57 Sentences With "epistemologists" | Random Sentence Generator

It is enough to scramble the minds of copyright lawyers and epistemologists alike.

Feminist epistemologists have developed the notion of situated knowledge to counter standard analytic approaches that treat knowledge as the goal of an isolated mind (à la Descartes), abstracted from concrete life situations such as the knower's body, emotions, values and social roles.

Regardless, the struggle Simone's dealing with now bears some relationship to what epistemologists call the problem of other minds: How do we know that other people feel and think the way we feel and think, or in a closely related way we can understand?

Many epistemologists studying justification have attempted to argue for various types of chains of reasoning that can escape the regress problem.

Many contemporary epistemologists reject the view that evidential support is the whole story about the justification of beliefs. While no sensible epistemologists generally urge people to disregard their evidence when forming beliefs, many believe that a more complete theory would introduce considerations about the processes that initiate and sustain beliefs. An example of one such theory is reliabilism. The most influential proponent of reliabilism is Alvin Goldman.

Some philosophers however, argue that religious belief is warranted without evidence and hence are sometimes called non-evidentialists. They include fideists and reformed epistemologists. Alvin Plantinga and other reformed epistemologists are examples of philosophers who argue that religious beliefs are "properly basic beliefs" and that it is not irrational to hold them even though they are not supported by any evidence.Rowe 2007, pp 106Meister 2009, p. 161.

Religious epistemologists have formulated and defended reasons for the rationality of accepting belief in God without the support of an argument. Some religious epistemologists hold that belief in God is more analogous to belief in a person than belief in a scientific hypothesis. Human relations demand trust and commitment. If belief in God is more like belief in other persons, then the trust that is appropriate to persons will be appropriate to God.

The most famous (or infamous) proponent of epistemic minimalism is Crispin Sartwell (1991). The view has been criticized by many epistemologists, with an influential criticism being delivered by William Lycan (1994).

Virtue epistemologists differ in the role they believe virtue to play: eliminative virtue epistemology uses the concepts of intellectual virtue and intellectual vice to do away with epistemic concepts like knowledge and justification, while non- eliminative virtue epistemology gives a role for such traditional concepts and uses virtue to provide substantive explanation of those concepts. Virtue epistemologists differ in what they believe epistemic virtues to be. Some accounts are Aristotelian, drawing a relationship between intellectual virtue and character in a similar way to the way moral virtue is related to character, while "weak" virtue epistemology have an account that doesn't require any particular commitment or cultivation of intellectual virtue. Abrol Fairweather argues that these "weak" virtue epistemologists "merely [use] virtue theory as a novel lexicon for expressing an independent epistemic theory".

Infallibilism states that knowledge requires certainty, such that, certainty is what serves to bridge the gap so that we arrive at knowledge, which means we would have an adequate definition of knowledge. However, infallibilism is rejected by the overwhelming majority of philosophers/epistemologists.

Dignaga founded a school of Buddhist epistemology and logic. Epistemology is the branch of philosophy that studies knowledge. Epistemologists examine putative sources of knowledge, including perceptual experience, reason, memory, and testimony. They also investigate questions about the nature of truth, belief, justification, and rationality.

An epistemological axiom is a self-evident truth. Thus the "Axiom of Causality" claims to be a universal rule that is so obvious that it does not need to be proved to be accepted. Even among epistemologists, the existence of such a rule is controversial. See the full article on Epistemology.

The epistemic virtues, as identified by virtue epistemologists, reflect their contention that belief is an ethical process, and thus susceptible to the intellectual virtue or vice of one's own life and personal experiences. Some epistemic virtues have been identified by W. Jay Wood, based on research into the medieval tradition.

Windows of Modernism: Selected Letters of Dorothy Richardson, ed. Gloria G. Fromm Athens, Georgia, University of Georgia Press, 1995, 282. Richardson hated the term, calling it in 1949 "that lamentably meaningless metaphor 'The Shroud of Consciousness' borrowed ... by May Sinclair from the epistemologists, ... to describe my work, & still, in Lit. criticism. pushing its inane career".

