42 Sentences With "encryptions" | Random Sentence Generator

Artificial intelligence can decode encryptions that previously could not be cracked.

They find this NYU professor who did the original encryptions, and beat his ass until he tells them what it says.

WhatsApp introduced end-to-end encryptions by default a year ago this month for its 1.2 billion users worldwide, joining other services such as Signal and Apple's iMessage.

Newer games have more intense anti-modding encryptions, but Scires admits they're pretty easy to crack if you've been at it for long enough—in his case, three years.

Medical texts to the hospital and women's health boats, banned books to people who promise to safely spirit them to other countries, notes and encryptions from one underground group to another.

It's all right when Elliot Alderson from Mr. Robot manages to hack the world's most difficult security encryptions while extremely high and suffering from so many forms of psychoses he regularly has conversations with hallucinations.

Earlier this year, FBI Director Christopher Wray stated that the inability to surpass the strong encryptions on electronic devices poses an "urgent public safety issue" that would impact the bureau's investigations across the board, including counterterrorism, counterintelligence, human trafficking and organized crime.

"It highlights an issue that you've all heard about before, with the advance of the technology and the phones and the encryptions [sic], law enforcement, whether that's at the state, local or federal level, is increasingly not able to get into these phones," he said.

This limitation makes it impossible for these one-way encryptions to be used to support classifying models in machine learning—or nearly anything else.

The first one-way encryptions were likely developed by James H. Ellis, Clifford Cocks, and Malcolm Williamson at the UK intelligence agency GCHQ during the 1960s and 1970s and were published independently by Diffie and Hellman in 1976 (History of cryptography). Common modern one-way encryption algorithms, including MD5 (message digest) and SHA-512 (secure hash algorithm) are similar to the first such algorithms in that they also contain no mechanism to disclose the original data. The output of these modern one-way encryptions offer high privacy but are not homomorphic, meaning that the results of the one-way encryptions do not allow high order math operations (such as match). For example, we cannot use two SHA-512 sums to compare the closeness of two encrypted documents.

The values resulting from the evaluation of the gate at each of the four possible pair of input bits are also replaced with random labels. The garbled truth table of the gate consists of encryptions of each output label using its inputs labels as keys. The position of these four encryptions in the truth table is randomized so no information on the gate is leaked. To correctly evaluate each garbled gate the encryption scheme has the following two properties.

Network encryption cracking is the breaching of network encryptions (e.g., WEP, WPA, ...), usually through the use of a special encryption cracking software. It may be done through a range of attacks (active and passive) including injecting traffic, decrypting traffic, and dictionary-based attacks.

One-way encryptions offer unlimited privacy by containing no mechanism to reverse the encryption and disclose the original data. Once a value is processed through a one-way hash, it is not possible to discover to the original value (hence the name “one- way”).

If the keysize is k, this attack uses only 2k+1encryptions (and decryptions) and O(2k) memory to store the results of the forward computations in a lookup table, in contrast to the naive attack, which needs 22·k encryptions but O(1) space.

M1 is basic Nonary Marain, the three-by-three grid. All Culture citizens can communicate in this variant. Other variants include M8 through M16, which are encrypted by various degrees, and are typically used by the Contact Section. Higher level encryptions exist, the highest of these being M32.

One known plaintext reduces the complexity of a brute force attack to about 235 trial encryptions; "a few dozen" known plaintexts lowers this number to about 231. Due to its simple key schedule, M6 is also vulnerable to a slide attack, which requires more known plaintext but less computation.

However, as the RSA decryption exponent is randomly distributed, modular exponentiation may require a comparable number of squarings/multiplications to BG decryption for a ciphertext of the same length. BG has the advantage of scaling more efficiently to longer ciphertexts, where RSA requires multiple separate encryptions. In these cases, BG may be significantly more efficient.

In 2014 Alex Biryukov and Ivica Nikolić found a weakness in the key schedule of SC2000 which allows an attacker to find colliding keys which result in identical encryptions in just 239 time for 256 bit keys. They proved that there are 268 colliding key pairs and the whole set can be found in 258 time.

