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54 Sentences With "estopped"

How to use estopped in a sentence? Find typical usage patterns (collocations)/phrases/context for "estopped" and check conjugation/comparative form for "estopped". Mastering all the usages of "estopped" from sentence examples published by news publications.

He alleged the variation agreement was binding, or if not that Wright Ltd was estopped from enforcing the full payment.
If the tenant relies on this statement in choosing to remain in the premises, the landlord could be estopped from collecting the full rent.
In addition, other parties who later attempt to re-litigate a matter already ruled on in a previous lawsuit will be estopped from doing so.
If the defendant's case is weak, there is great incentive for new parties to sue and claim that the defendant is estopped based on the prior adverse ruling.
A resident of the county in a suit to recover the amount by him paid under protest for taxes upon his property there situate is therefore estopped from raising the question as to the validity of the retrocession..
The party with the 'nol' is estopped from their non-disclosure, and is forced to impart it equitably. Yet proprietary estoppel has also arisen by acquiescence. The leading case in this area is Ramadan v Dyson (1866) LR 1 HL 129.
In a case such as this, the creditor may be estopped from relying on their legal right to repayment, as the creditor has represented that he no longer treats the debt as extant. A landlord may tell his tenant that he is not required to pay rent for a period of time ("you don't need to pay rent until the war is over"). Until the war is over, the landlord would be "estopped" from claiming rents during the war period. Estoppel is often important in insurance law, where some actions by the insurer or the agent estop the insurer from denying a claim.
App 95 S.W.2d 994, 997 For example, as between two or more claimants, a party that takes multiple and inconsistent legal positions is estopped to assert its positions against another consistent and certain claim, i.e. preferential treatment for certain over uncertain claims.
It should not, however, be confused with the so-called "ostensible" or "apparent" authority encountered when a principal is estopped from denying the agent's authority, to protect the interests of third parties. Instead, it is the agent who must acknowledge the agency relationship, to protect the principal's interests.
However, it transpired that Liverpool Victoria was under no legal obligation to renew. The claimants argued that Liverpool Victoria should be estopped from not renewing, based on their reliance. In response, Liverpool Victoria argued that estoppel was not relevant because they had not acted unconscionably but simply by mistake.
In the civil law of the common law legal systems, if a creditor states that they forgive a certain debt, they might be blocked (or estopped) from attempting to collect that same debt at a later date. Condonation would not prevent the creditor from collecting any subsequent or other debts, however.
Corporation by estoppel, on the other hand, applies against someone who operates a business as if it were a limited liability entity or corporation, irrespective of whether there was a good faith effort by the business to incorporate. The person doing business with such an entity, as if it were a limited liability entity or corporation, may later be estopped from arguing that it is not in fact a limited liability entity, in an attempt to reach the assets of the incorporators. For the same reason, defendants who had acted as a corporation will be estopped from denying liability as a corporation when sued by a plaintiff who had relied on the defendant's corporate form when dealing with the defendant.
The agent's authority to represent the principal constitutes the essence of commercial agency which may be formed in a number of ways. The principal may authorise the agent by express or implied appointment. Generally, the acts of an "agent" without actual authority cannot bind the principal. The principal may, however, be estopped from denying the agent's authority.
A more lenient approach may now exist. As Slade LJ pointed out in Peyman v Lanjani,[42] actual knowledge of the right to choose to affirm a contract or rescind is essential before one can be said to have "affirmed" a contract. and the claimant will be estopped from rescinding. The time limit for taking such steps varies depending on the type of misrepresentation.
Arthur is precluded by Arthur's previous conduct from denying that Boucher had authority to receive the payment on Arthur's behalf. In other words, Arthur is estopped from denying that Boucher acted as Arthur's agent in receiving the money from Kallis. In paying Boucher, Kallis is deemed to have paid Arthur and has discharged the obligation.See Faure v Louw; Maclear School Board v Roberts 1911 EDL 205.
