The two principal methods used to reach inductive conclusions are enumerative induction and eliminative induction.
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Eliminative materialism is the claim that folk psychology is false and should be discarded (or "eliminated").
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"Eliminative Materialism § Specific Problems With Folk Psychology" (rev.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Scientific materialism is often synonymous with, and has typically been described as being, a reductive materialism. In the early 21st century, Paul and Patricia Churchland advocated a radically contrasting position (at least, in regards to certain hypotheses): eliminative materialism.
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Quine himself wondered what exactly was so eliminative about eliminative materialism after all: On the other hand, the same philosophers also claimed that common-sense mental states simply do not exist. But critics pointed out that eliminativists could not have it both ways: either mental states exist and will ultimately be explained in terms of lower-level neurophysiological processes or they do not.
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Princeton: Princeton University PressReppert, V. 1992. "Eliminative Materialism, Cognitive Suicide, and Begging the Question." Metaphilosophy 23:378–92.Seidner, Stanley S. 10 June 2009.
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Finally, there is eliminative materialism, which simply denies that there are any such mental events; thus, there is really no problem of mental causation at all.
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Unlike strong eliminative materialism, the revisionist often claims that a theory or concept is only partially incorrect, perhaps because it ignores a few important causal factors.
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Eliminative materialism or eliminativism is the view that many or all of the mental states used in folk psychology (i.e., common-sense ways of discussing the mind) do not, upon scientific examination, correspond to real brain mechanisms. While Patricia Churchland and Paul Churchland have famously applied eliminative materialism to propositional attitudes, philosophers including Daniel Dennett, Georges Rey, and Keith Frankish have applied it to qualia or phenomenal consciousness (i.e., conscious experience).
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This position is sometimes referred to as eliminative materialism: the view that consciousness is a property that can be reduced to a strictly mechanical description, and that our experience of consciousness is, as Daniel Dennett describes it, a "user illusion". Other mental properties, such as original intentionality (also called “meaning”, “content”, and “semantic character”), is also commonly regarded as something special about beliefs and other propositional attitudes. Eliminative materialism maintains that propositional attitudes such as beliefs and desires, among other intentional mental states that have content, do not exist. If eliminative materialism is the correct scientific account of human cognition then the assumption of the Chinese room argument that "minds have mental contents (semantics)" must be rejected.
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Philosopher Mary MidgleyMidgley, Mary. 1990. The Myths We Live By. argues that materialism is a self-refuting idea, at least in its eliminative materialist form.Baker, L. 1987. Saving Belief.
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Anthropic mechanists typically respond in one of two ways. In the first, they agree with anti-mechanists that mechanism conflicts with some of our commonsense intuitions, but go on to argue that our commonsense intuitions are simply mistaken and need to be revised. Down this path lies eliminative materialism in philosophy of mind, and hard determinism on the question of free will. This option is accepted by the eliminative materialist philosopher Paul Churchland.
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The argument from reason claims that if beliefs, desires, and other contentful mental states cannot be accounted for in naturalism then naturalism is false. Eliminative materialism maintains that propositional attitudes such as beliefs and desires, among other intentional mental states that have content, cannot be explained on naturalism and therefore concludes that such entities do not exist. Even if successful, the argument from reason only rules out certain forms of naturalism and fails to argue against a conception of naturalism which accepts eliminative materialism to be the correct scientific account of human cognition.
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Eliminative induction, also called variative induction, is an inductive method in which a conclusion is constructed based on the variety of instances that support it. Unlike enumerative induction, eliminative induction reasons based on the various kinds of instances that support a conclusion, rather than the number of instances that support it. As the variety of instances increases, the more possible conclusions based on those instances can be identified as incompatible and eliminated. This, in turn, increases the strength of any conclusion that remains consistent with the various instances.
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Eliminative materialism holds that some mental phenomena simply do not exist at all, and that talk of those mental phenomena reflects a totally spurious "folk psychology" and introspection illusion. A materialist of this variety might believe that a concept like "belief" simply has no basis in fact (e.g. the way folk science speaks of demon-caused illnesses). With reductive materialism being at one end of a continuum (our theories will reduce to facts) and eliminative materialism on the other (certain theories will need to be eliminated in light of new facts), revisionary materialism is somewhere in the middle.
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In fact, it is in the idea that natural philosophy must begin with the senses that we find the revolutionary part of Bacon's philosophy, and its consequent philosophical method, eliminative induction, is one of Bacon's most lasting contributions to science and philosophy.
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That is, parts of the demon theory will be validated by future research. Today, one is likely to be eliminativist about demons. However, eliminative materialists mention other psychological concepts (e.g. belief, will, consciousness) about which one is more likely to be revisionist.