Adams, Robert M. (1987). The Virtue of Faith And Other Essays in Philosophical Theology Analytic epistemology and metaphysics has formed the basis for some philosophically-sophisticated theistic arguments, like those of the reformed epistemologists like Plantinga. Analytic philosophy of religion has also been preoccupied with Wittgenstein, as well as his interpretation of Søren Kierkegaard's philosophy of religion.Creegan, Charles. (1989).

Adams, Robert M. (1987). The Virtue of Faith And Other Essays in Philosophical Theology Analytic epistemology and metaphysics has formed the basis for a number of philosophically-sophisticated theistic arguments, like those of the reformed epistemologists like Plantinga. Analytic philosophy of religion has also been preoccupied with Ludwig Wittgenstein, as well as his interpretation of Søren Kierkegaard's philosophy of religion.Creegan, Charles. (1989).

Barry Stroud claims that doing epistemology competently requires the historical study of past attempts to find philosophical understanding of the nature and scope of human knowledge. He argues that since inquiry may progress over time, we may not realize how different the questions that contemporary epistemologists ask are from questions asked at various different points in the history of philosophy.

A key aspect of feminist political theory/philosophy is feminist epistemology. Feminist epistemologists question the objectivity of social and philosophical sciences by contending that standards of authority and credibility are socially constructed and thus reflect and re-entrench the sociopolitical status quo. Thus, one common feminist methodological solution is to include many diverse voices reflecting all parts of society in the process of knowledge-making.

It could be argued that alethiology is synonymous with epistemology, the study of knowledge, and that dividing the two is mere semantics, but sometimes a distinction is made between the two. Epistemology is the study of knowledge and its acquisition. Alethiology is specifically concerned with the nature of truth, which is only one of the areas studied by epistemologists. The term alethiology is rare.

Such use of analogy and comparison is, state the Indian epistemologists, a valid means of conditional knowledge, as it helps the traveller identify the new animal later.James Lochtefeld, "Upamana" in The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Hinduism, Vol. 2: N-Z, Rosen Publishing. , page 721 The subject of comparison is formally called upameyam, the object of comparison is called upamanam, while the attribute(s) are identified as samanya.

His epistemic norms are governed by defeasible reasoning; they are ceteris paribus conditions that can admit exceptions. Several other epistemologists (notably at Brown University, such as Ernest Sosa,and especially Roderick Chisholm), as well as his Arizona colleague Keith Lehrer, had written about defeasibility and epistemology. But Pollock's book, which combined a broad scope and a crucial innovation, brought the ideas into the philosophical mainstream.

The theory of justification is the part of epistemology that attempts to understand the justification of propositions and beliefs. Epistemologists are concerned with various epistemic features of belief, which include the ideas of justification, warrant, rationality, and probability. Of these four terms, the term that has been most widely used and discussed by the early 21st century is "warrant". Loosely speaking, justification is the reason that someone (probably) holds a belief.

Thalberg published two books of philosophical studies through the Muirhead Library of Philosophy: Enigmas of Agency (Allen & Unwin, London, 1972), and Perception, Emotion & Action (Blackwells, Oxford, 1977). Unlike most epistemologists, Thalberg published articles that defended the Platonic tripartite analysis of knowledge (justified true belief, a.k.a. "JTB") against the more popular view that Gettier counterexamples refuted the JTB account. Specifically, Thalberg argued that justification is not transmissible through valid deduction.

There is much less agreement about the extent to which a knower must know why something is true in order to know. On such views, something being known implies that it is true. However, this should not be confused for the more contentious view that one must know that one knows in order to know (the KK principle). Epistemologists disagree about whether belief is the only truth-bearer.

Feminist epistemology is a subfield of epistemology which applies feminist theory to epistemological questions. It began to emerge as a distinct subfield in the 20th century. Prominent feminist epistemologists include Miranda Fricker (who developed the concept of epistemic injustice), Donna Haraway (who first proposed the concept of situated knowledge), Sandra Harding, and Elizabeth Anderson. Harding proposes that feminist epistemology can be broken into three distinct categories: Feminist empiricism, standpoint epistemology, and postmodern epistemology.