Hartford persuaded the court of appeals to reverse the district court's judgment on the basis of the article, and is therefore estopped from claiming it was not effective. Moreover: "The article, even if true, should have stood or fallen under the only title it could honestly have been given—that of a brief in behalf of Hartford, prepared by Hartford's agents, attorneys, and collaborators." 322 U.S. 246-47.
Barnes & Noble, Inc., 269 Ga. 695, 697(2), 506 S.E.2d 116 (1998): "[A] grantor who conveys by warranty deed an interest that he does not then own, but later acquires, will be estopped to deny the validity of the first deed. It is generally understood, however, that this doctrine cannot be used to transfer title or to cure flaws in the legal requirements for the creation of a property interest." 3\.
Licensee estoppel is a doctrine under which a licensee of an intellectual property right, generally a patent or a trademark, is estopped from challenging the validity of the licensed property. The basis for the doctrine is the premise that a licensee should not be able to enjoy the benefit of an agreement and at the same time attack the validity of the intellectual property that forms the basis of the agreement.Adkins v. Lear, Inc.
City of Indianapolis, 540 N.E.2d 1189, 1191 (Ind. 1989). #A creditor unofficially informs a debtor that the creditor forgives the debt between them. Even if such forgiveness is not formally documented, the creditor may be estopped from changing its mind and seeking to collect the debt, because that change would be unfair. #A landlord informs a tenant that rent has been reduced, for example, because there was construction or a lapse in utility services.
Parties may be estopped from litigating determinations on issues made in prior actions. The determination may be an issue of fact or an issue of law. Preclusion requires that the issue decided was decided as part of a valid final judgment. In the United States, valid final judgments of state courts are given preclusive effect in other state and federal courts under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
Similarly in Inwards v Baker [1965] 2 QB 29, a father encouraged his son to build a house on his own land, promising to leave that land to the son in his will. Subsequently, the son built a house and lived there for some 30 years. No transfer of land was made in the father's will when he died. It was held that despite this the personal representatives of the father were estopped from evicting the son.
Alito went on to discuss the lack of a provision for prospective waiver in the statute. The Court then rejected the government's alternate theory of the case: that the defendant, having agreed to the waiver, is now estopped from challenging it. The Court declines to apply estoppel doctrines, stating that it would "entirely swallow the Act's no-waiver policy." Furthermore, the Court found, since the district court requested the waiver, rather than the defendant, estoppel is not applicable.
Writing the majority opinion, Justice Noah Haynes Swayne stated only that: > The plaintiff in error is estopped from raising the point which he seeks to > have decided. He cannot, under the circumstances, vicariously raise a > question, nor force upon the parties to the compact an issue which neither > of them desires to make. However, the U.S. Circuit Court of the District of Columbia did rule in 1849 that retrocession was constitutional in the case Sheehy vs. the Bank of the Potomac.
He also agreed that he would compel Bowyer, the holder of another lease, to consent to the assignment of that lease. The plaintiff argued that Bowyer was precluded (estopped) from objecting to the assignment, even though he had the legal power to make such an objection. The plaintiff claimed that Barber and Bowyer were acting in collusion, and that Bowyer had refused assent to the assignment on Barber's instructions. Therefore, allowing him to refuse consent would work a gross fraud upon the plaintiff.
Estoppel by deed is a rule of evidence arising from the status of a contract signed under seal—such agreements, called deeds, are more strictly enforced than ordinary contracts and the parties are expected to take greater care to verify the contents before signing them. Hence, once signed, all statements of fact (usually found in the opening recital which sets out the reason(s) for making the deed) are conclusive evidence against the parties who are estopped from asserting otherwise.
The eleven judge panel found that the Army was estopped from using Watkins' statements and behavior against him but did not address the constitutional issues. It was the first time a U.S. appellate court ruled against the U.S. military's ban on service by gays and lesbians. The Bush administration sought Supreme Court review of that decision without success. Watkins initially planned to reenlist, but settled instead for a retroactive promotion to sergeant first class, $135,000 in retroactive pay, full retirement benefits, and an honorable discharge.
