Q: Are there any scenarios where owners or occupants of fully-autonomous vehicles might still be "contributorily" liable for human decisions, such as the failure to download ADS software updates or to bring their cars in for maintenance?
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The trial court found that the defendants were negligent (i.e., that when they discharged their weapons they did not do so with ordinary prudence), and that the plaintiff was not contributorily negligent. The defendants appealed.
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The plaintiff husband and wife were hit by a car in Maine; the driver of the other car was killed. The plaintiffs sued the estate (law) of the dead driver in the Federal District Court in Massachusetts, naming the executor of the dead driver's estate as the defendant and invoking the court's diversity jurisdiction. The District court applied general principles of conflicts of law, determining that Maine law should control the case because that is where the accident happened. Under Maine law, the plaintiffs had the burden of proof to show that they were not contributorily negligent; had the court applied Massachusetts law, the defendant would have had the burden of showing plaintiff's contributorily negligence.
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He was paid a small wage for this help on several occasions, before he was injured due to the negligent driving of Mr Plenty, suffering a fractured leg. At first instance, Plenty was adjudged 75% contributorily negligent, and recovery from the employer was barred altogether, the judge stating that it was not in the scope of Mr Plenty's employment to take on a child as a subordinate.
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A female pedestrian (the plaintiff and appellant) was struck down by a motor vehicle driven by Chin (the defendant) while crossing a public highway. As a result, the plaintiff suffered serious personal injuries. The plaintiff then brought legal action, alleging that the defendant was negligent. The defendant denied the allegation and argued that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent in crossing the road without due care.
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D. Cal. 1995), is a U.S. district court case about whether the operator of a computer bulletin board service ("BBS") and Internet access provider that allows that BBS to reach the Internet should be liable for copyright infringement committed by a subscriber of the BBS. The plaintiff Religious Technology Center ("RTC") argued that defendant Netcom was directly, contributorily, and vicariously liable for copyright infringement. Netcom moved for summary judgment (i.e.
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The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground, among others, that violation of the statutory rule constitutes contributory negligence as a matter of law. The trial judge left to the jury the question whether failure to observe the statutory rule was a proximate cause of the accident. The trial judge found for P, which the appellate division affirmed. On this appeal, D argues the pedestrians were contributorily negligent as a matter of law for violating the statute.
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If the plaintiff's negligence was a cause of the injury, the plaintiff is barred from recovery. In an opinion written by Benjamin N. Cardozo, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's ruling that the trial judge's jury instruction was erroneous. The trial judge had instructed the jury to consider the plaintiff's statutory violation when determining whether the plaintiff was contributorily negligent. The Court of Appeals held that the question of contributory negligence should not have been submitted to the jury.
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The court of appeals reversed the decision of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, which had granted a preliminary injunction against myVidster, citing sufficient knowledge of infringement on Gunter's part, while denying safe harbor defense under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). The Court held that Gunter was not directly liable because the copyrighted content was not stored on myVidster's servers, and was not contributorily liable because there was no evidence that conduct by myVidster increased the amount of infringement.
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Contributory infringement occurs when a manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another to infringe a trademark, or if it continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement. Under these situations, the manufacturer or distributor is contributorily responsible for any harm done as a result of the deceit. General knowledge is not enough; the defendant must supply its product or services to "identified individuals" that it knows or has reason to know are engaging in trademark infringement. The district court relied on Tiffany Inc. v.
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In Canada the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has been largely overturned by the Supreme Court. In case of Fontaine v. British Columbia (Official Administrator)[1998] 1 S.C.R. 424 the Court rejected the use of res ipsa loquitur and instead proposed the rule that once the plaintiff has proven that the harm was under exclusive control of the defendant and that they were not contributorily negligent a tactical burden is placed on the defendant in which the judge has the discretion to infer negligence unless the defendant can produce evidence to the contrary.
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Under Scots law, they owed a duty of reasonable care to prevent the site becoming an "allurement" for the boys; had they discharged this duty? On the other hand, the children were trespassers and possibly contributorily negligent. A crucial issue was the likelihood (or foreseeability) of the presence of children on Russell Road, and whether the explosion causing the serious burn injuries was of "different type than that could have been foreseeable". The court of first instance, the First Division of the Court of Session, limited the liability of the Post Office on the grounds that although the danger to children was foreseeable the accident itself was not foreseeable.
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Further, the doctrine of ex turpi causa can only be used as a defence and cannot be used to negate a duty of care, because it would inappropriately place an onus on the plaintiff to show absence of illegal or immoral conduct; the duty of care cannot be selectively applied to heads of damage; and the consideration of illegal or immoral conduct in duty of care would raise procedural problems where there are concurrent claims. In the result, the plaintiff in this case was not seeking to profit from his illegal conduct (drinking and driving), nor was he circumventing the criminal law. However, he was contributorily negligent - therefore the damages were reduced to 50 percent.
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" In the later years of the 20th century, NHL attendance and interest grew as more games were broadcast and the league expanded. A half- century after the Minnesota court's decision in the Eveleth case, an appeals court in neighboring Wisconsin followed the trial court in extending the Baseball Rule (in the process making one of the earliest judicial references to it as such) to hockey in affirming a grant of summary judgement in favor of the Milwaukee Admirals, saying the plaintiff's admitted knowledge of hockey made her contributorily negligent enough to bar recovery even under comparative negligence. Courts in Pennsylvania and California made similar holdings. In the latter, the court noted, in the half-century since Thurman, "professional ice hockey has grown in popularity both in California and nationally.
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If the passenger had voluntarily chosen not to wear a seatbelt, was that person volenti to the injury? If so, volenti being a complete defence, the passenger would fail in a claim for negligence. In Froom v Butcher,Froom V Butcher[1976] 1 QB 286; [1975] 3 WLR 379; [1975] 3 All ER 520;[1975] 2 Lloyd's Rep 478; [1975] RTR 518; (1975) 119 SJ 613Case summary [v] Lord Denning MR sliced the Gordian knot by declaring that such a passenger was NOT volenti but rather was 20% contributorily negligent in the matter. Denning MR declared that "determining whether one is guilty of contributory negligence is a matter not of the cause of the accident, but of the cause of the damage", and he thereby ensured that the injured passenger could successfully claim against the driver's insurance, albeit that the claim would be only 80% of the loss.
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