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The book expands upon the classical conceptions of work and information in order to give an account of ententionality that is consistent with eliminative materialism and yet does not seek to explain away or pass off as epiphenominal the non-physical properties of life.
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Because a high-level language is a practical requirement for developing the most complex programs, functionalism implies that a non-reductive physicalism would offer a similar advantage over a strictly eliminative materialism. Eliminative materialists believe "folk psychology" is so unscientific that, ultimately, it will be better to eliminate primitive concepts such as mind, desire and belief, in favor of a future neuro-scientific account. A more moderate position such as J. L. Mackie's error theory suggests that false beliefs should be stripped away from a mental concept without eliminating the concept itself, the legitimate core meaning being left intact. Benjamin Libet's results are quotedWegner D., 2002.
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Pectate trisaccharide-lyase (, exopectate-lyase, pectate lyase A, PelA) is an enzyme with systematic name (1->4)-alpha-D-galacturonan reducing-end- trisaccharide-lyase. This enzyme catalyses the following chemical reaction: : eliminative cleavage of unsaturated trigalacturonate as the major product from the reducing end of polygalacturonic acid/pectate The predominant action of this enzyme is removal of a trisaccharide.
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"The Zombic Hunch: Extinction of an Intuition?" ROYAL INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY MILLENNIAL LECTURE. November 28, 1999 Patricia Churchland, also an eliminative materialist, maintains that philosophers ought to be more patient: neuroscience is still in its early stages, so Chalmers's hard problem is premature. Clarity will come from learning more about the brain, not from metaphysical speculation.
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Mereological nihilism is an extreme eliminative position. Mereological nihilism denies that any objects actually instantiate the parthood relation appealed to in theoretical descriptions of mereology. If there are no relationships that count as parthood relationships, then there are no composite objects. One may initially seek to reject such a position by pointing to its counterintuitive conclusions.
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The ancient Greeks already had a folk psychology comparable to modern views. But in contrast to this lack of development, the neurosciences are a rapidly progressing science complex that, in their view, can explain many cognitive processes that folk psychology cannot.Churchland, P.M. (1981) Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes. Journal of Philosophy 78(2): 67-90.
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Pectate lyase () is an enzyme involved in the maceration and soft rotting of plant tissue. Pectate lyase is responsible for the eliminative cleavage of pectate, yielding oligosaccharides with 4-deoxy-α-D-mann-4-enuronosyl groups at their non-reducing ends. The protein is maximally expressed late in pollen development. It has been suggested that the pollen expression of pectate lyase genes might relate to a requirement for pectin degradation during pollen tube growth. This enzyme catalyzes the chemical reaction :Eliminative cleavage of (1→4)-α-D-galacturonan to give oligosaccharides with 4-deoxy-α-D- galact-4-enuronosyl groups at their non-reducing ends The structure and the folding kinetics of one member of this family, pectate lyase C (pelC)1 from Erwinia chrysanthemi has been investigated in some detail,.
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Virtue epistemologists differ in the role they believe virtue to play: eliminative virtue epistemology uses the concepts of intellectual virtue and intellectual vice to do away with epistemic concepts like knowledge and justification, while non- eliminative virtue epistemology gives a role for such traditional concepts and uses virtue to provide substantive explanation of those concepts. Virtue epistemologists differ in what they believe epistemic virtues to be. Some accounts are Aristotelian, drawing a relationship between intellectual virtue and character in a similar way to the way moral virtue is related to character, while "weak" virtue epistemology have an account that doesn't require any particular commitment or cultivation of intellectual virtue. Abrol Fairweather argues that these "weak" virtue epistemologists "merely [use] virtue theory as a novel lexicon for expressing an independent epistemic theory".
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The LOTH has wide-ranging significance for a number of domains in cognitive science. It relies on a version of functionalist materialism, which holds that mental representations are actualized and modified by the individual holding the propositional attitude, and it challenges eliminative materialism and connectionism. It implies a strongly rationalist model of cognition in which many of the fundamentals of cognition are innate.
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The thesis of eliminativism seems to be so obviously wrong to many critics, under the claim that people know immediately and indubitably that they have minds, that argumentation seems unnecessary. This sort of intuition pumping is illustrated by asking what happens when one asks oneself honestly if one has mental states.Lycan, W. "A Particularly Compelling Refutation of Eliminative Materialism" ((online)). Retrieved Sept.
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Moreover, it can be very effective in producing bowel movements. Whereas purgatives would introduce "violent and unpleasant symptoms", water would not. Although it would not have much competition as an emetic at the time, Kellogg believed that no other substance could induce vomiting as well as water did. Returning to one of Kellogg's most admired qualities of water, it can function as a "most perfect eliminative".