Jonathan Parker J held Collins had overpaid Davis and Satterfield and he was entitled to set future royalties off against half of the sums overpaid. He said the overpayment was a mistake of fact, because Collins thought they had played in all 15 tracks. Collins was not estopped from maintaining there was overpayment of royalties because there was never any assumption between the parties that Davis and Satterfield would get royalties for all 15 tracks and there was no acquiescence in the assumption. Overpayment was not acquiescence.
Oliver J noted that Mr Scott and Mr Essayan for the claimants said: one’s state of mind was irrelevant. Mr Millett for Liverpool Victoria argued that unconscionability was necessary, following Fry J in the earlier leading case of Willmott v Barber. The judge noted: Oliver J clarified that Willmott was only a case applicable to situations where someone had stood by without protest as his rights were infringed.151-152 Knowledge of one of the parties alleged to be estopped is just one of many relevant factors.
At the end of the war the flats became fully let, and the claimants demanded the return to payment of full rent. Denning J held that they were entitled to this from the last two quarters of 1945. Denning mentioned in an obiter dictum that had the plaintiffs tried to be reimbursed for the full amount they would have been estopped from doing so even though no consideration was present. This is because the plaintiff represented that he would accept half the rent and the defendant acted upon this.
The Court accepted that the Ohio divorce would not be recognised in the Irish State. Consequently, the ceremony of marriage between the appellant and the respondent that took place in 1983 was invalid. However, it was acknowledged that such a situation would allow for considerable injustice to the appellant and also the respondent's previous wife who believed she had been divorced from the respondent. In answering the question posed, however, the Supreme Court answered in the negative - the respondent could not be estopped from denying that he was married to the appellant.
Connivance is the act of conniving or conspiring, especially with the knowledge of and active or passive consent to wrongdoing or a twist in truth, to make something appear as something that it is not. A legal finding of connivance may be made when an accuser has assisted in the act about which they are complaining. In some legal jurisdictions, and for certain behaviors, it may prevent the accuser from prevailing. For example, if someone were to entice their spouse to commit adultery, they might be blocked (or estopped) from divorcing their spouse on grounds of that adultery.
The US courts found Boesch liable. The rights that Boesch had under German law did not entitle him to import the product into the US. That is governed by US law. The US patentee had never "received any royalty or given any license to use the patented article in any part of the United States." Accordingly, the court held, a foreign sale does not of its own force authorize importation into the US. This does not mean, however, that a patentee by its conduct cannot waive its US rights, be estopped from asserting them, or be found to have granted an implied license.
Walton Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387 Yet, where an assurance concerns rights over property, a variant "proprietary estoppel" does allow a claimant to plead estoppel as a cause of action. So in Crabb v Arun District Council, Mr Crabbe was assured he would have the right to an access point to his land by Arun District Council, and relying on that he sold off half the property where the only existing access point was. The council was estopped from not doing what they said they would.See, Crabb v Arun District Council [1976] 1 Ch 170.
In all cases it allows people who act on others' assurances about legal rights, even without them attaining express agreement. For example, in Crabb v Arun District Council a farmer acquired the right to a path over the council's land, because they had assured him that if he sold off one portion an access point would remain.. In all cases, the minimum pattern of an assurance, reliance and some form of detriment is present. The High Court also recently confirmed that the onus of proof in relation to detrimental reliance cannot be shifted to the estopped party..
The High Court held that to avoid detriment through Waltons' unconscionable behaviour, Waltons was estopped from denying the contract. Whilst the mere exercise of legal right not to exchange contracts was not unconscionable, there were two additional elements which made Waltons' conduct unconscionable: a) element of urgency, b) Maher executed and forwarded on 11/11 and assumed execution by Walton was a formality. The award (though very similar to an expectation interest, as if it were a contract that was enforced) was only meant to cover reliance. Because Maher had acted to his detriment, in reliance on the encouragement of Walton Stores, which had acted unconscionably, equity would intervene.
