Without a First Amendment right of access, the ACLU and the media freedom clinic didn't have a "legally protected interest" that would give them standing, Collyer wrote.
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Trump's defenders have said any conservations with Bolton over the President's Ukrainian dealings would be barred because they involve Trump's constitutionally protected interest in confidential conversations with his advisers.
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The 9th Circuit, however, refused to dismiss a second due process claim in which some challengers claimed a protected interest in the government's prior assertions that information collected for DACA would not be used for enforcement purposes.
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Further, cases routinely test not only the merits of a dispute but also procedural matters, such as whether the person or group suing has legal "standing," that is, some protected interest that could be rectified by a judge.
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When we enforce our criminal laws, the protected interest is not just that of a single plaintiff: it is, in the truest sense, the public's interest because, in the hierarchy of administering justice, the enforcement of our criminal laws protects us all.
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"The Court finds that Plaintiffs have established a constitutionally-protected interest in their liberty, a right to due process which includes a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker to assess the necessity of their detention, and a likelihood of success on the merits of that issue," the judge wrote.
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In particular, the court ignores completely a century-old Supreme Court opinion that holds that due process does not apply when the government takes an action that deprives an entire class of people of a protected interest as opposed to a situation in which the government singles out individuals for adverse treatment.
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In the United States Supreme Court decision, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, it was decided that the Fourth Amendment was not violated in cases of interior checkpoints. Though this became a decision because of the importance of public interest over the protected interest of a private citizen, some would argue that this allowed for racial profiling because it permits for the inspection of suspicious persons.
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Steamboat Dev., Generally, it is not necessary to prove harm to a possessor's legally protected interest; liability for unintentional trespass varies by jurisdiction. " common law, every unauthorized entry upon the soil of another was a trespasser"; however, under the tort scheme established by the Restatement of Torts, liability for unintentional intrusions arises only under circumstances evincing negligence or where the intrusion involved a highly dangerous activity.Loe et ux. v.
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Since there is no constitutionally protected interest in regard to the "seizure" of a person, we are left with the precedent in Terry v. Ohio. In Terry, a police officer identified himself and the three gentlemen in question mumbled something leading Officer Mcfadden to believe they were dangerous. The officer grabbed Terry and threw Terry between the officer and the other two suspects. Terry was lawfully "seized" under the impression he was dangerous.
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There are three standing requirements: # Injury-in-fact: The plaintiff must have suffered or imminently will suffer injury—an invasion of a legally protected interest that is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent (that is, neither conjectural nor hypothetical; not abstract). The injury can be either economic, non-economic, or both. # Causation: There must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of, so that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and not the result of the independent action of some third party who is not before the court.For example, Massachusetts v.
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In Reno v. Flores, the Supreme Court ruled on March 23, 1993 that while "detained children in question had a constitutionally protected interest in freedom from institutional confinement", the Court reversed the Court of Appeals' 1991 decision in Flores v. Meese because the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) regulation 8 CFR 242.24 in question, complied with the requirements of due process. The INS regulation—8 CFR 242.24—"generally authorized the release of a detained alien juvenile, in order of preference, to a parent, a legal guardian, or specified close adult relatives of the juvenile, unless the INS determined that detention was required to secure an appearance or to ensure the safety of the juvenile or others".
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A state of necessity is a true justifying fact, which covers even involuntary infractions: Crim. 16 juillet 1986 found a gendarme not criminally responsible for a bullet shot into the ground because he needed to intimidate someone, which wounded that person in a ricochet. The determining criteria for the state of necessity to enter into play may be the balance between the protected interest and the sacrificed interest, as two arrests in the criminal chamber on May 11, 2004 . In this case (appeal n° 03-80.254), the guilty verdict of trial court judges of Sangachali-Duvanni on theft charges was overturned because the fraudulently-seized documents were to be used to defend of the accused in litigation with her employer.
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Such claims may be brought only when the trespasser (a) disposes the other of the chattel, (b) the chattel is impaired as to its condition, quality or value, (c) the processor is deprived of the use of the chattel for a substantial time, or (d) body harm is caused to the possessor, or harm is caused to some person or thing in which the possessor has a legally protected interest. The court noted that no Oklahoma court had earlier recognized trespass to chattels based upon intangible invasions of commuter resources. And the courts that have recognized such causes of action have not allowed "an action for nominal damages for harmless intermeddling with the chattel." Here, Mummagraphics had failed to submit any evidence the receiving the 11 commercial emails from Cruise.
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'" For this to be so, the plaintiff must "have suffered an 'injury in fact' in the form of the 'invasion of a legally protected interest,' that is both 'concrete and particularized' and 'actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.'" They cited DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 1854, 1862 (2006), saying that "Standing has been rejected in such cases because the alleged injury is not 'concrete and particularized,' but instead a grievance the taxpayer 'suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally,' and because the injury is not 'actual or imminent,' but instead 'conjectural or hypothetical.'" On a similar note they cited Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923) that "a federal taxpayer’s interest in the moneys of the treasury 'is shared with millions of others; is comparatively minute and indeterminable; and the effect upon future taxation, of any payment out of the funds, so remote, fluctuating and uncertain, that no basis is afforded for an appeal to the preventive powers of a court of equity.
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