Hare, 1989 While Hare was primarily interested in the supervenience of moral concepts on non-moral ones, he also argued that other evaluative concepts, e.g., aesthetic ones like beautiful, pleasant, nice, etc., must also supervene upon non-moral facts.
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The claim that moral properties are supervenient upon non-moral properties is called moral supervenience.
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Cornell realism accepts the view that moral facts are natural facts. They fall within the province of the natural and social sciences. But while they are not supernatural (as in divine command theory) and they are not non-natural (as in Moore's Principia Ethica or Mackie's picture of a realist world), they cannot be reduced to non-moral natural facts. That is, while moral facts are natural facts and supervene on non-moral natural facts, they cannot be identified with non-moral natural facts (see, e.g.
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So it is necessary to make another distinction: between moral and non- moral goods. A non-moral good is something that is desirable for someone or other; despite the name to the contrary, it may include moral goods. A moral good is anything which an actor is considered to be morally obligated to strive toward. When discussing non-moral goods, one may make a useful distinction between inherently serviced and material goods in the marketplace (or its exchange value), versus perceived intrinsic and experiential goods to the buyer.
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Another way to put this is to say that moral facts are a function of, depend upon, or are constrained or constituted by, some non-moral facts, and that the latter are a sufficient condition for making the moral facts true. Yet another common way of putting this is that any change in moral facts must be accompanied by a change in the non-moral facts (i.e., those on which it supervenes), but that the reverse is not the case.McPherson, 2015 A moral fact can be constituted by more than one set of non-moral facts-i.e.
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Amongst them, there are those who hold that moral knowledge is gained inferentially on the basis of some sort of non-moral epistemic process, as opposed to ethical intuitionism.
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The principle of moral supervenience states that moral predicates (e.g., permissible, obligatory, forbidden, etc.), and hence moral facts attributing these predicates to various particular actions or action-types, supervene, or are defined by and depend, upon non-moral facts. The moral facts are hence said to be supervenient facts, and the non-moral facts the supervenience base of the former. The principle is sometimes qualified to say that moral facts supervene upon natural facts, i.e.
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The open-question argument is a philosophical argument put forward by British philosopher G. E. Moore in §13 of Principia Ethica (1903), . to refute the equating of the property of goodness with some non-moral property, X, whether natural (e.g. pleasure) or supernatural (e.g. God's command).
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For example, one can infer from "The Sun is yellow" that "Either the Sun is yellow, or it is wrong to murder". But this provides no relevant moral guidance; absent a contradiction, one cannot deductively infer that "it is wrong to murder" solely from non-moral premises alone, adherents argue.
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Ethical non-naturalism is the meta-ethical view which claims that: # Ethical sentences express propositions. # Some such propositions are true. # Those propositions are made true by objective features of the world, independent of human opinion. # These moral features of the world are not reducible to any set of non-moral features.
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In arguing against Malthus, Edmonds (in common with Richard Jones, Augustus Henry Moreton and George Rickards) laid weight on factors that could cause postponement of marriage.Eversley, p. 257. In general he relied on "non- moral" effects, and Chapter VIII of the book addressed the possible effects on labourers' fertility of upward mobility.Eversley, p.
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Sara Algoe and Jonathan Haidt include admiration in the category of other-praising emotions, alongside awe, elevation, and gratitude. They propose that admiration is the emotion we feel towards non-moral excellence (i.e., witnessing an act of excellent skill), while elevation is the emotion we feel towards moral excellence (i.e., witnessing someone perform an act of exceeding virtue).
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He assumes that the question is a meaningful one (i.e. that it is an open question). This begs the question and the open-question argument thus fails. In response to this, the open-question argument can be reformulated.. The Darwall-Gibbard-Railton reformulation argues for the impossibility of equating a moral property with a non-moral one using the internalist theory of motivation.
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Skitka, Bauman, and Sargis placed participants in either attitudinally heterogeneous or homogenous groups to discuss procedures regarding two morally mandated issues, abortion and capital punishment. Those in attitudinally heterogeneous groups demonstrated the least amount of goodwill towards other group members, the least amount of cooperation, and the most tension/defensiveness. Furthermore, individuals discussing a morally mandated issue were less likely to reach a consensus compared to those discussing non-moral issues.
