (1952) introduced the philosophical terms occurrent causation and non-occurrent causation, which became the basis for the contemporary distinction between "agent-causal" and "event-causal" in debates on libertarian free will.

Brungardt (2016), pp. 1–24. Over the course of his career, De Koninck published articles addressing overlapping issues in classical Aristotelian and Thomistic philosophy and quantum indeterminism, the biological sciences, the foundation of mathematical physics, and the philosophy of mathematics. The most accessible introduction to his thought in the philosophy of nature and science are his Whidden Lectures of 1959, published as a collection titled The Hollow Universe. In the three lectures, De Koninck addresses the philosophical foundations, content, and implications of three modern scientific inquiries: modern mathematics ("The World of Symbolic Construction, or Two is One Twice Over"), physics ("Mental Construction and the Test of Experience"), and biology ("The Lifeless World of Biology").

According to this idea, atoms, as they are travelling through space, may deviate slightly from the course they would ordinarily be expected to follow. Epicurus's reason for introducing this doctrine was because he wanted to preserve the concepts of free will and ethical responsibility while still maintaining the deterministic physical model of atomism. Lucretius describes it, saying, "It is this slight deviation of primal bodies, at indeterminate times and places, which keeps the mind as such from experiencing an inner compulsion in doing everything it does and from being forced to endure and suffer like a captive in chains." Epicurus was first to assert human freedom as a result of the fundamental indeterminism in the motion of atoms.

Explanations of libertarianism that do not involve dispensing with physicalism require physical indeterminism, such as probabilistic subatomic particle behavior – a theory unknown to many of the early writers on free will. Physical determinism, under the assumption of physicalism, implies there is only one possible future and is therefore not compatible with libertarian free will. Some libertarian explanations involve invoking panpsychism, the theory that a quality of mind is associated with all particles, and pervades the entire universe, in both animate and inanimate entities. Other approaches do not require free will to be a fundamental constituent of the universe; ordinary randomness is appealed to as supplying the "elbow room" believed to be necessary by libertarians.

In philosophy, accidentalism denies the causal closure of physical determinism and maintains that events can succeed one another haphazardly or by chance (not in the mathematical but in the popular sense). Opponents of accidentalism maintain that what seems to be a chance occurrence is actually the result of one or more causes that remain unknown due only to a lack of investigation. Charles Sanders Peirce used the term tychism (from τύχη, chance) for theories that make chance an objective factor in the process of the Universe. In ethics the term is used, like indeterminism, to denote the theory that mental change cannot always be ascribed to previously ascertained psychological states, and that volition is not causally related to the motives involved.

In his discussion on free will (as an attempt to mediate between determinism and indeterminism) he categorically distinguishes between two perspectives: there is indeed a natural causality of brain processes, though conscious processes are not determined by an intelligible, but by the empirical character of humans – volitional acts are subject to the principles of mental causality. "When a man only follows inner causality he acts freely in an ethical sense, which is partly determined by his original disposition and partly by the development of his character."Wundt: Ethik, 1886, p. 410. On the one hand, Ethics is a normative discipline while, on the other hand, these ‘rules’ change, as can be seen from the empirical examination of culture-related morality.

Karl Popper discusses de La Mettrie's claim in relation to evolution and quantum mechanics. > "Yet the doctrine that man is a machine was argued most forcefully in 1751, > long before the theory of evolution became generally accepted, by de La > Mettrie; and the theory of evolution gave the problem an even sharper edge, > by suggesting there may be no clear distinction between living matter and > dead matter. And, in spite of the victory of the new quantum theory, and the > conversion of so many physicists to indeterminism de La Mettrie's doctrine > that man is a machine has perhaps more defenders than before among > physicists, biologists and philosophers; especially in the form of the > thesis that man is a computer."Popper, K.: Of Clouds and Clocks, included in > Objective Knowledge, revised, 1978, p. 224.