Contextualism in epistemology then is a semantic thesis about how 'knows' works in English, not a theory of what knowledge, justification, or strength of epistemic position consists in.Stanley (2005), p. 17. However, epistemologists combine contextualism with views about what knowledge is to address epistemological puzzles and issues, such as skepticism, the Gettier problem, and the Lottery paradox. Contextualist accounts of knowledge became increasingly popular toward the end of the 20th century, particularly as responses to the problem of skepticism.

Drake showed how the complex interaction of experimental measurement and mathematical analysis led Galileo to his law of falling bodies. Two New Sciences refutes Alexandre Koyré's claim that experiment played no significant part in Galileo's thought by demonstration, for example in Drake's models of Galileo's experiments. In 1984 Drake was awarded the Galileo Galilei Prize for the Italian History of Science by the Italian Rotary Clubs. The jury was composed of Italian epistemologists and science historians.

In contemporary philosophy, epistemologists including Ernest Sosa, John Greco, Jonathan Kvanvig, Linda Zagzebski, and Duncan Pritchard have defended virtue epistemology as a solution to the value problem. They argue that epistemology should also evaluate the "properties" of people as epistemic agents (i.e. intellectual virtues), rather than merely the properties of propositions and propositional mental attitudes. The value problem has been presented as an argument against epistemic reliabilism by Linda Zagzebski, Wayne Riggs, and Richard Swinburne, among others.

According to Kvanvig, an adequate account of knowledge should resist counterexamples and allow an explanation of the value of knowledge over mere true belief. Should a theory of knowledge fail to do so, it would prove inadequate. One of the more influential responses to the problem is that knowledge is not particularly valuable and is not what ought to be the main focus of epistemology. Instead, epistemologists ought to focus on other mental states, such as understanding.

While the Nyaya school (beginning with the Nyāya Sūtras of Gotama, between 6th-century BCE and 2nd-century CEJeaneane Fowler (2002), Perspectives of Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Hinduism, Sussex Academic Press, , p. 129B.K. Matilal "Perception. An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge" (Oxford University Press, 1986), p. xiv.) were a proponent of realism and supported four pramanas (perception, inference, comparison/analogy and testimony), the Buddhist epistemologists (Dignaga and Dharmakirti) generally accepted only perception and inference.

Infallibilism is rejected by most contemporary epistemologists, who generally accept that one can have knowledge based on fallible justification. Baron Reed has provided an account of the reasons why infallibilism is so widely regarded as untenable today. Nevertheless, an increasing number of contemporary philosophers have presented arguments in defense infalliblism and have therefore come to reject fallibilism. For instance, Mark Kaplan defends such a view in a 2006 paper entitled "If You Know You Can't Be Wrong".

It is particularly associated with a theory discussed in Plato's dialogues Meno and Theaetetus. While in fact Plato seems to disavow justified true belief as constituting knowledge at the end of Theaetetus, the claim that Plato unquestioningly accepted this view of knowledge stuck. The subject of justification has played a major role in the value of knowledge as "justified true belief". Some contemporary epistemologists, such as Jonathan Kvanvig assert that justification isn't necessary in getting to the truth and avoiding errors.

The question, then, is how it can be possible for conscious experiences to arise out of a lump of gray matter endowed with nothing but electrochemical properties. A related problem is to explain how someone's propositional attitudes (e.g. beliefs and desires) can cause that individual's neurons to fire and his muscles to contract in exactly the correct manner. These comprise some of the puzzles that have confronted epistemologists and philosophers of mind from at least the time of René Descartes.

Hasker credited Alston with developing his arguments with "great care and attention to detail." He predicted that Perceiving God would "set the standard for the discussion of its topic for at least the next several years." He believed that it "advances well beyond previous work on the subject, including Alston's own previously published writings" and "offers a wealth of careful analyses, compelling arguments, and forceful claims which will take epistemologists of religion a considerable time to assimilate." Van Woudenberg endorsed Alston's criticism of Proudfoot.