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Friedrich Nietzsche makes metaphor the conceptual center of his early theory of society in On Truth and Lies in the Non-Moral Sense. Some sociologists have found his essay useful for thinking about metaphors used in society and for reflecting on their own use of metaphor. Sociologists of religion note the importance of metaphor in religious worldviews, and that it is impossible to think sociologically about religion without metaphor.
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The vast majority of people > Knobe quizzed – 82 per cent – said he did. But what if the scenario is > changed such that the word ‘harm’ is replaced with ‘help’? In this case the > CEO doesn’t care about helping the environment, and still just wants to make > a profit – and his actions result in both outcomes. Now faced with the > question ‘Did the CEO intentionally help the environment?’, just 23 per cent > of Knobe’s participants said ‘yes’ (Knobe, 2003a). > This asymmetry in responses between the ‘harm’ and ‘help’ scenarios, now > known as the Knobe effect, provides a direct challenge to the idea of a one- > way flow of judgments from the factual or non-moral domain to the moral > sphere. ‘These data show that the process is actually much more complex,’ > argues Knobe. Instead, the moral character of an action’s consequences also > seems to influence how non-moral aspects of the action – in this case, > whether someone did something intentionally or not – are judged.
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The amygdala allows for sensory recognition of non- integrated emotional stimuli that are channeled to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex for moral indexing and processing. The mesolimbic reward pathway has been implicated with the generation of pleasurable feelings when a non-moral act is performed towards a hostile entity, a phenomenon called Schadenfreude. The cingulate cortex allows for conflict regulation when performing an immoral action and the feeling of envy when self identified entities are overcome by non identified ones.
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According to the principle of moral supervenience, moral properties of actions (obligatory, permissible, forbidden, etc.) supervene on--that is, depend upon or are functions of--non- moral properties. The principle itself does not specify which moral properties these are, so it does not constitute a universalizability test. However it is often considered a necessary feature of any moral truth, and hence is often thought to rule out certain general theories of morality (see meta-ethics), even if it cannot forbid many particular actions.
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He produced a book of poems, One-Way Song, in 1933, and a revised version of Enemy of the Stars. An important book of critical essays also belongs to this period: Men without Art (1934). It grew out of a defence of Lewis's satirical practice in The Apes of God and puts forward a theory of 'non-moral', or metaphysical, satire. The book is probably best remembered for one of the first commentaries on Faulkner and a famous essay on Hemingway.
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His grasp of the Western philosophical doctrines is brilliantly clear in his "Mission of Philosophy" (1960) where he discusses at great length Immanuel Kant's ideas on "Duty", "Ideal of Perfection", "Moral good vs. Non-moral good", "Promotion of Oneself" and "Rectification of the Will". He had of course, made a comparative study of Socrates and Plato. Hiriyanna's foreword to V. Raghavan's "The Number of Rasas" gives one a glimpse of his grasp of the "Rasa Theory" and his perspectives on "Alamkara Shastra".
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Teachers, executioners, nurses, physicians, attorneys, barbers, liquor salespersons, pharmacists, and many other professionals require a state-issued license to perform their job. In order to obtain a license to work, one must meet the regular non-moral requirements such as years of education and also convince the state board that the applicant has good moral character. However, the criteria used to determine good moral character can vary significantly. Background checks are a type of verification of good moral character and they are often accompanied by drug testing.
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Coherence-based reasoning framework draws symmetrical links between consistent (things that co-occur) and inconsistent (things that do not co-occur) psychological representations and use them as constraints, thereby providing a natural way to represent conflicts between irreconcilable motivations, observations, behaviors, beliefs, and attitudes, as well as moral obligations. Importantly, Thagard's framework was highly comprehensive in that it provided a computational basis for modeling reasoning processes using moral and non- moral facts and beliefs as well as variables related to both 'hot' and 'cold' cognitions.
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Likewise, if another person, say Cindy, has the same non-moral relationship to David that Alice does (e.g., having borrowed $10 from him), then she must have the same obligation Alice does. The principle is compatible with a very fine-grained analysis of the supervenience base for moral predicates, and hence is compatible with moral particularism. (R.M. Hare, in the first recorded usage of the term moral particularism, defined these as incompatible, saying they were contradictories, but his definition of particularism is not identical with its contemporary usage.