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He writes that "instead of arguing continually over this point it is usual to have the polite convention that everyone thinks." The Turing test simply extends this "polite convention" to machines. He doesn't intend to solve the problem of other minds (for machines or people) and he doesn't think we need to. ; Eliminative Materialism reply:Several philosophers argue that consciousness, as Searle describes it, does not exist.
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Most abnormal behaviours can be categorised collectively (e.g., eliminative, ingestive, stereotypies), however, many abnormal behaviours fall debatebly into several of these categories and categorisation is therefore not attempted in this article. Abnormal behaviours here are considered to be related to captive housing but may also be due to medical conditions. The article does not include behaviours in birds that are genetically modified to express abnormal behaviour.
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This type of induction may use different methodologies such as quasi-experimentation, which tests and where possible eliminates rival hypothesis. Different evidential tests may also be employed to eliminate possibilities that are entertained. Eliminative induction is crucial to the scientific method and is used to eliminate hypotheses that are inconsistent with observations and experiments. It focuses on possible causes instead of observed actual instances of causal connections.
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Feser 2008, pp. 44-46 And by defending realism and rejecting nominalism, he rejects eliminative materialism—and thus naturalism. In the third chapter, Feser summarizes three of Thomas Aquinas's arguments for the existence of God.Feser 2008, pp. 90-119 These include arguments for an unmoved mover,Feser 2008, pp. 91-102 first, uncaused causeFeser 2008, pp. 102-110 and (supernatural) supreme intelligence,Feser 2008, pp.
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Modern eliminativists have much more clearly expressed the view that mental phenomena simply do not exist and will eventually be eliminated from people's thinking about the brain in the same way that demons have been eliminated from people's thinking about mental illness and psychopathology. While it was a minority view in the 1960s, eliminative materialism gained prominence and acceptance during the 1980s.Niiniluoto, Ilkka. Critical Scientific Realism.
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Some eliminativists, such as Frank Jackson, claim that consciousness does not exist except as an epiphenomenon of brain function; others, such as Georges Rey, claim that the concept will eventually be eliminated as neuroscience progresses.Jackson, F. (1982) "Epiphenomenal Qualia", The Philosophical Quarterly 32:127-136. Consciousness and folk psychology are separate issues and it is possible to take an eliminative stance on one but not the other. The roots of eliminativism go back to the writings of Wilfred Sellars, W.V. Quine, Paul Feyerabend, and Richard Rorty.Sellars W. (1956). "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind", In: Feigl H and Scriven M (eds) The Foundations of Science and the Concepts of Psychology and Psychoanalysis: Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 1. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press: 253-329. online The term "eliminative materialism" was first introduced by James Cornman in 1968 while describing a version of physicalism endorsed by Rorty.
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Chondroitin ABC lyase ( , chondroitinase, chondroitin ABC eliminase, chondroitinase ABC) is an enzyme with systematic name chondroitin ABC lyase. This enzyme catalyses the following chemical reaction : Eliminative degradation of polysaccharides containing 1,4-beta-D-hexosaminyl and 1,3-beta- D-glucuronosyl or 1,3-alpha-L-iduronosyl linkages to disaccharides containing 4-deoxy-beta-D-gluc-4-enuronosyl groups This enzyme acts on chondroitin 4-sulfate, chondroitin 6-sulfate and dermatan sulfate.
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Emergent materialism can be divided into emergence which denies mental causation and emergence which allows for causal effect. A version of the latter type has been advocated by John R. Searle, called biological naturalism. The other main group of materialist views in the philosophy of mind can be labeled non-emergent (or non- emergentist) materialism, and includes pure physicalism (eliminative materialism), identity theory (reductive materialism), philosophical behaviorism, and functionalism.
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Along with a number of mid-20th century philosophers (most notably, Wilfrid Sellars, Willard Van Orman Quine, and Richard Rorty), Feyerabend was influential in the development of eliminative materialism, a radical position in the philosophy of mind that holds that our ordinary, common-sense understanding of the mind (what materialist monists call "folk psychology") is false. It is succinctly described by a modern proponent, Paul Churchland, as follows: : "Eliminative materialism is the thesis that our commonsense conception of psychological phenomena constitutes a radically false theory, a theory so fundamentally defective that both the principles and the ontology of that theory will eventually be displaced, rather than smoothly reduced, by completed neuroscience." In three short papers published in the early sixties, Feyerabend sought to defend materialism against the supposition that the mind cannot be a physical thing. Feyerabend suggested that our commonsense understanding of the mind was incommensurable with the (materialistic) scientific view, but that nevertheless we ought to prefer the materialistic one on general methodological grounds.