The court held that since the property in question was previously marketed by the seller as a "haunted house" he was estopped from claiming the contrary. The majority opinion specifically noted that the veracity of the claims of paranormal activities were outside the purview of the opinion. Notwithstanding these conclusions, the court affirmed the dismissal of the fraudulent misrepresentation action and stated that the realtor was under no duty to disclose the haunting to potential buyers. A previous version of this article stated that serious illness (such as AIDS) is also a reason a property may become stigmatized, citing a Florida law that contradicts federal law.
In fact he may be able to prove his civil case even when the driver is found not guilty in the criminal trial, because the standard to determine guilt is higher than the standard to determine fault. However, if a driver is found by a civil jury not to have been negligent, a prosecutor may be estopped from charging him criminally. If the plaintiff has shown that the defendant is liable, the main remedy in a civil court is the amount of money, or "damages", which the defendant should pay to the plaintiff. Alternative civil remedies include restitution or transfer of property, or an injunction to restrain or order certain actions.
The grantor purports to convey > the right to exclude others, in the one instance, from a defined tract of > land, and in the other, from a described and limited field of the useful > arts. The difference between the two cases is only the practical one of > fixing exactly what is the subject matter conveyed.’’Westinghouse’’, 266 > U.S. at 348-50. He then quoted a lower court opinion to clarify the limits of the doctrine: > It seems to be well settled that the assignor of a patent is estopped from > saying his patent is void for want of novelty or utility, or because > anticipated by prior inventions.
Although the subcontractor was indeed negligent, being in breach of the duty of care established in Donoghue v Stevenson 1921, the Court of Appeal held that it was clearly intended that the employer should bear the whole risk of damage by fire, including fire caused by the negligence of the contractor or of any subcontractors, especially as the contractors had responded to Clause 20A by omitting insurance costings in their tenders. Clause 20A was thus effectively a waiver saying that in the event of fire damage Norwich CC (rather than other parties) would be deemed liable for any loss; so Norwich CC was estopped from claiming otherwise.
The court, however, did not rule on the core constitutional matter of the retrocession. Writing the majority opinion, Justice Noah Swayne stated only that: > The plaintiff in error is estopped from raising the point which he seeks to > have decided. He cannot, under the circumstances, vicariously raise a > question, nor force upon the parties to the compact an issue which neither > of them desires to make. Arlington House, a mansion commissioned by a step-grandson of George Washington, last used as a residence by Robert E. Lee With barely separating the two capital cities, Northern Virginia found itself in the center of much of the conflict.
The District Court, Jones, J., held that: # Operator did not directly infringe on author's copyrighted works; # Author granted operator implied license to display "cached" links to web pages containing his copyrighted works; # Author was estopped from asserting copyright infringement claim against operator; # Fair use doctrine protected operator's use of author's works; and # Search engine fell within protection of safe harbor provision of Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). Summary judgment for operator. The court held that "Field decided to manufacture a claim for copyright infringement against Google in the hopes of making-money from Google's standard practice." The court then went on to rule in Google's favor on all of its defense theories.
Promissory estoppel requires (1) an unequivocal promise by words or conduct, (2) a change in position of the promisee as a result of the promise (not necessarily to their detriment), (3) inequity if the promisor were to go back on the promise. Estoppel is "a shield not a sword" – it cannot be used as the basis of an action on its own. It also does not extinguish rights. In High Trees the plaintiff company was able to restore payment of full rent (although estopped back rent was lost) from early 1945, but would have been able to restore full rent at any time after the initial promise provided a suitable period of notice had been given.
Estoppel is a judicial device in common law legal systems whereby a court may prevent or "estop" a person from making assertions or from going back on his or her word; the person being sanctioned is "estopped".Black's Law Dictionary defines estoppel as a "bar or impediment raised by the law, which precludes a man from alleging or from denying a certain fact or state of facts, in consequence of his previous allegation or denial or conduct or admission, or in consequence of a final adjudication of the matter in a court of law". Estoppel may prevent someone from bringing a particular claim. Legal doctrines of estoppel are based in both common law and equity.