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San Francisco, Harper & Row He then proposed a model of the relationship between moral judgments and moral action. According to Kohlberg, an individual first interprets the situation using their moral reasoning, which is influenced by their moral stage and sub-stage. After interpretation individuals make a deontic choice and a judgment of responsibility, which are both influenced by the stage and sub-stage of the individual. If the individual does decide on a moral action and their obligation to do it, they still need the non-moral skills to carry out a moral behavior.
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But, none the less, he does > not represent the highest ethical type. He is rather non- moral, neither > good nor bad. So also in the case of the woman... ...In the Jew and the > woman, good and evil are not distinct from one another. Jews, then, do not > live as free, self-governing individuals, choosing between virtue and vice > in the Aryan fashion... Accordingly, Weininger's views are considered an important step in attempts to exclude women and Jews from society based on methodical philosophy, in an era declaring human equality and scientific thought.
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This makes ethical non-naturalism a non-definist form of moral realism, which is in turn a form of cognitivism. Ethical non- naturalism stands in opposition to ethical naturalism, which claims that moral terms and properties are reducible to non-moral terms and properties, as well as to all forms of moral anti-realism, including ethical subjectivism (which denies that moral propositions refer to objective facts), error theory (which denies that any moral propositions are true), and non-cognitivism (which denies that moral sentences express propositions at all).
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Moralization, a term introduced to moral psychology by Paul Rozin, refers to the process through which preferences are converted into values. Relatedly, Linda Skitka and colleagues have introduced the concept of moral conviction, which refers to a "strong and absolute belief that something is right or wrong, moral or immoral." According to Skitka's integrated theory of moral conviction (ITMC), attitudes held with moral conviction, known as moral mandates, differ from strong but non-moral attitudes in a number of important ways. Namely, moral mandates derive their motivational force from their perceived universality, perceived objectivity, and strong ties to emotion.
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In many of his works, Hildebrand focuses on distinguishing kinds of values and describing the intellectual, volitional, or affective response that is due to it. Values must be grasped by direct perception, and so realist phenomenology is an excellent method for describing exactly how values appear. Hildebrand frequently engages in this description by distinguishing experiences in which a certain value appears from experiences in which other values or other phenomena appear. For example, in Graven Images, he carefully describes the difference between experiences of genuine moral values from experiences of similar, but non-moral values, like honor.
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The belief "that no one should be forcibly prevented from acting in any way he chooses provided his acts are not invasive of the free acts of others" has become one of the basic principles of libertarian politics. The harm principle was first fully articulated by the English philosopher John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) in the first chapter of On Liberty (1859), where he argued that: Even if a self-regarding action results in harm to oneself, it is still beyond the sphere of justifiable state coercion. Harm itself is not a non-moral concept. The infliction of harm upon another person is what makes an action wrong.
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In science, Weber argued that the discovery of laws is not the end of scientific inquiry since they have been rendered irrational by the inductivist and deductivist approaches. The thinker held that the discovery of the causes and reason behind these laws is the ultimate goal. Ultimate end is also expressed in the realm of policymaking in the way decisions are not guided by the moral values of those who are making them. Politicians, for instance, must sometimes use extraordinary and non-moral means to achieve certain goals because an alternative method based on ethics does not often address the realities of everyday life.
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According to the open question argument (originally articulated by intuitionist and non-naturalist G. E. Moore), for any proposed definition of a moral term, e.g. " 'good' = 'the object of desire' ", a competent speaker of English who understands the meaning of the terms involved in the statement of the definition could still hold that the question, "Is the object of desire good?" remains unanswered. The upshot of this argument is that normative or moral terms cannot be analytically reduced to "natural" or non-moral terms. Expressivists argue that the best explanation of this irreducibility is that moral terms are not used to describe objects, but rather to evaluate them.
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Terence Cuneo argues against expressivism by means of the following premise: > It is false that, in ordinary optimal conditions, when an agent performs the > sentential act of sincerely uttering a moral sentence, that agent does not > thereby intend to assert a moral proposition, but intends to express an > attitude toward a non-moral state of affairs or object.Cuneo (2006), p. 67 Proponents of expressivism are concerned to preserve the participants in ordinary moral thought and discourse from charges of deep error. But, Cuneo argues, there is evidence that many such participants do intend to represent a factual moral reality when they make moral judgments.
