In the Prajñaparamita sutras, the emptiness of phenomena is often illustrated by metaphors like drops of dew. The Prajñāpāramitā (Perfection of Wisdom) Sutras taught that all entities, including dharmas, are empty of self, essential core, or intrinsic nature (svabhava), being only conceptual existents or constructs.
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Passive intellect is identical with Aql Bil Quwwah in Islamic philosophy. Aql bi-al-quwwah, defined as reason, could abstract the forms of entities with which it is finally identified. For Farabi, the potential intellect becomes actual by receiving the form of matter. In other words, Aql Hayulany tries to separate the forms of existents from their matter.
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In general, Avicenna derives the attributes based on two aspects of the necessary existent: (1)its necessity, which can be shown to imply its sheer existence and a range of negations (e.g. not being caused, not being multiple), and (2)its status as a cause of other existents, which can be shown to imply a range of positive relations (e.g. knowing and powerful).
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Dhammajoti (2009), p. 278. Also, if nirvāṇa is not a real force, then beings could not give rise to delight in nirvāṇa and disgust towards saṃsāra, for nirvāṇa would be inferior in terms of existence. It would also mean that the Buddha had been deluding everyone by speaking of non-existents in the same way that he spoke of the existents.Dhammajoti (2009), p. 479.
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Unconditioned dharmas are those which exist without being dependently co- arisen (pratītya-samutpanna), they are also not temporal or spatial. They transcend arising and ceasing, and are real existents that possess a unique efficacy (though not a temporal causal efficacy like other dharmas).Dhammajoti (2009), pp. 472-474. The Vaibhāṣika school taught three types of unconditioned dharmas: space (ākāśa), cessation through deliberation (pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha), and cessation independent of deliberation (apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha).
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The concept of "being" is derived by us from the objects of human experience and is an attribute of such objects, but the infinite, transcendent One is beyond all such objects and, therefore, is beyond the concepts which we can derive from them. The One "cannot be any existing thing" and cannot be merely the sum of all such things (compare the Stoic doctrine of disbelief in non-material existence) but "is prior to all existents".
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54 (June 2001), pp. 753–78. Some argue that Avicenna anticipated Frege and Bertrand Russell in "holding that existence is an accident of accidents" and also anticipated Alexius Meinong's "view about nonexistent objects." He also provided early arguments for "a "necessary being" as cause of all other existents." The idea of "essence preced[ing] existence" is a concept which dates back to Avicenna and his school as well as Shahab al-Din Suhrawardi and his Illuminationist philosophy.
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From Nagarjuna's Middle Way: "1. Not from itself, not from another, not from both, nor without cause: Never in any way is there any existing thing that has arisen." According to Mark Siderits and Shōryū Katsura, "This is the overall conclusion for which Nāgārjuna will argue in this chapter: that existents do not come into existence as the result of causes and conditions."Mark Siderits and Shōryū Katsura (2013), Nagarjuna's Middle Way: Mulamadhyamakakarika, Simon and Schuster, p.
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54 (June 2001), pp. 753-778. Some argue that Avicenna anticipated Frege and Bertrand Russell in "holding that existence is an accident of accidents" and also anticipated Alexius Meinong's "view about nonexistent objects." He also provided early arguments for "a 'necessary being' as cause of all other existents." The idea of "essence precedes existence" is a concept which dates back to Avicenna and his school of Avicennism as well as Shahab al-Din Suhrawardi and his Illuminationist philosophy.
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For narratologists all parts of narratives—characters, narrators, existents, actors—are characterized in terms of diegesis. For definitions of diegesis, one should consult Aristotle's Poetics; Gerard Genette's Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method (Cornell University Press, 1980); or (for a readable introduction) H. Porter Abbott's The Cambridge Introduction to Narrative (Cambridge University Press 2002). In literature, discussions of diegesis tend to concern discourse/sjužet (in Russian Formalism) (vs. story/fabula). Diegesis is multi-levelled in narrative fiction.