Kane is one of several philosophers and scientists to propose a two-stage model of free will. The American philosopher William James was the first (in 1884). Others include the French mathematician and scientist Henri Poincaré (about 1906), the physicist Arthur Holly Compton (1931, 1955), the philosopher Karl Popper (1965, 1977), the physicist and philosopher Henry Margenau (1968, 1982), the philosopher Daniel Dennett (1978), the classicists A. A. Long and David Sedley (1987), the philosopher Alfred Mele (1995), and most recently, the neurogeneticist and biologist Martin Heisenberg (2009), son of the physicist Werner Heisenberg, whose quantum indeterminacy principle lies at the foundation of indeterministic physics.Two-stage models of free will Kane's model goes beyond Daniel Dennett's by trying to keep indeterminism as late as possible in the process of deliberation, indeed as late as the decision itself in the SFAs (Self-Forming Actions).

Non-deterministic behavior in wave function collapse is not only a feature of the Copenhagen interpretation, with its observer-dependence, but also of objective collapse and other theories. Opponents of quantum indeterminism suggested that determinism could be restored by formulating a new theory in which additional information, so-called hidden variables ,Cosmos Magazine: How Much Free Will Do We Have would allow definite outcomes to be determined. For instance, in 1935, Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen wrote a paper titled "Can Quantum- Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be Considered Complete?" arguing that such a theory was in fact necessary to preserve the principle of locality. In 1964, John S. Bell was able to define a theoretical test for these local hidden variable theories, which was reformulated as a workable experimental test through the work of Clauser, Horne, Shimony and Holt.

Neuroscientists such as Bjoern Brembs and Christof Koch believe thermodynamically stochastic processes in the brain are the basis of free will, and that even very simple organisms such as flies have a form of free will.BBC Science: Free Will Similar in Animals, Humans—But Not So Free Similar ideas are put forward by some philosophers such as Robert Kane. Despite recognizing indeterminism to be a very low-level, necessary prerequisite, Bjoern Brembs says that it's not even close to being sufficient for addressing things like morality and responsibility. Edward O. Wilson does not extrapolate from bugs to people, and Corina E. Tarnita alerts against trying to draw parallels between people and insects, since human selflessness and cooperation, however, is of a different sort, also involving the interaction of culture and sentience, not just genetics and environment.

The neural code: Tse argues that thinking of the neural code as one where neural spikes trigger neural spikes, much like billiard balls triggering motion in other billiard balls, is misleading and incomplete. He argues that the neural code is in fact as much a synaptic reweighting (i.e. informational reparameterization) code as it is a code based on neural spikes or action potentials. Tse argues that criterial causation offers a middle path between the extremes of determinism, where one's decisions and their consequences were ‘set in stone’ ages before one was even born, and informationally uncontrained indeterminism, where decisions happen randomly, for no reason at all. He argues that David Hume was wrong when he wrote “tis impossible to admit of any medium betwixt chance and an absolute necessity.” The middle path between the two is afforded by criterial causation.

Tismăneanu & Vasile, pp.70, 92–93 Formally acknowledged as Chișinevschi's closest collaborator, a member of the central committee from 1948, and head of the Agitprop from 1956, Leonte Răutu is widely regarded as the dictator of Romanian cultural life until the death of party leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu- Dej.Tismăneanu & Vasile, pp.27–34, 38–39, 44–45, 109–111, 115, 445 His credentials came from the communist essay Împotriva cosmopolitismului și obiectivismului burghez în științele sociale ("Against Cosmopolitanism and Bourgeois Objectivism in Social Science"), published by the party press and Lupta de Clasă journal in 1949. This work introduced Romanians to historical materialism and a partiinost' analysis of cultural or scientific matters, borrowing Soviet criticism of "bourgeois pseudoscience": against genetics, neo-Malthusianism, Indeterminism, and in large part against "cosmopolitan" social thinkers (Ernest Bevin, Léon Blum, Harold Laski).Tismăneanu & Vasile, pp.