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Nevertheless, according to Hare, human logic shows the error of relativism in one very important sense (see Hare's Sorting out Ethics). Hare and other philosophers also point out that, aside from logical constraints, all systems treat certain moral terms alike in an evaluative sense. This parallels our treatment of other terms such as less or more, which meet with universal understanding and do not depend upon independent standards (for example, one can convert measurements). It applies to good and bad when used in their non-moral sense, too; for example, when we say, "this is a good wrench" or "this is a bad wheel".
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The story of Markham Sutherland is presented through various letters, journals, and the third-person account of the novel's supposed editor, Arthur. Sutherland, under pressure from his father to become a clergyman, confesses to Arthur his reservations about accepting the Thirty-Nine Articles and contemporary English Christianity in general. In particular, Sutherland is concerned about the depiction of God in the Old Testament, God's patronage of the Israelites on non-moral grounds, the doctrine of Eternal Punishment, and the supposed inerrancy of the Bible. Sutherland was profoundly influenced by John Henry Newman in his early years, but was ultimately unable to accept Newman's doctrines.
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The deontological ethics of Immanuel Kant has been cast as rejecting divine command theory by several figures, among whom is ethicist R. M. Hare. Kant's view that morality should be determined by the categorical imperative – duty to the moral law, rather than acting for a specific end – has been viewed as incompatible with divine command theory. Philosopher and theologian John E. Hare has noted that some philosophers see divine command theory as an example of Kant's heteronomous will – motives besides the moral law, which Kant regarded as non-moral. American philosopher Lewis White Beck takes Kant's argument to be a refutation of the theory that morality depends of divine authority.
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In modern times, "Hume's law" often denotes the informal thesis that, if a reasoner only has access to non-moral factual premises, the reasoner cannot logically infer the truth of moral statements; or, more broadly, that one cannot infer evaluative statements (including aesthetic statements) from non-evaluative statements. An alternative definition of Hume's law is that "If P implies Q, and Q is moral, then P is moral". This interpretation-driven definition avoids a loophole with the principle of explosion. Other versions state that the is-ought gap can technically be formally bridged without a moral premise, but only in ways that are formally "vacuous" or "irrelevant", and that provide no "guidance".
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While Russell wrote a great deal on ethical subject matters, he did not believe that the subject belonged to philosophy or that when he wrote on ethics that he did so in his capacity as a philosopher. In his earlier years, Russell was greatly influenced by G.E. Moore's Principia Ethica. Along with Moore, he then believed that moral facts were objective, but known only through intuition; that they were simple properties of objects, not equivalent (e.g., pleasure is good) to the natural objects to which they are often ascribed (see Naturalistic fallacy); and that these simple, undefinable moral properties cannot be analysed using the non-moral properties with which they are associated.
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And as for probable reasoning, Hume famously contends that we observe nothing in an action besides its ordinary non-moral qualities—experience reveals no moral qualities unless one looks to the moral feelings in one's own mind, so that virtue and vice are (like the secondary qualities of modern philosophy) "not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind". This first section ends with the famous is-ought paragraph. Hume is thus left endorsing a moral sentimentalism somewhat like that of Hutcheson: "Morality... is more properly felt than judg'd of". The moral evaluations in our mind are impressions—"nothing but particular pains or pleasures"—and Hume's task is to explain how certain kinds of "action, or sentiment, or character" produce these special moral sentiments in us.
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Natural evil (also non-moral or surd evil) is a term generally used in discussions of the problem of evil and theodicy that refers to states of affairs which, considered in themselves, are those that are part of the natural world, and so are independent of the intervention of a human agent. Both natural and moral evil are a challenge to religious believers. Many atheists claim that natural evil is proof that there is no God, at least not an omnipotent, omnibenevolent one, as such a being would not allow such evil to happen to his/her creation. However, the deist position states that intervention by God to prevent such actions (or any intervention) is not an attribute of God.
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Dennett also suggests that adherence to high ethical standards might pay off for the individual, because if others know your behaviour is restricted in these ways, the scope for certain beneficial mutual arrangements is enhanced. This is related to game theoretical considerations: in the famous Prisoner's Dilemma, 'moral' agents who cooperate will be more successful than 'non-moral' agents who do not cooperate. Cooperation wouldn't seem to naturally arise since agents are tempted to 'defect' and restore a Nash equilibrium, which is often not the best possible solution for all involved. Dennett concludes by contemplating the possibility that people might be able to opt in or out of moral responsibility: surely, he suggests, given the benefits, they would choose to opt in, especially given that opting out includes such things as being imprisoned or institutionalized.