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Plotinus taught that there is a supreme, totally transcendent "One", containing no division, multiplicity, or distinction; beyond all categories of being and non-being. His "One" "cannot be any existing thing", nor is it merely the sum of all things (compare the Stoic doctrine of disbelief in non- material existence), but "is prior to all existents". Plotinus identified his "One" with the concept of 'Good' and the principle of 'Beauty'. (I.6.9) His "One" concept encompassed thinker and object.
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Furthermore, according to Saṃghabhadra, only if there are true existent forms can there be a difference between correct and incorrect cognitions regarding material things.Dhammajoti (2009), p. 73. Saṃghabhadra further adds that they are of two types of existents: > What exists truly (dravyato’sti) and what exists conceptually > (prajñaptito’sti), the two being designated on the basis of conventional > truth and absolute truth. If, with regard to a thing, a cognition (buddhi) > is produced without depending on anything else, this thing exists truly — > e.g.
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He argues against the view that nibbana is unreal or non-existent and quotes a famous verse found in the Itivuttaka and the Udana which states "There is an unborn, an unbecome, an unmade, an unconditioned..."Ronkin (2005), p. 180. Thus, the commentary to the Visuddhimagga states that nibbāna is the opposite to all conditioned states. In Theravāda Abhidhamma, nibbāna is seen as totally other than the conditioned existents and as the only unique unconditioned dhamma.Ronkin (2005), pp. 180–181.
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Unfortunately, so little remains of Heraclitus' aphorisms that not much about his philosophy can be said with certainty. He seems to have held that strife of opposites is universal both within and without, therefore both opposite existents or qualities must simultaneously exist, although in some instances in different respects. "The road up and down are one and the same" implies either the road leads both ways, or there can be no road at all. This is the logical complement of the law of non-contradiction.
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On September 6, 2007, while finishing the album, Barrio Dill learned his friend and mentor, Greg Marchak, had died suddenly of a brain aneurism. The album was dedicated to the memory of Marchak. A portion of each album sale goes to the Conservation International and Invisible Children charities. Barrio Dill has remained active in the music community and has been involved in The Existents, an experimental musical theatre work-in-progress where he worked with Ty Taylor (Rock Star: INXS, Dakota Moon) and Broadway vocalist Eden Espinosa.
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The distinction between physical phenomena and mental phenomena is also removed by this system. Omnific Awareness gives rise to everything – thus the use of the term omnific – and this includes thoughts that phenomenally arise in brains as well as existents that arise phenomenally as things in the world. By removing this distinction this system cuts off the inevitable paradoxes that otherwise arise in philosophical systems. The implications of this move create a number of novel, but necessary, modifications in current categorizations of ideas about reality and our study of it.
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However, if no differentia distinguishes them from each other, then there is no sense in which these 'Existents' are not one and the same.Nader El-Bizri, The Phenomenological Quest between Avicenna and Heidegger (Binghamton, N.Y.: Global Publications SUNY, 2000) Avicenna adds that the 'Necessary-Existent-due-to-Itself' has no genus (jins), nor a definition (hadd), nor a counterpart (nadd), nor an opposite (did), and is detached (bari) from matter (madda), quality (kayf), quantity (kam), place (ayn), situation (wad), and time (waqt).Avicenna, Kitab al-Hidaya, ed. Muhammad 'Abdu (Cairo, 1874), pp.
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Lawson has engaged in debates with numerous contributors, including, early on, over the use of econometrics, and later, regarding the value of ontology to social theorising, including to feminist theorising. In addition, Edward Fullbrook’s Ontology and Economics: Tony Lawson and his Critics, contains a series of debates between Lawson and leading heterodox economists. Recently Lawson has debated the relative advantages of competing conceptions of social ontology with several ontologists such as John Searle, Doug Porpora and Colin Wight. Moreover, he has debated the nature of specific social existents, such as money, with Searle and Geoffrey Ingham.
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Thus this system does away with the idea of an active, creative force called Free Will and replaces it with an active volitional component known as affections, that does not itself create anything, whether movement or structure, but instead, constrains the possibilities of what arises naturally. Arguably, the concept of Free Will necessitates a world of separation as it implies an actor and that which is acted upon. In this conception there is no such separation. Yet our intuitive modeling of the existents of reality as arising from natural processes, as well as our intuitive understanding that we can ‘cause’ things to happen by our ‘will’, are both cleanly supported.