When trying to improve the security of a block cipher, a tempting idea is to encrypt the data several times using multiple keys. One might think this doubles or even n-tuples the security of the multiple-encryption scheme, depending on the number of times the data is encrypted, because an exhaustive search on all possible combination of keys (simple brute-force) would take 2n·k attempts if the data is encrypted with k-bit keys n times. The MITM is a generic attack which weakens the security benefits of using multiple encryptions by storing intermediate values from the encryptions or decryptions and using those to improve the time required to brute force the decryption keys. This makes a Meet-in-the-Middle attack (MITM) a generic space–time tradeoff cryptographic attack.

One attack on KASUMI, a block cipher used in 3GPP, is a related-key rectangle attack which breaks the full eight rounds of the cipher faster than exhaustive search (Biham et al., 2005). The attack requires 254.6 chosen plaintexts, each of which has been encrypted under one of four related keys, and has a time complexity equivalent to 276.1 KASUMI encryptions.

When that happens, an attacker is able to observe repeat encryptions, since encryption is a deterministic function of the nonce and message. However, beyond that, no additional information is revealed to the attacker. For this reason, AES-GCM- SIV is an ideal choice in cases that unique nonces cannot be guaranteed, such as multiple servers or network devices encrypting messages under the same key without coordination.

A counter of the number of PIN encryptions that have occurred since the PIN Entry Device was first initialized. Certain counter values are skipped (as explained below), so that over 1 million PIN encryption operations are possible. Note: The concatenation (left to right) of the Initial Key Serial Number Register and the Encryption Counter form the 80-bit (20 hexadecimal digits) Key Serial Number Register.

Furthermore, this problem is random self- reducible, which ensures that for a given N, every public key is just as secure as every other public key. The GM cryptosystem has homomorphic properties, in the sense that if c0, c1 are the encryptions of bits m0, m1, then c0c1 mod N will be an encryption of m_0 \oplus m_1. For this reason, the GM cryptosystem is sometimes used in more complex cryptographic primitives.

A commutative encryption is an encryption that is order- independent, i.e. it satisfies E(a,E(b,m))=E(b,E(a,m)) for all encryption keys a and b and all messages m. Commutative encryptions satisfy D(d,E(k,E(e,m))) = D(d,E(e,E(k,m))) = E(k,m). The three-pass protocol works as follows: # The sender chooses a private encryption key s and a corresponding decryption key t.

VIPRE Email Security, (also known as VIPRE or VIPRE Security) a brand of j2 Global, develops cybersecurity products focused on endpoint and email security along with advanced threat intelligence applications. VIPRE is based in Clearwater, Florida. In may 2019 VIPRE Security was merged with Fusemail, a brand that specializes in email filtering and email encryptions and changed name to VIPRE Email Security. After the merger Fusemail was renamed to VIPRE and the two brands became one.

Despite the existence of attacks on RC4 that broke its security, cipher suites in SSL and TLS that were based on RC4 were still considered secure prior to 2013 based on the way in which they were used in SSL and TLS. In 2011, the RC4 suite was actually recommended as a work around for the BEAST attack.security – Safest ciphers to use with the BEAST? (TLS 1.0 exploit) I've read that RC4 is immune – Server Fault New forms of attack disclosed in March 2013 conclusively demonstrated the feasibility of breaking RC4 in TLS, suggesting it was not a good workaround for BEAST. An attack scenario was proposed by AlFardan, Bernstein, Paterson, Poettering and Schuldt that used newly discovered statistical biases in the RC4 key table to recover parts of the plaintext with a large number of TLS encryptions. An attack on RC4 in TLS and SSL that requires 13 × 220 encryptions to break RC4 was unveiled on 8 July 2013 and later described as "feasible" in the accompanying presentation at a USENIX Security Symposium in August 2013.

The team realizes that PiperNet's AI compression abilities have become so advanced that it can bypass numerous advanced encryptions, potentially eradicating all privacy measures. Realizing the severity of its potential, Gilfoyle (Martin Starr) proposes that the only way to prevent PiperNet from abolishing privacy is to sabotage it at its launch. After initial opposition, Richard reluctantly agrees to sabotage PiperNet. But Dinesh (Kumail Nanjiani) recuses himself from the effort, thinking that his pride would prevent the sabotage from going through.