As mentioned above, epistemologists draw a distinction between what can be known a priori (independently of experience) and what can only be known a posteriori (through experience). Much of what we call a priori knowledge is thought to be attained through reason alone, as featured prominently in rationalism. This might also include a non-rational faculty of intuition, as defended by proponents of innatism. In contrast, a posteriori knowledge is derived entirely through experience or as a result of experience, as emphasized in empiricism.

IRI, on the other hand, argues that it is the context of the practical interests of the subject of the knowledge attribution that determines the epistemic standards. Stanley writes that bare IRI is "simply the claim that whether or not someone knows that p may be determined in part by practical facts about the subject's environment."Stanley (2005), p. 85. ("Contextualism" is a misnomer for either form of Invariantism, since "Contextualism" among epistemologists is considered to be restricted to a claim about the context- sensitivity of knowledge attributions (or the word "knows").

Robert Reid, Knowledge (1896). Thomas Jefferson Building, Washington, D.C. Knowledge is the primary subject of the field of epistemology, which studies what we know, how we come to know it, and what it means to know something. The definition of knowledge is a matter of ongoing debate among epistemologists. The classical definition, described but not ultimately endorsed by Plato,In Plato's Theaetetus, Socrates and Theaetetus discuss three definitions of knowledge: knowledge as nothing but perception, knowledge as true judgment, and, finally, knowledge as a true judgment with an account.

Each of these definitions is shown to be unsatisfactory. specifies that a statement must meet three criteria in order to be considered knowledge: it must be justified, true, and believed. Epistemologists today generally agree that these conditions are not sufficient, as various Gettier cases are thought to demonstrate. There are a number of alternative definitions which have been proposed, including Robert Nozick's proposal that all instances of knowledge must 'track the truth' and Simon Blackburn's proposal that those who have a justified true belief 'through a defect, flaw, or failure' fail to have knowledge.

Upamāna (उपमान) means comparison and analogy. Upamana, states Lochtefeld, may be explained with the example of a traveller who has never visited lands or islands with endemic population of wildlife. He or she is told, by someone who has been there, that in those lands you see an animal that sort of looks like a cow, grazes like cow but is different from a cow in such and such way. Such use of analogy and comparison is, state the Indian epistemologists, a valid means of conditional knowledge, as it helps the traveller identify the new animal later.

Kornblith is perhaps most well known for his defense of the view that knowledge is a natural kind. This claim is defended in his book Knowledge and its Place in Nature (Oxford University Press, 2002) where Kornblith argues that knowledge, as it is being studied in cognitive ethology, is a sufficiently robust and inductively valuable category to qualify as a natural kind. Consequently, he claims, the proper method for epistemology is empirical, contrary to what has been assumed by most epistemologists, who traditionally have proceeded by way of conceptual analysis and the probing of intuitions rather than by way of empirical investigation.

Timothy Williamson has advanced a theory of knowledge according to which knowledge is not justified true belief plus some extra condition(s), but primary. In his book Knowledge and its Limits, Williamson argues that the concept of knowledge cannot be broken down into a set of other concepts through analysis—instead, it is sui generis. Thus, according to Williamson, justification, truth, and belief are necessary but not sufficient for knowledge. Williamson is also known for being one of the only philosophers who take knowledge to be a mental state; most epistemologists assert that belief (as opposed to knowledge) is a mental state.

Though formally oriented epistemologists have been laboring since the emergence of formal logic and probability theory (if not earlier), only recently have they been organized under a common disciplinary title. This gain in popularity may be attributed to the organization of yearly Formal Epistemology Workshops by Branden Fitelson and Sahotra Sarkar, starting in 2004, and the PHILOG-conferences starting in 2002 (The Network for Philosophical Logic and Its Applications) organized by Vincent F. Hendricks. Carnegie Mellon University's Philosophy Department hosts an annual summer school in logic and formal epistemology. In 2010, the department founded the Center for Formal Epistemology.