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From an etic perspective, perception of an image, icon, or sign of religious or spiritual import to the perceiver is indelibly mediated or filtered through culture, politics, and worldview. As Gregory Price Grieve states: Psychology of the sacred, taking stock of the human condition, conveys that people construct meaning from that which is without meaning; stated differently, culture gives context to lived experience. Therefore, both meaning and absence of meaning may be perceived as being co-existents. Cultural context as constructed meaning and memetic transmission engenders social, existential, and spiritual comfort in a tenuous and arbitrary lived experience and millieu: perception as a participatory event parsing experience into meaningful units.
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Rand bases her solution to the problem of universals on a quasi- mathematical analysis of similarity. Rejecting the common view that similarity is unanalyzable, she defines similarity as: "the relationship between two or more existents which possess the same characteristic(s), but in different measure or degree." The grasp of similarity, she holds, requires a contrast between the two or more similar items and a third item that differs from them, but differs along the same scale of measurement (which she termed a "Conceptual Common Denominator"). Thus two shades of blue, to be perceived as similar must be contrasted with something differing greatly in hue from both—e.g.
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Philippe Descola in his work among the Amazonian Achuar suggested that the category of nature is not a human universal and therefore, should not be considered a line of anthropological inquiry. The domain of "nature", Descola argues has emerged from modern, Western notions that intend to posit "nature" as ontologically real. Instead, Descola claims that "Other civilizations have devised different ways of detecting qualities among existents, resulting in other forms of organizing continuity and discontinuity between humans and nonhumans, of aggregating beings in collectives, of defining who or what is capable of agency and knowledge". Meaning Descola treats animism not as some sort of mistaken belief, but as an extension of social relationality to nonhuman actors.
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Tashkīk or gradation is closely associated with Sadrian interpretation of waḥdat al-wujūd. According to this school, the reality and existence are identical which means existence is one but graded in intensity. This methodology was given a name of tashkik al-wujud and it thus explains that there is gradation of existence that stand in a vast hierarchical chain of being (marāṭib al-wujūd) from floor (farsh) to divine throne (ʿarsh), but the wujūd of each existent māhīyya is nothing but a grade of the single reality of wujūd whose source is God, the absolute being (al- wujūd al-mutlaq). What differentiates the wujūd of different existents is nothing but wujūd in different degrees of strength and weakness.
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The limitation of the argument so far is that it only shows the existence of a necessary existent, and that is different from showing the existence of God as worshipped in Islam. An atheist might agree that a necessary existent exists, but it could be the universe itself, or there could be many necessary existents, none of which is God. Avicenna is aware of this limitation, and his works contains numerous arguments to show the necessary existent must have the attributes associated with God identified in Islam. For example, Avicenna gives a philosophical justification for the Islamic doctrine of tawhid (oneness of God) by showing the uniqueness and simplicity of the necessary existent.
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In fact, a thing's "essence" consisted in those defining properties without which we could not use the name for it.Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy, London: Routledge, 1991 Although the concept of essence was "hopelessly muddled" it became part of every philosophy until modern times. The Egyptian-born philosopher Plotinus (204–270 A.D.) brought idealism to the Roman Empire as Neoplatonism, and with it the concept that not only do all existents emanate from a "primary essence" but that the mind plays an active role in shaping or ordering the objects of perception, rather than passively receiving empirical data. Despite the metaphysical basis for the term, academics in science, aesthetics, heuristics, psychology, and gender-based sociological studies have advanced their causes under the banner of essentialism.
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Proceeding from the one necessarily true and unquestionable fact – that we are present to our experiences – an understanding of reality is developed that is neither a materialist nor an idealist conceptualization. This way of viewing the world is referred to as surjective, a metaphorical use of a concept found in mathematical set theory that means a function that works upon every member of a set, where Awareness is the function and Omnific Awareness is the set, in order to distinguish this position from both subjectivity and objectivity. Within this system anything whatsoever can arise from Omnific Awareness, thus the use of the term “indefinite” in labeling this monism. What does arise as the existents that we are conscious of is conditioned by the affections of Awareness for its display.