In cryptography, UES (Universal Encryption Standard) is a block cipher designed in 1999 by Helena Handschuh and Serge Vaudenay. They proposed it as a transitional step, to prepare for the completion of the AES process. UES was designed with the same interface as AES: a block size of 128 bits and key size of 128, 192, or 256 bits. It consists of two parallel Triple DES encryptions on the halves of the block, with key whitening and key-dependent swapping of bits between the halves.

As for the uniqueness requirement, a predictable IV may allow recovery of (partial) plaintext. :Example: Consider a scenario where a legitimate party called Alice encrypts messages using the cipher-block chaining mode. Consider further that there is an adversary called Eve that can observe these encryptions and is able to forward plaintext messages to Alice for encryption (in other words, Eve is capable of a chosen-plaintext attack). Now assume that Alice has sent a message consisting of an initialization vector IV1 and starting with a ciphertext block CAlice.

If at any point the letters failed to match, the initial rotor setting would be rejected; most incorrect settings would be ruled out after testing just two letters. This test could be readily mechanised and applied to all 17,576 settings of the rotors. However, with the plugboard, it was much harder to perform trial encryptions because it was unknown what the crib and ciphertext letters were transformed to by the plugboard. For example, in the first position, `A` and `W` were unknown because the plugboard settings were unknown.

Rambaldi (1444–1496), an artist, alchemist, engineer, mystic, and renaissance man in the vein of Da Vinci, served as chief architect to Pope Alexander Sextus. Rambaldi was born in Parma, educated by Vespertine monks, and worked as a student of the arts until he was 12. During his travels to Rome when he was 18, he met Cardinal Rodericus and was retained privately as an architect, consultant and prophet when Rodericus of Borgia (Borja) became Pope in 1492. His writings and plans are written in multiple languages ranging from Italian and Demotic hybrids to elusive mixtures of symbols (pre-masonic cipher encryptions).

At the AsiaWorld- Expo, the unused backup polling station, two notebook computers storing the name list of the 1,194 Election Committee members and personal data of all 3.78 million registered voters were reported as lost. The incident was investigated by the police as theft, but the whereabouts of the lost computers remained unknown. The Registration and Electoral Office (REO) posted letters of apology to all affected voters, stating the personal data was "protected by multiple encryptions" which were "extremely difficult to break through". Nevertheless, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner for Personal Data received more than 900 complaints in the following days.

In detail, the user's password is truncated to eight characters, and those are coerced down to only 7-bits each; this forms the 56-bit DES key. That key is then used to encrypt an all-bits-zero block, and then the ciphertext is encrypted again with the same key, and so on for a total of 25 DES encryptions. A 12-bit salt is used to perturb the encryption algorithm, so standard DES implementations can't be used to implement crypt(). The salt and the final ciphertext are encoded into a printable string in a form of base64.

To counter this problem, cryptographers proposed the notion of "randomized" or probabilistic encryption. Under these schemes, a given plaintext can encrypt to one of a very large set of possible ciphertexts, chosen randomly during the encryption process. Under sufficiently strong security guarantees the attacks proposed above become infeasible, as the adversary will be unable to correlate any two encryptions of the same message, or correlate a message to its ciphertext, even given access to the public encryption key. This guarantee is known as semantic security or ciphertext indistinguishability, and has several definitions depending on the assumed capabilities of the attacker (see semantic security).

In 2005, Israeli researchers Eli Biham, Orr Dunkelman and Nathan Keller published a related-key rectangle (boomerang) attack on KASUMI that can break all 8 rounds faster than exhaustive search. The attack requires 254.6 chosen plaintexts, each of which has been encrypted under one of four related keys, and has a time complexity equivalent to 276.1 KASUMI encryptions. While this is obviously not a practical attack, it invalidates some proofs about the security of the 3GPP protocols that had relied on the presumed strength of KASUMI. In 2010, Dunkelman, Keller and Shamir published a new attack that allows an adversary to recover a full A5/3 key by related-key attack.