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Churchland's work is in the school of analytic philosophy in western philosophy, with interests in epistemology and the philosophy of science, and specific principal interests in the philosophy of mind and in neurophilosophy and artificial intelligence. His work has been described as being influenced by the work of W. V. O. Quine, Thomas Kuhn, Russell Hanson, Wilfred Sellars, and Paul Feyerabend. Along with his wife, Churchland is a major proponent of eliminative materialism, the belief that where by folk psychology is meant everyday mental concepts such as beliefs, feelings, and desires, which are viewed as theoretical constructs without coherent definition, and thus destined to be obviated by a scientific understanding of human nature. From the perspective of Zawidzki, Churchland's concept of eliminativism is suggested as early as his book Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind (1979), with its most explicit formulation appearing in a Journal of Philosophy essay, "Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes" (1981, see #Written works section below).
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The ring-tailed lemur (Lemur catta) advertises its territory with urine scent marks. When it is urinating for marking purposes, it holds its extremely distinctive tail high in the air adding a visual component to the advertisement; when it is urinating for eliminative purposes, its tail is only slightly raised. Rhinoceros have poor vision but may use visual marking. Dominant white rhino bulls mark their territory with faeces and urine (olfactory marking).
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In a follow up to his target article in the Journal of Consciousness Studies, Frankish summarized the reactions to his article. He labeled as "sceptics" Susan Blackmore, Nicholas Humphrey, Pete Mandik, and Eric Schwitzgebel. In the category of "opponents" he included thinkers such as Katalin Balog, Philip Goff, Martine Nida-Rümelin, and Jesse Prinz. Additionally, Paul Boghossian has argued that eliminative materialism is self-refuting, since the theory itself presupposes the existence of mental phenomena.
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He instead relied on the theory that the adaptive unconscious does much of the moment-to-moment work of perception and behaviour. When people are asked to report on their mental processes, they cannot access this unconscious activity. However, rather than acknowledge their lack of insight, they confabulate a plausible explanation, and "seem" to be "unaware of their unawareness". The idea that people can be mistaken about their inner functioning is one applied by eliminative materialists.
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Stich is primarily known in philosophy for his work in the philosophy of mind, cognitive science, epistemology, and moral psychology. In philosophy of mind and cognitive science, Stich (1983) has argued for a form of eliminative materialism--the view that talk of the mental should be replaced with talk of its physical substrate. Since then, however, he has changed some of his views on the mind. See Deconstructing the Mind (1996) for his more recent views.
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In enzymology, a glucuronan lyase () is an enzyme that catalyzes the chemical reaction of eliminative cleavage of (1->4)-beta-D-glucuronans. This produces either oligosaccharides with 4-deoxy-beta-D-gluc-4-enuronosyl groups at their non-reducing ends, or, if the substrate is completely degraded, glucuronans produce tetrasaccharides. This enzyme belongs to the family of lyases, specifically those carbon-oxygen lyases acting on polysaccharides. The systematic name of this enzyme class is (1->4)-beta-D-glucuronan lyase.
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Rhamnogalacturonan exolyase (, YesX) is an enzyme with systematic name alpha- L-rhamnopyranosyl-(1->4)-alpha-D-galactopyranosyluronate exolyase. This enzyme catalyses the following chemical reaction : Exotype eliminative cleavage of alpha-L-rhamnopyranosyl-(1->4)-alpha-D-galactopyranosyluronic acid bonds of rhamnogalacturonan I oligosaccharides containing alpha-L-rhamnopyranose at the reducing end and 4-deoxy-4,5-unsaturated D-galactopyranosyluronic acid at the non-reducing end. The enzyme is part of the degradation system for rhamnogalacturonan I in Bacillus subtilis strain 168.
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Gellan lyase () is an enzyme with systematic name gellan beta-D- glucopyranosyl-(1->4)-D-glucopyranosyluronate lyase. This enzyme catalyses the following chemical reaction : Eliminative cleavage of beta-D- glucopyranosyl-(1->4)-beta-D-glucopyranosyluronate bonds of gellan backbone releasing tetrasaccharides containing a 4-deoxy-4,5-unsaturated D-glucopyranosyluronic acid at the non-reducing end. The tetrasaccharide produced from deacetylated gellan is beta-D-4-deoxy-Delta4-GlcAp-(1->4)-beta- D-Glcp-(1->4)-alpha-L-Rhap-(1->3)-beta-D-Glcp.
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At the end of the 1980s, Putnam became increasingly disillusioned with what he perceived as the "scientism" and the rejection of history that characterize modern analytic philosophy. He rejected internal realism because it assumed a "cognitive interface" model of the relation between the mind and the world. Putnam claimed that the very notion of truth would have to be abandoned by a consistent eliminative materialist.Feser, E., The Last Superstition: A Refutation of the New Atheism (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine Press, 2008), p. 234.
