I mean, philosophers call these second order volitions as opposed to just first order volitions.
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While they're trying to be like TV, or trying to be like films, or trying to be anything but formed of game-makers' own, proud, confident volitions, great video games will struggle to be made.
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Higher-order volitions (or higher-order desire), as opposed to action- determining volitions, are volitions about volitions. Higher-order volitions are potentially more often guided by long-term convictions and reasoning. A first-order volition is a desire about anything else, such as to own a new car, to meet the pope, or to drink alcohol. Second-order volition are desires about desires, or to desire to change the process, the how, of desiring.
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Saṃskāra or Saṅkhāra in Buddhism refers to mental "dispositions".David Kalupahana, "A History of Buddhist Philosophy." University of Hawaii Press, 1992, page 71. These result from past volitions, and are causes of future volitions.
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Sue Hamilton, Identity and Experience. LUZAC Oriental, 1996, page 107. Thinking is closely associated with volitions, because mental activity is one of the ways that volitions manifest themselves: "Having willed, one acts through body, speech, and thoughts."Sue Hamilton, Identity and Experience.
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Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. p.543 In essence, Kant is saying that Reason is outside of the causative elements of the natural world and as such is not subject to the law of cause and effect. Hence, for Kant, Reason needs no prior explanation for any of its choices or volitions. Ryle's assumption is that all volitions are physicalistic processes and thus subject to cause and effect.
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If such is the case, then Ryle would be correct in his regress. However, if some volitions are not subject to cause and effect, per Kant, then Ryle's regress fails.
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Examples would be desires to want to own a new car; to want to meet the pope; or to want to quit drinking alcohol permanently. A higher-order volition can go unfulfilled due to uncontrolled lower-order volitions. An example for a failure to follow higher-order volitions is the drug addict who takes drugs even though they would like to quit taking drugs. According to Harry Frankfurt the drug addict has established free will when their higher-order volition to stop wanting drugs determines the precedence of their changing, action- determining desires either to take drugs or not to take drugs.
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Sue Hamilton, Identity and Experience. LUZAC Oriental, 1996, page 112. One's mindset can be out of tune with one's desires or aspirations. In that it reflects the volitions, the citta is said to go off with a will of its own if not properly controlled.
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There is thus the need for the meditative integration of personality to provide a greater, more wholesome consistency.Peter Harvey, The Selfless Mind. Curzon Press, 1995, page 114. Regarding volitions, there is a similarity between viññāna and citta; they are both associated with the qualitative condition of a human being.
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In the Tenth Elucidation, for instance, Malebranche introduced his theory of "intelligible extension", a single, archetypal idea of extension into which the ideas of all particular kinds of bodies could be jointly resolved. In others, Malebranche placed a greater emphasis than he had previously done on his occasionalist account of causation, and particularly on his contention that God acted for the most part through "general volitions" and only rarely, as in the case of miracles, through "particular volitions". Malebranche expanded on this last point in 1680 when he published Treatise on Nature and Grace. Here, he made it explicit that the generality of the laws whereby God regulated His behaviour extended not only to His activity in the natural world but also applied to His gift of grace to human beings.
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Sue Hamilton, Identity and Experience. LUZAC Oriental, 1996, page 112. Citta is therefore closely related to volitions; this connection is also etymological, as citta comes from the same verbal root in Pali as the active terms meaning "to will".Sue Hamilton, Identity and Experience. LUZAC Oriental, 1996, page 112. Citta also reflects one's cognitive condition/progress.Sue Hamilton, Identity and Experience.
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Porter was elected Deputy Speaker instead. While both Chief Minister Katy Gallagher and Opposition Leader Zed Seselja retained their positions following the outcome of this election, neither lasted in their positions to lead their respective parties at the next election in 2016 as both remarkably resigned from their positions of their own volitions and from the territory Parliament to move to the Federal Parliament as the two Senators representing the ACT.
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The complex causal nexus of volitions (or intentions) which one experiences continuously conditions one's thoughts, speech, and actions. One's state of mind at any given time reflects that complex; thus, the causal origin of actions, speech, and thoughts is sometimes associated with the state of mind (citta), in a manner of speaking. This does not mean that it is that causal nexus; it is better understood as an abstract reflection.