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Alberto Garcia Umbon, Las proyectadas elecciones del general Berenguer en Navarra (1930), [in:] Cuadernos de Sección Historia y Geografía, 10 (1988) , pp. 213-219 Villores declared himself leaning towards a more active policy and seemed supportive of a broad Catholic coalition in defense of the monarchy, though he challenged the primate, cardinal Segura, and was firm to underline that monarchism could not amount to support of the liberal Alfonsine system.Segura stressed an “obligación de participar en la res publicae, los católicos podían militar en los partidos existents o fundar otros confesionales, siempre que no fuesen antidinásticos”, to which Villores replied in private letter that “debe haber sido una mala interpretación del corrector de pruebas, no el pensamiento de Va Emma Rdvma, de quien me costa, sois un antiliberal convencido, y por consecuencia, incapaz de sostener esa tesis”.
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Pancastikayasara of Kundakunda Niyamsara, another text by Kundakunda The works attributed to Kundakunda, all of them in Prakrit, can be divided in three groups. The first group comprises four original works described as "The Essence" (sara)—namely, the Niyamasara (The Essence of the Restraint, in 187 verses), the Pancastikayasara (The Essence of the Five Existents, in 153 verses), the Samayasara (The Essence of the Self, in 439 verses), and the Pravachanasara (The Essence of the Teaching, in 275 verses). The second group is a collection of ten bhaktis (devotional prayers), short compositions in praise of the acharya (Acharyabhakti), the scriptures (Srutabhakti), the mendicant conduct (Charitrabhakti), and so forth. They form the standard liturgical texts used by the Digambara in their daily rituals and bear close resemblance to similar texts employed by the Śvētāmbara, suggesting the possibility of their origin in the canonical period prior to the division of the community.
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According to Rahner, Christian faith affirms that the cosmos reaches its final fulfillment when it receives the immediate self- communication of its own ground in the spiritual creatures which are its goal and its high point. Rahner further states that God's self-communication to the world is the final goal of the world and that the process of self- transcendence makes the world already directed towards this self-communication and its acceptance by the world. As a consequence, and explaining the place of Christ in this whole process of self-transcendence of the world, Rahner says that it has to do with the process of the intercommunication of spiritual subjects, because otherwise there is no way to retain the unity of the very process. God's self-communication is given to cosmic subjects who have freedom to accept or reject it and who have intercommunication with other existents.
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He argues that the necessary existent must be unique, using a proof by contradiction, or reductio, showing that a contradiction would follow if one supposes that there were more than one necessary existent. If one postulates two necessary existents, A and B, a simplified version of the argument considers two possibilities: if A is distinct from B as a result of something implied from necessity of existence, then B would share it, too (being a necessary existent itself), and the two are not distinct after all. If, on the other hand, the distinction resulted from something not implied by necessity of existence, then this individuating factor will be a cause for A, and this means that A has a cause and is not a necessary existent after all. Either way, the opposite proposition resulted in contradiction, which to Avicenna proves the correctness of the argument.
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Upon his family's return to the Republic of Lithuania, Levinas spent two years at a Jewish gymnasium before departing for France, where he commenced his university education. Levinas began his philosophical studies at the University of Strasbourg in 1923, and his lifelong friendship with the French philosopher Maurice Blanchot. In 1928, he went to the University of Freiburg for two semesters to study phenomenology under Edmund Husserl. At Freiburg he also met Martin Heidegger, whose philosophy greatly impressed him. Levinas would in the early 1930s be one of the first French intellectuals to draw attention to Heidegger and Husserl by translating in 1931 Husserl's Cartesian Meditations (with the help of Gabrielle Peiffer and with advice from Alexandre Koyré) and by drawing on their ideas in his own philosophy, in works such as ' (The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology; his 1929/30 doctoral thesis), ' (From Existence to Existents; 1947), and ' (Discovering Existence with Husserl and Heidegger; first edition, 1949, with additions, 1967).
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