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George Berkeley is credited with the development of subjective idealism. Subjective idealism, or empirical idealism, is the monistic metaphysical doctrine that only minds and mental contents exist. It entails and is generally identified or associated with immaterialism, the doctrine that material things do not exist. Subjective idealism rejects dualism, neutral monism, and materialism; indeed, it is the contrary of eliminative materialism, the doctrine that all or some classes of mental phenomena (such as emotions, beliefs, or desires) do not exist, but are sheer illusions.
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In her work on the philosophy of mind, Antony stakes out a middle ground between eliminative materialists like Daniel Dennett who deny the possibility of the existence of the mind, and groups such dualists and neutral monists - those who look for non-physical explanations of the mind. Antony is also a prominent proponent of analytic feminist philosophy, suggesting that earlier feminist philosophers overlooked the extent to which analytic philosophers had rejected the ideas of empiricists and rationalists, and thus misidentified analytic epistemology with empiricism.
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In enzymology, a pectate disaccharide-lyase () is an enzyme that catalyzes the chemical reaction :Eliminative cleavage of 4-(4-deoxy-alpha-D- galact-4-enuronosyl)-D-galacturonate from the reducing end of pectate, i.e. de-esterified pectin This enzyme belongs to the family of lyases, specifically those carbon-oxygen lyases acting on polysaccharides. The systematic name of this enzyme class is (1->4)-alpha-D-galacturonan reducing-end-disaccharide- lyase. Other names in common use include pectate exo-lyase, exopectic acid transeliminase, exopectate lyase, exopolygalacturonic acid-trans-eliminase, PATE, exo-PATE, and exo-PGL.
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In enzymology, a chondroitin AC lyase () is an enzyme that catalyzes the chemical reaction :Eliminative degradation of polysaccharides containing 1,4-beta-D-hexosaminyl and 1,3-beta-D-glucuronosyl linkages to disaccharides containing 4-deoxy-beta-D-gluc-4-enuronosyl groups This enzyme belongs to the family of lyases, specifically those carbon-oxygen lyases acting on polysaccharides. The systematic name of this enzyme class is chondroitin AC lyase. Other names in common use include chondroitinase (ambiguous), chondroitin sulfate lyase, chondroitin AC eliminase, chondroitin AC lyase, chondroitinase AC, and ChnAC.
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In enzymology, a chondroitin B lyase () is an enzyme that catalyzes the chemical reaction :Eliminative cleavage of dermatan sulfate containing 1,4-beta-D-hexosaminyl and 1,3-beta-D-glucurosonyl or 1,3-alpha-L-iduronosyl linkages to disaccharides containing 4-deoxy-beta-D-gluc-4-enuronosyl groups to yield a 4,5-unsaturated dermatan-sulfate disaccharide (deltaUA-GalNAc-4S). This enzyme belongs to the family of lyases, specifically those carbon-oxygen lyases acting on polysaccharides. The systematic name of this enzyme class is chondroitin B lyase. Other names in common use include chondroitinase B, ChonB, and ChnB.
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In enzymology, a heparin lyase () is an enzyme that catalyzes the chemical reaction :Eliminative cleavage of polysaccharides containing 1,4-linked D-glucuronate or L-iduronate residues and 1,4-alpha-linked 2-sulfoamino-2-deoxy-6-sulfo-D-glucose residues to give oligosaccharides with terminal 4-deoxy-alpha-D-gluc-4-enuronosyl groups at their non-reducing ends This enzyme belongs to the family of lyases, specifically those carbon-oxygen lyases acting on polysaccharides. The systematic name of this enzyme class is heparin lyase. Other names in common use include heparin eliminase, and heparinase.
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The primary competitors to the physicalist interpretations of the mind are idealism, substance dualism, and types of property dualism, and by some lights eliminative materialism and anomalous monism. There is a lengthy tradition in philosophy, religion, psychology, and cognitive science about what constitutes a mind and what are its distinguishing properties. One open question regarding the nature of the mind is the mind–body problem, which investigates the relation of the mind to the physical brain and nervous system. Older viewpoints included dualism and idealism, which considered the mind somehow non-physical.
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Adherents of panpsychism, a kind of property dualism, hold that everything has a mental aspect, but not that everything exists in a mind. Neutral monism postulates that existence consists of a single substance that in itself is neither mental nor physical, but is capable of mental and physical aspects or attributesthus it implies a dual-aspect theory. For the last century, the dominant theories have been science-inspired including materialistic monism, type identity theory, token identity theory, functionalism, reductive physicalism, nonreductive physicalism, eliminative materialism, anomalous monism, property dualism, epiphenomenalism and emergence.
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Stephen P. Stich (born May 9, 1943) is an American academic who is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science at Rutgers University, as well as an Honorary Professor in Philosophy at the University of Sheffield. Stich's main philosophical interests are in the philosophy of mind, epistemology, and moral psychology. His 1983 book, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief, received much attention as he argued for a form of eliminative materialism about the mind. He changed his mind, in later years, as indicated in his 1996 book Deconstructing the Mind.