One attack was able to obtain an entire AES key after only 800 operations triggering encryptions, in a total of 65 milliseconds. This attack requires the attacker to be able to run programs on the same system or platform that is performing AES. In December 2009 an attack on some hardware implementations was published that used differential fault analysis and allows recovery of a key with a complexity of 232. In November 2010 Endre Bangerter, David Gullasch and Stephan Krenn published a paper which described a practical approach to a "near real time" recovery of secret keys from AES-128 without the need for either cipher text or plaintext.

Fictional depictions of the CIA exist in many books, films and video games. Some fiction draws, at least in parts, on actual historical events, while other works are entirely fictional. The television series Chuck (2007), was based solely on a man who accidentally sees secret CIA encryptions and eventually becomes an asset/liability, and later on an agent in the agency. Films include Charlie Wilson's War (2007), based on the story of U.S. Congressman Charlie Wilson and CIA operative Gust Avrakotos, who supported the Afghan mujahideen, and The Good Shepherd (2006), a fictional spy film produced and directed by Robert De Niro based loosely on the development of counter- intelligence in the CIA.

In the Paillier, ElGamal, and RSA cryptosystems, it is also possible to combine several ciphertexts together in a useful way to produce a related ciphertext. In Paillier, given only the public key and an encryption of m_1 and m_2, one can compute a valid encryption of their sum m_1+m_2. In ElGamal and in RSA, one can combine encryptions of m_1 and m_2 to obtain a valid encryption of their product m_1 m_2. Block ciphers in the cipher block chaining mode of operation, for example, are partly malleable: flipping a bit in a ciphertext block will completely mangle the plaintext it decrypts to, but will result in the same bit being flipped in the plaintext of the next block.

The approach also works on AES-128 implementations that use compression tables, such as OpenSSL. Like some earlier attacks this one requires the ability to run unprivileged code on the system performing the AES encryption, which may be achieved by malware infection far more easily than commandeering the root account. In March 2016, Ashokkumar C., Ravi Prakash Giri and Bernard Menezes presented a side-channel attack on AES implementations that can recover the complete 128-bit AES key in just 6–7 blocks of plaintext/ciphertext, which is a substantial improvement over previous works that require between 100 and a million encryptions. The proposed attack requires standard user privilege and key-retrieval algorithms run under a minute.

Just as there are no proofs that integer factorization is computationally difficult, there are also no proofs that the RSA problem is similarly difficult. By the above method, the RSA problem is at least as easy as factoring, but it might well be easier. Indeed, there is strong evidence pointing to this conclusion: that a method to break the RSA method cannot be converted necessarily into a method for factoring large semiprimes. This is perhaps easiest to see by the sheer overkill of the factoring approach: the RSA problem asks us to decrypt one arbitrary ciphertext, whereas the factoring method reveals the private key: thus decrypting all arbitrary ciphertexts, and it also allows one to perform arbitrary RSA private-key encryptions.

Six-and-a- half years after the initial Polish decryption of Enigma ciphers, French and British intelligence representatives were briefed on Polish achievements at a trilateral conference held at Cipher Bureau facilities in the Kabaty Woods, just south of Warsaw, on July 26, 1939, barely five weeks before the outbreak of World War II. This formed the basis for early Enigma decryption by the British at Bletchley Park, northwest of London. Without the head start provided by Poland, British reading of Enigma encryptions might have been delayed several years, if it would have gotten off the ground at all. Key Polish Cipher Bureau personnel escaped from Poland on September 17, 1939, on the Soviet Union's entry into eastern Poland, and eventually reached France. There, at "PC Bruno" outside Paris, they resumed cracking Enigma ciphers through the "Phony War" (October 1939 – May 1940).

This type of attack applies to the encryption of files that are only slight variations of a public document. For example, if the defender encrypts a bank form including a ten digit bank account number, an attacker that is aware of generic bank form format may extract defender's bank account number by producing bank forms for all possible bank account numbers, encrypt them and then by comparing those encryptions with defender's encrypted file deduce the bank account number. Note that this attack can be extended to attack a large number of targets at once (all spelling variations of a target bank customer in the example above, or even all potential bank customers), and the presence of this problem extends to any type of form document: tax returns, financial documents, healthcare forms, employment forms, etc. Also note that there is no known method for decreasing the severity of this attack -- adding a few random bytes to files as they are stored does not help, since those bytes can likewise be attacked with the "learn the remaining information" approach.