But in this attack on one of the contradictories, the two speakers more or less give in to the temptation of making personal, right from the start, one of the contradictories of the problem.
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He entitles this kind of opposition dialectical, and that of contradictories analytical.
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Self and not-self, subject and object, are not contradictories, but dialectical polarities.
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In other words, by which endoxes one of the contradictories becomes a legitimate opinion.
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Following Aristotle, he announced that the primary principle of reasoning is that contradictories cannot both be true.
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Contradictories are such that one of them is true if and only if the other is false.
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God can make either of them true, but he can't make both of them true, since they are contradictories.
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Spontaneously we seek, among the relevant endoxes, those which force us to conclude one of the contradictories, because of the implied concept's properties.
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Contradictories and contraries, in syllogistic, or traditional, logic, two basically different forms of opposition that can obtain between two categorical propositions or statements formed from the same terms.
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It also preserves our intuition on contradictoriness, in the form: A and B are contradictories iff, if A is true, B is false, and if A is false, B is true.
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The dialectic of contradictories refers to the beautiful and the ugly in art, to truth and falsehood in philosophy, to the useful and useless in economics, to good and evil in ethics.
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Even though it's quite possible for one person to discover and judge, one after the other, the principles capable of invalidating both contradictories of the problem, it remains far easier and more natural for two persons.
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A correlative conjunction is a relationship between two statements where one must be false and the other true. In formal logic this is known as the exclusive or relationship; traditionally, terms between which this relationship exists have been called contradictories.
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Some scholars argue that this troubled relationship with the homeland because of Nazism caused Christa Wolf - or at least her narrator persona - to repress her positive thoughts towards her childhood home.Stone, “Visiting the Hometown, Revisiting the Past,” 598. Her return to “L” uncovers the complicated contradictories in her emotions.
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Reprinted in Russian and Slavic Grammar Studies, 1931–1981. Mouton, 1984. Forty years later, Jakobson described language by saying that "every single constituent of a linguistic system is built on an opposition of two logical contradictories: the presence of an attribute ('markedness') in contraposition to its absence ('unmarkedness')."Jakobson, R. (1972).
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At about the same time (1912) that Russell and Whitehead were finishing the last volume of their Principia Mathematica, and the publishing of Russell's "The Problems of Philosophy" at least two logicians (Louis Couturat, Christine Ladd-Franklin) were asserting that two "laws" (principles) of contradiction" and "excluded middle" are necessary to specify "contradictories"; Ladd-Franklin renamed these the principles of exclusion and exhaustion. The following appears as a footnote on page 23 of Couturat 1914: :"As Mrs. LADD·FRANKLlN has truly remarked (BALDWIN, Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, article "Laws of Thought"), the principle of contradiction is not sufficient to define contradictories; the principle of excluded middle must be added which equally deserves the name of principle of contradiction. This is why Mrs.
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The traditional square of opposition demonstrates two sets of contradictories A and O, and E and I (i.e. they cannot both be true and cannot both be false), two contraries A and E (i.e. they can both be false, but cannot both be true), and two subcontraries I and O (i.e. they can both be true, but cannot both be false) according to Aristotle’s definitions.
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All adaptation requires is selection against. That was Darwin’s point. But the combination of blind variation and selection-against is not possible without disjunctive outcomes. It is important to see that ‘selection-against’ isn’t the contradictory of ‘selection for.’ Why are they not contradictories? That is, why isn’t selection-against trait T just selection for trait not-T? Simply because there are traits that are neither selected-against nor selected-for.
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Metaphysics 7, 1011b 26–27 Aristotle wrote that ambiguity can arise from the use of ambiguous names, but cannot exist in the facts themselves: Aristotle's assertion that "...it will not be possible to be and not to be the same thing", which would be written in propositional logic as ¬(P ∧ ¬P), is a statement modern logicians could call the law of excluded middle (P ∨ ¬P), as distribution of the negation of Aristotle's assertion makes them equivalent, regardless that the former claims that no statement is both true and false, while the latter requires that any statement is either true or false. However, Aristotle also writes, "since it is impossible that contradictories should be at the same time true of the same thing, obviously contraries also cannot belong at the same time to the same thing" (Book IV, CH 6, p. 531). He then proposes that "there cannot be an intermediate between contradictories, but of one subject we must either affirm or deny any one predicate" (Book IV, CH 7, p. 531).
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Likewise, if another person, say Cindy, has the same non-moral relationship to David that Alice does (e.g., having borrowed $10 from him), then she must have the same obligation Alice does. The principle is compatible with a very fine-grained analysis of the supervenience base for moral predicates, and hence is compatible with moral particularism. (R.M. Hare, in the first recorded usage of the term moral particularism, defined these as incompatible, saying they were contradictories, but his definition of particularism is not identical with its contemporary usage.
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These are the neutral ones that biologists, especially molecular evolutionary biologists, describe as silent, switched off, junk, non-coding, etc. ‘Selection for’ and ‘selection-against’ are contraries, not contradictories. Natural selection cannot discriminate between coextensive properties. To see how the process that Darwinian selection-against works in a real case, consider an example: two distinct gene products, one of which is neutral or even harmful to an organism and the other of which is beneficial, which are coded for by genes right next to each other on the chromosomes.
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Frege's square of opposition The conträr below is an erratum: It should read subconträr In the 19th century, George Boole argued for requiring existential import on both terms in particular claims (I and O), but allowing all terms of universal claims (A and E) to lack existential import. This decision made Venn diagrams particularly easy to use for term logic. The square of opposition, under this Boolean set of assumptions, is often called the modern Square of opposition. In the modern square of opposition, A and O claims are contradictories, as are E and I, but all other forms of opposition cease to hold; there are no contraries, subcontraries, or subalterns.
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Thus, from a modern point of view, it often makes sense to talk about 'the' opposition of a claim, rather than insisting as older logicians did that a claim has several different opposites, which are in different kinds of opposition with the claim. Gottlob Frege's Begriffsschrift also presents a square of oppositions, organised in an almost identical manner to the classical square, showing the contradictories, subalternates and contraries between four formulae constructed from universal quantification, negation and implication. Algirdas Julien Greimas' semiotic square was derived from Aristotle's work. The traditional square of opposition is now often compared with squares based on inner- and outer-negation.
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