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The discursive activities of the cognitive process are rather the function of saññā, together with "reasoning" and "making manifold". This suggests that the "thinking" done by manas is more closely linked to volition than to the discursive processes associated with apperception. Manas is mainly the mental activity which follows from volitions, whether immediately, or separated by time and caused by the activation of a latent tendency.Sue Hamilton, Identity and Experience.
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In his best known work, Politics And Markets (1977), Lindblom notes the "Privileged position of business in Polyarchy". He also introduces the concept of "circularity", or "controlled volitions" where "even in the democracies, masses are persuaded to ask from elites only what elites wish to give them." Thus any real choices and competition are limited. Worse still, any development of alternative choices or even any serious discussion and consideration of them is effectively discouraged.
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Epiphenomenalism is a form of property dualism, in which it is asserted that one or more mental states do not have any influence on physical states (both ontologically and causally irreducible). It asserts that while material causes give rise to sensations, volitions, ideas, etc., such mental phenomena themselves cause nothing further: they are causal dead-ends. This can be contrasted to interactionism, on the other hand, in which mental causes can produce material effects, and vice versa.
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In mathematics, intuitionism is a program of methodological reform whose motto is that "there are no non-experienced mathematical truths" (L. E. J. Brouwer). From this springboard, intuitionists seek to reconstruct what they consider to be the corrigible portion of mathematics in accordance with Kantian concepts of being, becoming, intuition, and knowledge. Brouwer, the founder of the movement, held that mathematical objects arise from the a priori forms of the volitions that inform the perception of empirical objects.
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K. Ramakrishna Rao, V. Gowri Rammohan New Frontiers of Human Science: A Festschrift for K. Ramakrishna Rao 2002, p. 54 The psychical researcher Ralph Noyes (1998) published an article discussing the theories of Price and attempted to update them with recent finds in parapsychology. Noyes proposed that the mental world of Price is a "psychosphere" which he defined as a "vast and complex cauldron of ideas, memories, volitions, desires and all the other furniture of conscious experience and unconscious mental functioning".
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In the sutra, Avalokiteśvara addresses Śariputra, explaining the fundamental emptiness (śūnyatā) of all phenomena, known through and as the five aggregates of human existence (skandhas): form (rūpa), feeling (vedanā), volitions (saṅkhāra), perceptions (saṃjñā), and consciousness (vijñāna). Avalokiteśvara famously states, "Form is Emptiness (śūnyatā). Emptiness is Form", and declares the other skandhas to be equally empty—that is, dependently originated. Avalokiteśvara then goes through some of the most fundamental Buddhist teachings such as the Four Noble Truths, and explains that in emptiness none of these notions apply.
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Nicolas Malebranche, one of Hume's philosophical opponents By "necessary connection", Hume means the power or force which necessarily ties one idea to another. He rejects the notion that any sensible qualities are necessarily conjoined, since that would mean we could know something prior to experience. Unlike his predecessors, Berkeley and Locke, Hume rejects the idea that volitions or impulses of the will may be inferred to necessarily connect to the actions they produce by way of some sense of the power of the will. He reasons that, 1.
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Among philosophers, he was for a time best known for his interpretation of Descartes's rationalism. His most influential work, however, has been on freedom of the will (on which he has written numerous important papersFeinberg; Shafer-Landau: Reason & Responsibility, p. 486.) based on his concept of higher-order volitions and for developing what are known as "Frankfurt cases" or "Frankfurt counterexamples" (i.e., thought experiments designed to show the possibility of situations in which a person could not have done other than he/she did, but in which our intuition is to say nonetheless that this feature of the situation does not prevent that person from being morally responsible).
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Action is the purposive use of chosen means for the attainment of chosen ends, and ideas, beliefs, and judgments of value (called mental phenomena) determine the choice of both means and ends.Mises. (2008). Human action: A treatise on economics, pp. 11-3. Thus, these mental phenomena occupy a central position in the sciences of human action for, as Mises argues, “acts of choosing are determined by thoughts and ideas.”Theory and history, p. 11. In arguing for methodological dualism, Mises states because the natural sciences have not yet determined “how definite external events […] produce within the human mind definite ideas, value judgments, and volitions”,Mises. (1962).
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Ancient science has been described as having gotten off to a good start, then faltered. The doctrine of atomism, propounded by the pre-Socratic philosophers Leucippus and Democritus, was naturalistic, accounting for the workings of the world by impersonal processes, not by divine volitions. Nevertheless, these pre-Socratics come up short for Weinberg as proto-scientists, in that they apparently never tried to justify their speculations or to test them against evidence. Weinberg believes that science faltered early on due to Plato's suggestion that scientific truth could be attained by reason alone, disregarding empirical observation, and due to Aristotle's attempt to explain nature teleologically—in terms of ends and purposes.
