Charlene Z. Perry and Lisa Perry Martin, Looking for Catherine: Memories of a House That Spoke, Author House, August 2013.THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Defendant in Error, vs. IRENE ALZINA JONES, alias MRS. BIRMINGHAM, Plaintiff in Error.
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The petition was denied, with two justices dissenting. An appeal was finally made to the US Supreme Court on July 13, 1922. It would be more than three years before the case was actually heard, with Walter Nelles of New York City making the argument for the plaintiff in error on October 18, 1925.
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In the course of unloading, the Grocery Company discovered that some of the flour was wet, and thereupon reloaded the part removed and returned the flour to the plaintiff in error. The subsequent course of events is thus stated by the court of appeals (id. pp. 144, 145): 'The railway company' (that is, the plaintiff in error) 'retook possession of the car and unloaded it, and in a few days sold, as perishable property, a part of the flour alleged to be damaged, and on December 23, 1910, sold the remainder. On June 3, 1910, after the Grocery Company had turned the flour back to the railway company, B. C. Prince, traffic manager of the Georgia, Florida, & Alabama Railway Company, telegraphed to the Blish Milling Company as follows: 'Flour order notify Draper-Garrett Grocery Company refused account damage.
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In any view we are justified in taking of the > nature of the controversy disclosed by the pleadings in this proceeding, we > conclude that both the original defendants are necessary parties to its > determination, and that consequently the plaintiff in error was not entitled > to remove the suit from the jurisdiction of the state court. The judgment of the circuit court was accordingly affirmed.
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State of Mississippi (162 U.S. 592 [1896]). In Smith, Jones was the sole representative of the plaintiff in error, while in Gibson that position was filled by Hewlett. In 1900, Wilford H. Smith became the first African-American attorney to win a case before the Supreme Court, Carter v. Texas (177 U.S. 442 [1900]), in which he also served as lead attorney along with co-counsel Hewlett.
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The bill of lading was issued by the Baltimore & Ohio Southwestern Railroad Company. The shipper's sight draft upon the Draper- Garrett Grocery Company, for $1,109.89, covering the price of the flour, with a carrying charge, was attached to the bill of lading and forwarded to a bank in Bainbridge for collection. The flour was transferred to another car by the Central of Georgia Railway Company, a connecting carrier, and reached Bainbridge on June 2, 1910, over the line of the Georgia, Florida, & Alabama Railway Company, the plaintiff in error, in accordance with routing. The plaintiff in error, without requiring payment of the draft and surrender of the bill [241 U.S. 190, 193] of lading (which were ultimately returned to the Blish Milling Company), delivered the car to the Draper-Garrett Grocery Company immediately on its arrival by placing it on the sidetrack of that company.
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Paul A. Weems, plaintiff in error, was a disbursing officer of the Bureau of Coast Guard and Transportation. He was charged, in the Philippine courts, with falsifying a public and official document for the purposes of defrauding the government. He was convicted of this and sentenced to 15 years incarceration, and a fine of 4,000 Philippine pesos. The conviction and sentence was upheld by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands.
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The suit was brought for breach of covenant of warranty of title to a tract of land in Kansas. Plaintiff in error was defendant below. Its title was derived from grants of public land to aid in the construction of a railway to the Pacific. The tract was within the location of the railroad grants, but was excepted from those grants by reason of a homestead entry and possession.
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On December 21, 1911, Fremont Weeks, the plaintiff in error and defendant, was arrested by a police officer at the Union Station in Kansas City, Missouri, where an express company employed him. Weeks was convicted of using the mails for the purpose of transporting lottery tickets, in violation of the Criminal Code. At the time of his arrest, police officers went to Weeks' house to search it. A neighbor told them where to find the key.
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One argument repeatedly made by tax protesters is that the income of individuals is not taxable because income should mean only "corporate profits" or "corporate gain". This is the Merchants' Loan argument, named after the case of Merchants' Loan & Trust Company, as Trustee of the Estate of Arthur Ryerson, Deceased, Plaintiff in Error v. Julius F. Smietanka, formerly United States Collector of Internal Revenue for the First District of the State of Illinois.255 U.S. 509 (1921).
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Writing the majority opinion, Justice Noah Haynes Swayne stated only that: > The plaintiff in error is estopped from raising the point which he seeks to > have decided. He cannot, under the circumstances, vicariously raise a > question, nor force upon the parties to the compact an issue which neither > of them desires to make. However, the U.S. Circuit Court of the District of Columbia did rule in 1849 that retrocession was constitutional in the case Sheehy vs. the Bank of the Potomac.
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Denny Martin was admitted to defend the suit and plead the general issue upon the usual terms of confessing lease, entry, and ouster. Martin agreed to assert only claim to the title. The facts being settled in the form of a case agreed to be taken and considered as a special verdict, the court, on consideration thereof, gave judgment in favor of the defendant in ejectment on April 24, 1794. From that judgment the plaintiff in ejectment (now plaintiff in error) appealed to the court of appeals.
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' This defense was overruled. The court of appeals stated that 'so far as appears from the record, no claim was filed by the shipper,' but deemed the provision to be inapplicable. Id. p. 149\. There are only two questions presented here, and these are thus set forth in the brief of the plaintiff in error: '1st. That the plaintiff's exclusive remedy was against the initial carrier, the Baltimore & Ohio Southwestern Railroad Company, under the Carmack amendment of 20 of the Hepburn bill [34 Stat.