Deane's successors in title, who were currently in possession of the land, contended that they and those from whom they claimed the land had been in "open, continuous adverse possession" of the disputed land for more than thirty years prior to the start of the current action, and had paid taxes due on the land; the plaintiffs and those from whom they claimed had not been in possession for any period of time exceeding thirty years or paid taxes. They further contended that equitable title came from the United States starting in 1803, that the United States had made no attempt to claim the land itself, and that the previous holding in the 1836 equity suit by John Deane estopped the plaintiffs from now trying to claim the land.
Near the beginning of the majority opinion (three out of five justices) appears its most well-known conclusion: "having reported [the ghosts'] presence in both a national publication... and the local press... defendant is estopped to deny their existence and, as a matter of law, the house is haunted." The court noted that regardless of whether the house was truly haunted or not, the fact that the house had been widely reported as being haunted greatly affected its value. Notwithstanding these conclusions, the court affirmed the dismissal of the fraudulent misrepresentation action and stated that the realtor was under no duty to disclose the haunting to potential buyers. Thus, no damages were available to Stambovsky because New York, at the time, adhered to property law doctrine of caveat emptor.
Promissory estoppel, however, has been thought to be incapable of raising an independent cause of action, so that one may only plead another party is estopped from enforcing their strict legal rights as a "shield", but cannot bring a cause of action out of estoppel as a "sword".e.g. Combe v Combe [1952] EWCA Civ 7 In Australia, this rule was relaxed in Walton Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher, where Mr Maher was encouraged to believe he would have a contract to sell his land, and began knocking down his existing building before Walton Stores finally told him they did not wish to complete. Mr Maher got generous damages covering his loss (i.e. reliance damages, but seemingly damages for loss of expectations as if there were a contract).
In his decision, U.S. District Court Judge Gerald J. Weber first noted that the jurisdictional situation was unclear. While no previous cases had been brought by or against Satan and so no official precedent existed, there was an "unofficial account of a trial in New Hampshire where this defendant filed an action of mortgage foreclosure as plaintiff", a reference to the 1936 short story "The Devil and Daniel Webster" by Stephen Vincent Benét. Judge Weber suggested that the Devil (who had claimed in that story to be an American), should he appear, might have been therefore estopped from arguing a lack of personal jurisdiction. In this context, the Court noted that Satan was a foreign prince, but did not have occasion to address whether, if sued as a defendant, he would be able to claim sovereign immunity from suit.
If the patent office accepts claims that have been invented, published or even patented before, ignoring material prior art, then even existing technologies in use are subject to patent trolling. Reexamination to invalidate the patent based on prior art can be requested, but requests are typically made only after a lawsuit is filed or threatened (about 0.33% of patents in U.S. have re- examination requested)USPTO 2005 annual report , Table 13A and 13B and often in conjunction with an infringement lawsuit.Robert A. Saltzberg and Mehran Arjomand, Reexaminations Increase in Popularity , Morrison and Foerster, September 2007 Only the patent holder will participate in this process, and the party requesting the reexamination has no right of appeal and is estopped from using the same evidence in any subsequent civil action; this risk keeps the popularity of reexamination low despite its lower cost.Patent Reexamination by Robert J. Yarbrough.
The court held that the Moscow on the Hudson poster was not a parody because it was not meant to satirize the Steinberg image itself, but merely satirized the same concept of the parochial New Yorker that was parodied by Steinberg's work. Because the copyrighted work was not an object of the parody, the appropriation of the image was not fair use. The defendants also argued that Steinberg was estopped from defending his copyright on the grounds that he had taken no action over a period of eight years to stop others from counterfeiting his posters and adapting his idea to other locations, and had not acted in response to newspaper ads promoting the movie. The court rejected this argument, holding that the defendants had not proved any of the elements of estoppel: (1) a representation in fact; (2) reasonable reliance thereon; and (3) injury or damage resulting from denial by the party making the representation.