The book received mixed reviews from the philosopher Raziel Abelson in Commentary and the philosopher Paul Feyerabend in the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, and a negative review from William Gilman in The Nation. Ayer described the book as a well-written work that avoided being overly technical, should have wide appeal, and was an "important contribution toward the essential task of building a bridge between philosophy and science." He credited Nagel with providing a diverse range of examples in his discussion of scientific explanation, and considered his views about geometry and physics, while not novel, to be "sensible and convincing"; he complimented Nagel for his discussion of history and the social sciences, and praised his discussion of "the question of causality and indeterminism." However, he was not fully satisfied by Nagel's discussion of the distinction between a scientific law and a "generalization of fact".

James described chance as neither hard nor soft determinism, but "indeterminism": > The stronghold of the determinist argument is the antipathy to the idea of > chance...This notion of alternative possibility, this admission that any one > of several things may come to pass is, after all, only a roundabout name for > chance. James asked the students to consider his choice for walking home from Lowell Lecture Hall after his talk: > What is meant by saying that my choice of which way to walk home after the > lecture is ambiguous and matter of chance?...It means that both Divinity > Avenue and Oxford Street are called but only one, and that one either one, > shall be chosen. With this simple example, James laid out a two-stage decision process with chance in a present time of random alternatives, leading to a choice of one possibility that transforms an ambiguous future into a simple unalterable past.

More or less, all interpretations of quantum mechanics share two qualities: # They interpret a formalism—a set of equations and principles to generate predictions via input of initial conditions # They interpret a phenomenology—a set of observations, including those obtained by empirical research and those obtained informally, such as humans' experience of an unequivocal world Two qualities vary among interpretations: # Ontology—claims about what things, such as categories and entities, exist in the world # Epistemology—claims about the possibility, scope, and means toward relevant knowledge of the world In philosophy of science, the distinction of knowledge versus reality is termed epistemic versus ontic. A general law is a regularity of outcomes (epistemic), whereas a causal mechanism may regulate the outcomes (ontic). A phenomenon can receive interpretation either ontic or epistemic. For instance, indeterminism may be attributed to limitations of human observation and perception (epistemic), or may be explained as a real existing maybe encoded in the universe (ontic).

Also at the Fifth Solvay Congress, Max Born and Werner Heisenberg made a presentation summarizing the recent tremendous theoretical development of quantum mechanics. At the conclusion of the presentation, they declared: > [W]hile we consider ... a quantum mechanical treatment of the > electromagnetic field ... as not yet finished, we consider quantum mechanics > to be a closed theory, whose fundamental physical and mathematical > assumptions are no longer susceptible of any modification.... On the > question of the 'validity of the law of causality' we have this opinion: as > long as one takes into account only experiments that lie in the domain of > our currently acquired physical and quantum mechanical experience, the > assumption of indeterminism in principle, here taken as fundamental, agrees > with experience.Max Born and Werner Heisenberg, "Quantum mechanics", > proceedings of the Fifth Solvay Congress. Although there is no record of Einstein responding to Born and Heisenberg during the technical sessions of the Fifth Solvay Congress, he did challenge the completeness of quantum mechanics during informal discussions over meals, presenting a thought experiment intended to demonstrate that quantum mechanics could not be entirely correct.

Hard incompatibilism is the idea that free will cannot exist, whether the world is deterministic or not. Derk Pereboom has defended hard incompatibilism, identifying a variety of positions where free will is irrelevant to indeterminism/determinism, among them the following: :#Determinism (D) is true, D does not imply we lack free will (F), but in fact we do lack F. :#D is true, D does not imply we lack F, but in fact we don't know if we have F. :#D is true, and we do have F. :#D is true, we have F, and F implies D. :#D is unproven, but we have F. :#D isn't true, we do have F, and would have F even if D were true. :#D isn't true, we don't have F, but F is compatible with D. ::::::Derk Pereboom, Living without Free Will, p. xvi. Pereboom calls positions 3 and 4 soft determinism, position 1 a form of hard determinism, position 6 a form of classical libertarianism, and any position that includes having F as compatibilism.