Plantinga argues that the theories of what he calls "warrant"—what many others have called justification (Plantinga draws out a difference: justification is a matter of fulfilling one's epistemic duties, whereas warrant is what transforms true belief into knowledge)—put forth by these epistemologists have failed to capture in full what is required for knowledge.Plantinga, Warrant: The Current Debate, 1993. 3. In the second book of his three book philosophical series, Warrant and Proper Function, he introduces the notion of warrant as an alternative to justification and discusses topics like self-knowledge, memories, perception, and probability. Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.

SE was popularized by Anthony Magnabosco who has uploaded many examples of SE conversations he has had to a YouTube channel, created many resources surrounding the topic, and engages with a community of Street Epistemologists looking to become proficient in the method and apply it in their lives. Magnabosco is the founder of Street Epistemology International, a non-profit organization "whose mission is to encourage and normalize critical thinking and skepticism while providing people around the world with the resources needed to develop and promote Street Epistemology." Resources are available for the community of SE practitioners, which include a guide on how to perform interviews using the style.

Justification (also called epistemic justification) is a concept in epistemology used to describe beliefs that one has good reason for holding. Epistemologists are concerned with various epistemic features of belief, which include the ideas of warrant (a proper justification for holding a belief), knowledge, rationality, and probability, among others. Loosely speaking, justification is the reason that someone holds a rationally admissible belief (although the term is also sometimes applied to other propositional attitudes such as doubt). Debates surrounding epistemic justification often involve the structure of justification, including whether there are foundational justified beliefs or whether mere coherence is sufficient for a system of beliefs to qualify as justified.

In modern philosophy, the coherence theory of truth was defended by Baruch Spinoza, Immanuel Kant, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Karl Wilhelm Friedrich Schlegel,Elizabeth Millan, Friedrich Schlegel and the Emergence of Romantic Philosophy, SUNY Press, 2012, p. 49. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Harold Henry Joachim (who is credited with the definitive formulation of the theory).Harold Henry Joachim (1868—1938) (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy) However, Spinoza and Kant have also been interpreted as defenders of the correspondence theory of truth.The Correspondence Theory of Truth (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) In contemporary philosophy, several epistemologists have significantly contributed to and defended the theory, primarily Brand Blanshard (who gave the earliest characterization of the theory in contemporary times) and Nicholas Rescher.

Since Gettier, "knowledge" is no longer widely accepted as meaning "justified true belief" only. However, some epistemologists still consider knowledge to have a justification condition. Traditional theories of justification (foundationalism and coherentism) and indeed some philosophers consider an infinite regress not to be a valid justification. In their view, if A is justified by B, B by C, and so forth, then either # The chain must end with a link that requires no independent justification (a foundation), # The chain must come around in a circle in some finite number of steps (the belief may be justified by its coherence), or # Our beliefs must not be justified after all (as is posited by philosophical skeptics).

British epistemologists, following Moore, suggested that humans have a special faculty, a faculty of moral intuition, which tells us what is good and bad, right and wrong. Ethical intuitionists assert that, if we see a good person or a right action, and our faculty of moral intuition is sufficiently developed and unimpaired, we simply intuit that the person is good or that the action is right. Moral intuition is supposed to be a mental process different from other, more familiar faculties like sense-perception, and that moral judgments are its outputs. When someone judges something to be good, or some action to be right, then the person is using the faculty of moral intuition.

121–123 (1963). The extent to which this is true is highly contentious, since Plato himself disavowed the "justified true belief" view at the end of the Theaetetus. Regardless of the accuracy of the claim, Gettier's paper produced major widespread discussion which completely reoriented epistemology in the second half of the 20th century, with a newfound focus on trying to provide an airtight definition of knowledge by adjusting or replacing the "justified true belief" view. Today there is still little consensus about whether any set of conditions succeeds in providing a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge, and many contemporary epistemologists have come to the conclusion that no such exception-free definition is possible.

Plantinga discusses his view of Reformed epistemology and proper functionalism in a three-volume series. In the first book of the trilogy, Warrant: The Current Debate, Plantinga introduces, analyzes, and criticizes 20th-century developments in analytic epistemology, particularly the works of Chisholm, BonJour, Alston, Goldman, and others.Alvin Plantinga, Warrant: The Current Debate, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. In the book, Plantinga argues specifically that the theories of what he calls "warrant"-what many others have called justification (Plantinga draws out a difference: justification is a property of a person holding a belief while warrant is a property of a belief)—put forth by these epistemologists have systematically failed to capture in full what is required for knowledge.Plantinga, Warrant: The Current Debate, 1993. 3.