The land was sold by the company to George W. Miller, to whom a certificate of sale was given, which afterwards was assigned to Lewis Dunmeyer, to whom the company made a deed purporting to convey a good title. On this covenant for good title Dunmeyer brought the present action, alleging that the railroad company never had any title, and that the covenant was therefore broken. On this issue the case was tried. Several other defenses were set up, among them that the covenant was not broken, because Dunmeyer was in possession when he bought the certificate issued to Miller and when he took his deed, and has never been disturbed or ousted; that Miller was in possession when he bought of the company and transferred possession to Dunmeyer, and that this has been held ever since, and that Miller's purchase was a compromise of disputed rights, and he and Dunmeyer are therefore estopped to maintain this action.
The Army, despite recently losing in court and settling its dispute with another gay servicemember, Leonard Matlovich, expected to win its case against Watkins. The Army cited Watkins' failure to answer questions about his intentions with respect to future homosexual conduct, but in October 1982, District Judge Barbara Rothstein ruled for Watkins, finding that the Army was estopped from using Watkins' statements against him after repeatedly allowing him to serve and granting him security clearances despite knowing he was gay. As the case proceeded, the Army allowed Watkins to reenlist for another 6 years with the understanding that he would be separated from the military if the District Court's decision was not upheld. In 1983, the Army prevented him from dancing in drag at an army recreation center at Fort Lewis, Washington.Jet, January 3, 1983, available online, accessed May 14, 2013 A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's decision in 1983, finding that the lower court could not require Army officials to act in contradiction of Army regulations unless the regulations themselves were ruled invalid.
Vague or ambiguous allegations broad enough to encompass a range of possibilities both within and without coverage are usually construed in favor of a potential for coverage, but speculation about unpled allegations (that is, matters on which the complaint is totally silent) is insufficient to create a potential for coverage. Some jurisdictions allow extrinsic evidence to be considered, either because it is expressly described in the complaint or it is relevant to the facts expressly alleged in the complaint. If there is a duty to defend, it means the insurer must defend the insured against the entire lawsuit even if most of the claims or causes of action in the complaint are clearly not covered. An insurer can choose to defend unconditionally without reserving any rights, but by doing so, it waives (or is later estopped from asserting) the absence of coverage as a defense to the duty to defend and impliedly commits to defending the insured to a final judgment or a settlement regardless of how long it takes (unless the policy expressly provides that defense costs reduce policy limits).
In a further alternative plea, the government said that Vianini was estopped from claiming by reason of the fact that, before the government entered into the contract, it had notified Vianini, who had agreed thereto, that it proposed entering into similar contracts with various other firms in respect of its requirements of pipes and that it would purchase either from Vianini or from such other firms; that such contracts were entered into; and that, if Vianini had not agreed to the government entering into such contracts, the government would not, as Vianini knew, have entered into the contract claimed on. The court held that, as a plea of estoppel, the plea was had inasmuch as no representation made by the plaintiff was alleged. If the plea was intended to raise the exceptio doli, it was also bad, inasmuch as the defendant accepted the written contract as a true and valid contract and the plea in its present form merely set up an oral agreement inconsistent with the written contract and made before the written contract was executed. The decision of the Transvaal Provincial Division in Vianini Ferro Concrete Pipes (Pty.) Ltd v Union Government was thus confirmed.
Firstly, it included a clause stating that any amount which Mr Johnson wished to subsequently claim against Gore Wood in his personal capacity would be limited to £250,000 excluding interest and costs. Secondly, the confidentiality clause contained an except which permitted the settlement agreement to be referred to in any action which Mr Johnson might bring against Gore Wood. Mr Johnson then subsequently issued proceedings against Gore Wood in his personal name, and Gore Wood made applications to strike out some or all of the claims on the basis that (i) it was an abuse of process to seek to relitigate issues which had already been compromised in the settlement agreement, and (ii) some or all of the claims which Mr Johnson was making were for losses sustained by WWH, and his personal claims should be disallowed as reflective loss. At first instance Mr Johnson succeeded as Pumfrey J in the High Court held that Gore Wood was estopped by convention from contending that the claims were an abuse of process as both parties had tacitly agreed that such claims could be brought when they entered into the settlement agreement.

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