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Heretofore it has been commonly looked upon as helpful and desirable. Plaintiff in error taught this language in school as part of his occupation. His right thus to teach and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct their children, we think, are within the liberty of the amendment." And further: "Evidently the Legislature has attempted materially to interfere with the calling of modern language teachers, with the opportunities of pupils to acquire knowledge, and with the power of parents to control the education of their own.
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A party who files an appeal is called an "appellant", "plaintiff in error", "petitioner" or "pursuer", and a party on the other side is called an "appellee". A "cross- appeal" is an appeal brought by the respondent. For example, suppose at trial the judge found for the plaintiff and ordered the defendant to pay $50,000. If the defendant files an appeal arguing that he should not have to pay any money, then the plaintiff might file a cross-appeal arguing that the defendant should have to pay $200,000 instead of $50,000.
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See also Parkersburg v. Brown, 106 U. S. 501. The doctrine announced in these cases is sustained by United States v. County of Macon, 99 U. S. 582, upon which the plaintiff in error relies; for, in that case, the very act, conferring upon the county authority to make a subscription to the stock of a railroad corporation, made special provision for a tax to meet the subscription, and thus negatived the inference that the legislature intended to permit any taxation beyond that allowed by that special act and the general laws of the state.
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The court, however, did not rule on the core constitutional matter of the retrocession. Writing the majority opinion, Justice Noah Swayne stated only that: > The plaintiff in error is estopped from raising the point which he seeks to > have decided. He cannot, under the circumstances, vicariously raise a > question, nor force upon the parties to the compact an issue which neither > of them desires to make. Arlington House, a mansion commissioned by a step-grandson of George Washington, last used as a residence by Robert E. Lee With barely separating the two capital cities, Northern Virginia found itself in the center of much of the conflict.
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Prentice v. Stearns, 113 U.S. 435 (1885), was an action to recover possession of real estate and damages for its detention, the plaintiff in error being plaintiff below, and a citizen of Ohio, the defendant being a citizen of Minnesota, specifically recovery of real estate deeded from an Indian chief to A, in 1858, of a tract described by metes and bounds and further as: did not convey the equitable interest of the chief in another tract described by different metes and bounds, granted to the said chief by a subsequent patent in 1858 in conformity with the said treaty in such manner that an action at law may be maintained by A or his grantee for recovering possession of the same.Prentice v. Stearns, 113 U.S. 435 (1885) Justia.
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But these and perhaps other points, decided against plaintiff in error, do not present questions of federal law which this Court can review in a judgment of a state court. The record shows that on July 25, 1866, Miller made a homestead entry on this land which was in every respect valid if the land was then public land subject to such entry. It also shows that the line of definite location of the company's road was first filed with the Commissioner of the General Land Office at Washington, September 21, 1866. This entry of Miller's therefore brought the land within the language of the exception in the grant as land to which a homestead claim had attached at the time the line of said road was definitely fixed.
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In summation the Dallas reporter quoted John Jay and summed up the case holding as follows: West, Plaintiff in error, v. Barnes et al. > On the first day of the term, Bradford presented to the court, a writ, > purporting to be a writ of error, issued out of the office of the clerk of > the circuit court for Rhode Island district, directed to that court, and > commanding a return of the judgment and proceedings rendered by them in this > cause: And thereupon he moved for a rule, that the defendant rejoin to the > errors assigned in this cause. Barnes, one of the defendants, (a counsellor > of the court) objected to the validity of the writ, that it had issued out > of the wrong office: and, after argument, THE COURT were unanimously of > opinion, That writs of error to remove causes to this court from inferior > courts, can regularly issue only from the clerk's office of the court.
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The case was an action brought by the plaintiff in error to recover upon a policy of insurance issued by the defendant, whereby it insured William Edward Parker Baylis, the father of the plaintiff, in the sum of $10,000, owed the plaintiff in case said assured should accidentally sustain bodily injuries which should produce death within ninety days. The complaint alleged that the assured "on or about the 20th day of November 1872, did sustain bodily injuries accidentally, to-wit, in that wholly by accident he took certain drugs and medicines, which, as taken by him, were poisonous and deadly, when, in fact he intended to take wholly a different thing and in a different manner, and that, in consequence of said accident solely, said assured died on said 20th day of November 1872." An issue was made by a denial in the answer of this allegation, so far as it alleged that the poisonous and deadly drugs were taken "accidentally, or by accident, or with the intent, or under the circumstances stated or mentioned in the complaint" to commit suicide.
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The Court set forth a lengthy examination of the history leading to the inclusion of the apportionment requirement in the Constitution: After further examining the contemporaneous writings of James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, the Court quoted Hamilton as asserting that direct taxes should be held to be only "capitation or poll taxes, and taxes on lands and buildings, and general assessments, whether on the whole property of individuals or on their whole real or personal estate. All else must, of necessity, be considered as indirect taxes".Springer, 102 U.S. at 598. Comparing Hamilton's understanding of the clause to the facts of the case, the Court stated: The Court concluded that "whenever the government has imposed a tax which it recognized as a direct tax, it has never been applied to any objects but real estate and slaves", and ultimately held "that direct taxes, within the meaning of the Constitution, are only capitation taxes, as expressed in that instrument, and taxes on real estate; and that the tax of which the plaintiff in error complains is within the category of an excise or duty".
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