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Joy received her M.Ed. from the Harvard Graduate School of Education, and her Ph.D. in psychology from the Saybrook Graduate School. At age 23, while a student at Harvard, she contracted a food- borne disease from a tainted hamburger and was hospitalized, which led her to become a vegetarian. In a speech related by Indian cabinet minister Maneka Gandhi, Joy recalled how her dietary choice, made for non-moral reasons, transformed her perspective on the treatment of animals: > That experience led me to swear off meat, which led me to become more open > to information about animal agriculture—information that had been all around > me but that I had been unwilling to see, so long as I was still invested in > maintaining my current way of life. And as I learned the truth about meat, > egg and dairy production, I became increasingly distraught.
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Glassen's first set of publications consisted in eight papers published in major philosophical journals in 1957, 1958 and 1959. These reflected his core interests: analytic moral theory (where he was a cognitivist and champion of ordinary language analysis), value theory (particularly the classification of, and distinctions among, moral and non- moral varieties of normative judgment), and epistemology (notably the question of the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge). There followed a period of reduced activity, with two papers on cognitivism in 1962 and 1963, several reviews for Dialogue from 1963 to 1970, and finally a series of papers on another subject of enduring interest—the refutation of arguments against dualism—between 1976 and 1984. Glassen also authored a number of conference papers, including two that were published in the proceedings of the 12th and 13th meetings of the International Congress of Philosophy, in 1958 and 1963 respectively.
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Henry Jarvis Raymond, who began his journalistic career on the Tribune and gained further experience in editing the respectable, old-fashioned, political Courier and Enquirer, perceived that there was an opening for a type of newspaper that should stand midway between Greeley, the moralist and reformer, and Bennett, the cynical, non-moral news- monger. He was able to interest friends in raising the hundred thousand dollars that he thought essential to the success of his enterprise. This sum is significant of the development of American daily journalism, for Greeley had started the Tribune only ten years earlier with a capital of one thousand dollars, and Bennett had founded the Herald with nothing at all. On this sound financial basis, Raymond began the career of the New York Times with his business partner George Jones on September 18, 1851, and made it a success from the outset.
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Nor can the morality of an action be founded on the true or false judgments causally linked to it: no immoral action is wrong due to its arising from a mistake of fact, or (contra Wollaston) due to its causing false judgments in others. After summing up this critique, Hume develops a "more particular" case against rationalism, recalling his system's two kinds of reasoning: "the comparing of ideas" and "the inferring of matter of fact". Now as for demonstrative reasoning, the four abstract relations from Book 1 seem perfectly irrelevant to morality, and indeed it is hard to see how any relation could have just the right scope (holding only between someone's psychology and external situation) and the right practical implications as well (somehow it must be certain a priori that no rational being could consider these relations without being motivated accordingly). Consider the immorality of parricide and incest: this cannot consist merely in the abstract relations at play, for the very same relations can be found in perfectly non-moral contexts involving inanimate objects and animals.
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Post war Winter was working for the Boundary Commission for the Schleswig-Holstein when he was appointed in May 1920 by the Secretary of State for War, Winston Churchill to replace his friend General Tudor as Chief of Intelligence in Dublin Castle, taking a pay cut to accept the position.A Winter's Tale p288 Winter originally was housed in a lodge outside Dublin Castle and remarked on his unconventional introduction to Ireland when his mess steward shot himself on his first night A Winter's Tale p289. Even given Winter's lack of experience in the espionage field, 'O' impressed at the time with his initial reorganisation of heavily centralised departments. Mark Sturgis wrote of the Dublin Castle regime; "'O' is a marvel, he looks like a wicked little white snake, is as clever as paint, probably entirely non-moral, a first class horseman, a card genius, knows several languages, is a super sleuth and a most amazing original, he can do anything".(Sturgis papers)Hopkinson The Last Days of Dublin Castle p40 If nothing else he was innovative, yet his detractors claimed him to be obsessed with cloak and dagger operations, at one point donning a disguise to personally seize part of IRA funds.
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