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For (non eliminative) physicalists, mental properties are a kind of high level property which can be understood in terms of fine- grained neural activity. Property dualists, on the other hand, claim that no such reductive explanation is possible. Eliminativists may reject the existence of mental properties, or at least of those corresponding to folk psychological categories such as thought and memory. Some philosophers seek to find a unifying characteristic for the generally accepted mental properties: a famous example is Franz Brentano's claim that all mental properties are characterised by intentionality or "aboutness".
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There is a very active program within eliminative materialism to explain consciousness as an illusion. Such a position is promoted by Daniel Dennett, Keith Frankish, and Michael Graziano. The attention schema theory of consciousness is advanced by the neuroscientist Michael Graziano and if the theory gains support from neuroscience it will succeed in explaining consciousness as an illusion. Once we can explain consciousness as an illusion without the need for supposing a realist view of consciousness then we can construct a debunking argument against realist views of consciousness.
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In enzymology, a poly(alpha-L-guluronate) lyase () is an enzyme that catalyzes the chemical reaction :Eliminative cleavage of polysaccharides containing a terminal alpha-L-guluronate group, to give oligosaccharides with 4-deoxy- alpha-L-erythro-hex-4-enuronosyl groups at their non-reducing ends This enzyme belongs to the family of lyases, specifically those carbon-oxygen lyases acting on polysaccharides. The systematic name of this enzyme class is poly(alpha-L-1,4-guluronide) exo-lyase. Other names in common use include alginase II, guluronate lyase, L-guluronan lyase, L-guluronate lyase, poly- alpha-L-guluronate lyase, and polyguluronate-specific alginate lyase.
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While returning from Toronto to Winnipeg for the beginning of the 1965-66 school year, Glassen was involved in a car accident that took the life of the other driver. Though not ultimately found at fault, Glassen never fully recovered from the shock. His scholarly output declined and he turned down an opportunity to move to the more prominent department at the University of Toronto in 1967. His career might have faded into complete obscurity had it not been for the development of eliminative materialism by fellow University of Manitoba philosophers Paul Churchland and Patricia Churchland in the 1970s.
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Many forms of emergentism, including proponents of complex adaptive systems, do not hold a material but rather a relational or processual view of the universe. Furthermore, they view mind–body dualism as a conceptual error insofar as mind and body are merely different types of relationships. As a theory of mind (which it is not always), emergentism differs from idealism, eliminative materialism, identity theories, neutral monism, panpsychism, and substance dualism, whilst being closely associated with property dualism. It is generally not obvious whether an emergent theory of mind embraces mental causation or must be considered epiphenomenal.
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Various arguments have been put forth both for and against eliminative materialism over the last forty years. Most of the arguments in favor of the view are based on the assumption that people's commonsense view of the mind is actually an implicit theory. It is to be compared and contrasted with other scientific theories in its explanatory success, accuracy, and ability to allow people to make correct predictions about the future. Eliminativists argue that, based on these and other criteria, commonsense "folk" psychology has failed and will eventually need to be replaced with explanations derived from the neurosciences.
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Revisionary materialism is the view that falls between eliminative materialism and reductive materialism when it comes to a particular psychological phenomenon. Take, for example, debates over the reality of a psychological concept like "demonology" – the posit that evil spirits influence human behaviour. An eliminativist might argue that this theory completely fails to describe anything real; the reductionist might argue that the concepts are valid, and that science will simply provide an increasingly detailed understanding of the demons. The revisionist would be somewhere in between, suggesting only that partial revision of the common sense understanding will be necessary.
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In his book Pure and Simple Natural Weight Control, Walker stated: "If the feces in the colon have putrefied and fermented, any nutritional elements present in it would pass into the bloodstream as polluted products. What would otherwise be nutritional instead generates toxemia, a condition in which the blood contains poisonous products which are produced by the growth of pathogenic or disease-producing bacteria." Pimples can be an indication of the presence of toxaemia. Walker maintained that the Standard American Diet causes the colon to be filled with toxins that strain the eliminative channels and, ultimately, the immune system.
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Type physicalism can now be understood to argue that there is an identity between types (any mental type is identical with some physical type), whereas token identity physicalism says that every token mental state/event/property is identical to some brain state/event/property. There are other ways a physicalist might criticize type physicalism; eliminative materialism and revisionary materialism question whether science is currently using the best categorisations. In the same way talk of demonic possession was questioned with scientific advance, categorisations like "pain" may need to be revised. Among professional philosophers the physicalist view of the mind has been diminishing in recent years.
