The claim that moral properties are supervenient upon non-moral properties is called moral supervenience.
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An interesting consequence is that neither behavior of an organism nor its mental operations can be considered fully or exclusively supervenient on the body of the organism. On the one hand, behavior is not supervenient on all parts of the body. On the other hand, due to the necessary interactions with the environment at all levels of organization, behavior is supervenient also on some aspects of the environment. The same holds for the mental operations, or the mind.
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Firstly, token physicalism does not imply supervenience physicalism because the former does not rule out the possibility of non-supervenient properties (provided that they are associated only with physical particulars). Secondarily, supervenience physicalism does not imply token physicalism, for the former allows supervenient objects (such as a "nation", or "soul") that are not equal to any physical object.
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Some thinkers question the plausibility of strong emergence as contravening our usual understanding of physics. Mark A. Bedau observes: > Although strong emergence is logically possible, it is uncomfortably like > magic. How does an irreducible but supervenient downward causal power arise, > since by definition it cannot be due to the aggregation of the micro-level > potentialities? Such causal powers would be quite unlike anything within our > scientific ken.
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The principle of moral supervenience states that moral predicates (e.g., permissible, obligatory, forbidden, etc.), and hence moral facts attributing these predicates to various particular actions or action-types, supervene, or are defined by and depend, upon non-moral facts. The moral facts are hence said to be supervenient facts, and the non-moral facts the supervenience base of the former. The principle is sometimes qualified to say that moral facts supervene upon natural facts, i.e.
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138 A further problem for supervenience-based formulations of physicalism is the so-called "necessary beings problem". A necessary being in this context is a non-physical being that exists in all possible worlds (for example what theists refer to as God). A necessary being is compatible with all the definitions provided, because it is supervenient on everything; yet it is usually taken to contradict the notion that everything is physical. So any supervenience-based formulation of physicalism will at best state a necessary but not sufficient condition for the truth of physicalism.
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If not, a new entity is formed with new, emergent properties: this is called strong emergence, which it is argued cannot be simulated or analysed. Some common points between the two notions are that emergence concerns new properties produced as the system grows, which is to say ones which are not shared with its components or prior states. Also, it is assumed that the properties are supervenient rather than metaphysically primitive . Weak emergence describes new properties arising in systems as a result of the interactions at an elemental level.
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The writer of Acts held Basilides responsible for dualism, yet his language on this point is loose, as if he were not sure of his ground; and the quotation which he gives by no means bears him out. It is quite conceivable that his understanding of Basilides came from the dualistic Basilidians of his day, who have given a wrong interpretation to genuine words of their master.Cf. Uhlhorn, 52 f. Indeed the description of evil as a supervenient nature without root, reads almost as if it were directed against Persian doctrine, and may be fairly interpreted by Basilides's comparison of pain and fear to the rust of iron as natural accidents.
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The value of a physical object to an agent is sometimes held to be supervenient upon the physical properties of the object. In aesthetics, the beauty of La Grande Jatte might supervene on the physical composition of the painting (the specific molecules that make up the painting), the artistic composition of the painting (in this case, dots), the figures and forms of the painted image, or the painted canvas as a whole. In ethics, the goodness of an act of charity might supervene on the physical properties of the agent, the mental state of the agent (his or her intention), or the external state of affairs itself. Similarly, the overall suffering caused by an earthquake might supervene on the spatiotemporal entities that constituted it, the deaths it caused, or the natural disaster itself.
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For Berlin, values are creations of mankind, rather than products of nature waiting to be discovered. He argued, on the basis of the epistemic and empathetic access we have to other cultures across history, that the nature of mankind is such that certain values – the importance of individual liberty, for instance – will hold true across cultures, and this is what he meant by objective pluralism. Berlin's argument was partly grounded in Wittgenstein's later theory of language, which argued that inter-translatability was supervenient on a similarity in forms of life, with the inverse implication that our epistemic access to other cultures entails an ontologically contiguous value-structure. With his account of value pluralism, he proposed the view that moral values may be equally, or rather incommensurably, valid and yet incompatible, and may, therefore, come into conflict with one another in a way that admits of no resolution without reference to particular contexts of a decision.
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