After studying at the Ecole Normale Supérieure, he completed his agrégation in 1943, being received premier ex aequo alongside Tran Duc Thao. A student of French historical epistemologists Gaston Bachelard and Jean Cavaillès, he was however at first influenced by phenomenology and existentialism, before shifting towards study of logics and science. In 1962, he published a book titled The Philosophy of Algebra, dedicated to the mathematician Pierre Samuel, a member of the Bourbaki group, as well as to René Thom, to the physicist Raymond Siestrunck and to the linguist George Vallet. Vuillemin thought that renewals of methods in mathematics have influenced philosophy, thus relating the discovery of irrational numbers to Platonism, algebraic geometry to Cartesianism, infinitesimal calculus to Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz.

During the 18th, 19th centuries, and 20th centuries many theologians reacted against the modernist, Enlightenment, and positivist attacks on Christian theology. Some existentialistic or neo-orthodox Protestant intellectuals like the Swiss Reformed theologian Karl Barth turned away from philosophy (called fideism) and argued that faith should be based strictly upon divine revelation. A popular approach in some circles is the approach of Reformed epistemologists, such as Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff, who assert that belief in God might be foundational (or, properly 'basic') and warranted without the need for logical or evidential justification, like belief in other minds or the external world, rather than inferentially derived from other beliefs; it can, however, be subject to defeaters, rationally requiring that one give up the belief. Many other philosophers and theologians, however, disagree with this perspective and provide alternative views.

In many of his ethnographic works, he focuses on the individual, in his early works from a psychoanalytic perspective, later from a dialectical one, and more recently from a critical phenomenological one that stresses inter-subjectivity. He recognizes phenomenology’s inherent limitations, which stem from its embeddedness in a particular language –its language of description— and, Husserl notwithstanding, from the threat posed by the possibility of solipsism and the stress on the opacity of the other characteristic of the epistemologies of modernity. He argues that as social actors we are destined to be bad epistemologists insofar as we have to assume, rightly or wrongly, that we can intuit what the other is thinking and feeling. He does recognize the possibility of other epistemologies; say those of the heart, which are not haunted by what transpires in the mind of the other.

Justification, or working out the reason for a true belief, locks down true belief. The problem is to identify what (if anything) makes knowledge more valuable than mere true belief, or that makes knowledge more valuable than a mere minimal conjunction of its components, such as justification, safety, sensitivity, statistical likelihood, and anti-Gettier conditions, on a particular analysis of knowledge that conceives of knowledge as divided into components (to which knowledge-first epistemological theories, which posit knowledge as fundamental, are notable exceptions). The value problem re-emerged in the philosophical literature on epistemology in the twenty-first century following the rise of virtue epistemology in the 1980s, partly because of the obvious link to the concept of value in ethics. In contemporary philosophy, epistemologists including Ernest Sosa, John Greco, Jonathan Kvanvig, Linda Zagzebski, and Duncan Pritchard have defended virtue epistemology as a solution to the value problem.

The situation > changes however, when one of the casually employed terms is replaced by a > sharper more accurate one, because the development of a particular science- > branch commands it: Then energic protest and lamentations are voiced by > those guilty of sloppy procedure with their own terms, fearing for their > most holy possessions. In this howling the voices of other philosophers > chime in who think themselves unable to do without yonder term, because they > had so lined it up within their little treasure-trove of the "absolute", the > "a priori", et cetera, that they had proclaimed it an irrevocable > fundamental principle. The reader already conjectured that I am here > particularly alluding to certain concepts of space and time and mechanics, > which have been subjected to a modification through the theory of > relativity. No one can take it away from the epistemologists that they paved > the way here; at least in my own case I know that I have been propelled > immensely, directly and indirectly, especially by Hume and Mach.