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In this way, Hegel defended the truth in Kantian dualism against reductive or eliminative programs like materialism and empiricism. Like Plato, with his dualism of soul versus bodily appetites, Kant pursued the mind's ability to question its felt inclinations or appetites and to come up with a standard of "duty" (or, in Plato's case, "good") which transcends bodily restrictiveness. Hegel preserved this essential Platonic and Kantian concern in the form of infinity going beyond the finite (a process that Hegel in fact related to "freedom" and the "ought"),See Science of Logic, trans. Miller [Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities, 1989] the universal going beyond the particular (in the Concept) and Spirit going beyond Nature.
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Predicate monism can be characterized as the view subscribed to by eliminative materialists, who maintain that such intentional predicates as believe, desire, think, feel, etc., will eventually be eliminated from both the language of science and from ordinary language because the entities to which they refer do not exist. Predicate dualists believe that so-called "folk psychology," with all of its propositional attitude ascriptions, is an ineliminable part of the enterprise of describing, explaining, and understanding human mental states and behavior. For example, Davidson subscribes to anomalous monism, according to which there can be no strict psychophysical laws which connect mental and physical events under their descriptions as mental and physical events.
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Rhamnogalacturonan endolyase (, rhamnogalacturonase B, alpha-L- rhamnopyranosyl-(1->4)-alpha-D-galactopyranosyluronide lyase, Rgase B, rhamnogalacturonan alpha-L-rhamnopyranosyl-(1,4)-alpha-D- galactopyranosyluronide lyase, RG-lyase, YesW, RGL4, Rgl11A, Rgl11Y, RhiE) is an enzyme with systematic name alpha-L-rhamnopyranosyl-(1->4)-alpha-D- galactopyranosyluronate endolyase. This enzyme catalyses the following chemical reaction : Endotype eliminative cleavage of L-alpha- rhamnopyranosyl-(1->4)-alpha-D-galactopyranosyluronic acid bonds of rhamnogalacturonan I domains in ramified hairy regions of pectin leaving L-rhamnopyranose at the reducing end and 4-deoxy-4,5-unsaturated D-galactopyranosyluronic acid at the non-reducing end. The enzyme is part of the degradation system for rhamnogalacturonan I in Bacillus subtilis strain 168 and Aspergillus aculeatus.
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Some have questioned how eliminative materialism is compatible with the freedom of will apparently required for anyone (including its adherents) to make truth claims.Hans Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2001/1966), p. 175. The second option, common amongst philosophers who adopt anthropic mechanism, is to argue that the arguments given for incompatibility are specious: whatever it is we mean by "consciousness" and "free will," be fully compatible with a mechanistic understanding of the human mind and will. As a result, they tend to argue for one or another non-eliminativist physicalist theories of mind, and for compatibilism on the question of free will.
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Hieronymus Bosch's Ascent of the Blessed depicts a tunnel of light and spiritual figures, often described in reports of near-death experiences. Reductionistic and eliminative materialistic approaches, for example the Multiple Drafts Model, hold that consciousness can be wholly explained by neuroscience through the workings of the brain and its neurons, thus adhering to biological naturalism. On the other hand, some scientists, like Andrei Linde, have considered that consciousness, like spacetime, might have its own intrinsic degrees of freedom, and that one's perceptions may be as real as (or even more real than) material objects. Hypotheses of consciousness and spacetime explain consciousness in describing a "space of conscious elements", often encompassing a number of extra dimensions.
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Corliss Swain notes that "Commentators agree that if Hume did find some new problem" when he reviewed the section on personal identity, "he wasn't forthcoming about its nature in the Appendix." One interpretation of Hume's view of the self, argued for by philosopher and psychologist James Giles, is that Hume is not arguing for a bundle theory, which is a form of reductionism, but rather for an eliminative view of the self. That is, rather than reducing the self to a bundle of perceptions, Hume is rejecting the idea of the self altogether. On this interpretation, Hume is proposing a "no-self theory" and thus has much in common with Buddhist thought (see anattā).
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'Spicy and non-poisonous' accords well with the culinary use of P. japonicum in Korean cuisine, whereas 'bifurcates at the top' and 'produces madness' accords with the morphology and medicinal/toxic properties of S. divaricata. However, as fang k'uei, P. japonicum is definitely used for medicinal as well as culinary purposes in China, where it is employed as an 'eliminative', diuretic, tussive, sedative and tonic. Ming Dynasty pharmacologist Li Shizhen was likewise of the opinion that P. japonicum was, although medicinal, not toxic in itself, maintaining that the hallucinogenic properties of the drug were probably a result of its adulteration with material derived from Aconitum or Euphorbia species.Schultes, Richard Evans; Hofmann, Albert (1979).