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Many such affective acts are responses to values; some values call for feelings as their proper response. It is a sign that some feelings are properly speaking personal or spiritual that they are meaningful, motivated responses to values. A person is not fully virtuous until he or she gives valuable goods their proper affective response; to merely perform morally right acts or hold true beliefs is not sufficient for full virtue, or for giving objects and persons all that is due to them. Feelings must be received as a gift, and cannot be forced by our own volitions, but we can encourage the right feelings to arise by voluntarily sanctioning them and by voluntarily disavowing undue feelings.
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The insight refers to apprehension of the fundamental emptiness (śūnyatā) of all phenomena, known through and as the five aggregates of human existence (skandhas): form (rūpa), feeling (vedanā), volitions (saṅkhāra), perceptions (saṃjñā), and consciousness (vijñāna). The specific sequence of concepts listed in lines 12–20 ("...in emptiness there is no form, no sensation, ... no attainment and no non-attainment") is the same sequence used in the Sarvastivadin Samyukta Agama; this sequence differs in comparable texts of other sects. On this basis, Red Pine has argued that the Heart Sūtra is specifically a response to Sarvastivada teachings that, in the sense "phenomena" or its constituents, are real. Lines 12–13 enumerate the five skandhas.
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In his letter to G. H. Schuller (Letter 58), he wrote: "men are conscious of their desire and unaware of the causes by which [their desires] are determined."Ethics, Pt. I, Prop. XXXVI, Appendix: "[M]en think themselves free inasmuch as they are conscious of their volitions and desires, and never even dream, in their ignorance, of the causes which have disposed them so to wish and desire." This picture of Spinoza's determinism is illuminated by this famous quote in Ethics: ″the infant believes that it is by free will that it seeks the breast; the angry boy believes that by free will he wishes vengeance; the timid man thinks it is with free will he seeks flight; the drunkard believes that by a free command of his mind he speaks the things which when sober he wishes he had left unsaid.
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Hume begins Book 3 by examining the nature of moral evaluation, offering a critique of moral rationalism and a defense of moral sentimentalism: in the terms of his overall system, Hume is arguing that the evaluations in our mind are impressions, not ideas. His main target is the rationalism of such philosophers as Clarke and Balguy, which posits "eternal fitnesses and unfitnesses of things, which are the same to every rational being that considers them", in effect classifying morality alongside mathematics under "relations of ideas". Hume's principal arguments against this rationalism rest on Book 2's thesis that there is no opposition between reason and the passions: reason alone cannot motivate us, and "passions, volitions, and actions" cannot be in agreement or disagreement with reason. This thesis "proves directly", he writes, that an action's moral status cannot consist in the action's agreement or disagreement with reason, and it "proves indirectly" that moral evaluation, which has a practical influence on us and can "excite passion[s] and produce or prevent actions", cannot be "the offspring of reason".
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Manmatha Nath Dutt (1895), English translation of The Mahabharata, Udyoga Parva, Chapter 159, verse 15 The Mahabharata, which includes Hindu deity Vishnu in the form of Krishna as one of the central characters in the Epic, debates the nature and existence of suffering from these three perspectives, and includes a theory of suffering as arising from an interplay of chance events (such as floods and other events of nature), circumstances created by past human actions, and the current desires, volitions, dharma, adharma and current actions (purusakara) of people.Gregory Bailey (1983), Suffering in the Mahabharata: Draupadi and Yudhishthira, Purusartha, No. 7, pp. 109–129Alf Hiltebeitel (2001), Rethinking the Mahabharata: A Reader's Guide to the Education of the Dharma King, University of Chicago Press, , Chapters 2 and 5 However, while karma theory in the Mahabharata presents alternative perspectives on the problem of evil and suffering, it offers no conclusive answer.Emily Hudson (2012), Disorienting Dharma: Ethics and the Aesthetics of Suffering in the Mahabharata, Oxford University Press, , pp. 178–217P.B. Mehta (2007), The ethical irrationality of the world Weber and Hindu Ethics, in Indian Ethics (Editors: Billimoria et al.), Volume 1, Ashgate, , pp.
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