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In enzymology, a pectin lyase also known as pectolyase is a naturally occurring pectinase a type of enzyme that degrades pectin. It is produced commercially for the food industry from fungi and used to destroy residual fruit starch, known as pectin, in wine and cider. In plant cell culture, it is used in combination with the enzyme cellulase to generate protoplasts by degrading the plant cell walls. Pectin lyase is an enzyme that catalyzes the chemical reaction :Eliminative cleavage of (1->4)-alpha-D-galacturonan methyl ester to give oligosaccharides with 4-deoxy-6-O-methyl-alpha-D- galact-4-enuronosyl groups at their non-reducing ends This enzyme belongs to the family of lyases, specifically those carbon-oxygen lyases acting on polysaccharides.
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The debates that occur within the philosophy of mind have taken center stage. American philosophers such as Hilary Putnam, Donald Davidson,"Donald Davidson" at the Internet Encylclopedia of Philosophy Retrieved September 10, 2009 Daniel Dennett,"Daniel Dennett" at the Dictionary of the Philosophy of Mind Retrieved September 10, 2009 Douglas Hofstadter,Douglas Hofstadter's page at Indiana.edu Retrieved September 10, 2009 John Searle,"John Searle" at the Dictionary of the Philosophy of Mind Retrieved September 10, 2009 as well as Patricia and Paul Churchland"Eliminative Materialism" at the Stanford Encylclopedia of Philosophy Retrieved September 10, 2009 continue the discussion of such issues as the nature of mind and the hard problem of consciousness, a philosophical problem indicated by the Australian philosopher David Chalmers.
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743–766: "Analytic philosophy is rediscovering Hegel. [There is] a particularly strong thread of new analytic Hegelianism, sometimes called 'Pittsburgh Hegelianism' ... The sociality and historicity of reason, the proper treatment of space and time, conceptual holism, inferentialism, the reality of conceptual structure, the structure of experience, and the nature of normativity are the central concerns of Pittsburgh Hegelianism." Other philosophers strongly influenced by Sellars span the full spectrum of contemporary English-speaking philosophy, from neopragmatism (Richard Rorty) to eliminative materialism (Paul Churchland) to rationalism (Laurence BonJour). Sellars's philosophical heirs also include Ruth Millikan, Héctor-Neri Castañeda, Bruce Aune, Jay Rosenberg, Johanna Seibt, Matthew Burstein, Ray Brassier, Andrew Chrucky, Jeffrey Sicha, Pedro Amaral, Thomas Vinci, Willem A. de Vries, David Rosenthal, Ken Wilber and Michael Williams.
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For example, the observation that both a fire and boiling water are instances of heat allows us to exclude light as the true form of heat, because light is present in the case of the fire but not in the case of the boiling water. Through this comparative analysis, Bacon intends to eventually extrapolate the true form of heat, although it is clear that such a goal is only gradually approachable by degrees. Indeed, the hypothesis that is derived from this eliminative induction, which Bacon names The First Vintage, is only the starting point from which additional empirical evidence and experimental analysis can refine our conception of a formal cause. The "Baconian method" does not end at the First Vintage.
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The later Ludwig Wittgenstein was also an important inspiration for eliminativism, particularly with his attack on "private objects" as "grammatical fictions". Early eliminativists such as Rorty and Feyerabend often confused two different notions of the sort of elimination that the term "eliminative materialism" entailed. On the one hand, they claimed, the cognitive sciences that will ultimately give people a correct account of the workings of the mind will not employ terms that refer to common-sense mental states like beliefs and desires; these states will not be part of the ontology of a mature cognitive science. But critics immediately countered that this view was indistinguishable from the identity theory of mind.Savitt, S. (1974). Rorty's Disappearance Theory, Philosophical Studies 28:433-36.
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The philosopher Mary Midgley states that the idea that nothing exists except matter is also self-refuting because if it were true neither it, nor any other idea, would exist, and similarly that an argument to that effect would be self-refuting because it would deny its own existence.see Mary Midgley The Myths we Live by Several other philosophers also argue that eliminative materialism is self-refuting. And However, other forms of materialism may escape this kind of argument because, rather than eliminating the mental, they seek to identify it with, or reduce it to, the material. For instance, identity theorists such as J. J. C. Smart, Ullin Place and E. G. Boring state that ideas exist materially as patterns of neural structure and activity.
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In the early 20th century, matter was found to be a form of energy and therefore not fundamental as materialists had assumed. (See History of physics.) In contemporary analytic philosophy, renewed attention to the problem of universals, philosophy of mathematics, the development of mathematical logic, and the post-positivist revival of metaphysics and the philosophy of religion, initially by way of Wittgensteinian linguistic philosophy, further called the naturalistic paradigm into question. Developments such as these, along with those within science and the philosophy of science brought new advancements and revisions of naturalistic doctrines by naturalistic philosophers into metaphysics, ethics, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind, epistemology, etc., the products of which include physicalism and eliminative materialism, supervenience, causal theories of reference, anomalous monism, naturalized epistemology (e.g.
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