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85 Sentences With "states of affairs"

How to use states of affairs in a sentence? Find typical usage patterns (collocations)/phrases/context for "states of affairs" and check conjugation/comparative form for "states of affairs". Mastering all the usages of "states of affairs" from sentence examples published by news publications.

Buffett lamented these states of affairs in his annual letter to Berkshire shareholders.
Buffett lamented these states of affairs in his widely read annual letter to Berkshire shareholders.
There's a whole lot of, lot of sad states of affairs over the last couple of years.
But Trump simply doesn't view what he's engaged in as an exercise in articulating and defending beliefs about factual states of affairs.
The first life unconsciously "sensed" or "registered" states of affairs — dangers, the integrity of its boundaries, temperature and light sources — and made adjustments to sustain itself.
As a candidate, Trump "made really extraordinary reprehensible comments targeted directly at our client," Fidell told reporters Friday, calling the situation "one of the most preposterous states of affairs" in American legal history.
I personally believe that a realist viewpoint can include our ability to carve out the space of what might be objectively possible in nature, rather than in terms of mapping onto some actual states of affairs.
On Monday, Stephanie Pierson, the mother of a former chorister, recalled warmly of Ms. Doria, "She did a great job, and she made children cry" — two states of affairs that in Ms. Doria's energetic ambit were entirely compatible.
The emergence of subjectivity in the form of integrated sensory images of bodily boundaries and position, as well as states of affairs in the external world accompanied by evaluative, "valenced" feelings, offered such a major advantage — a "dramatic leap" — over the simple unconscious "sensing" and "registering" of the first life-forms that sentience proliferated.
When combined, objects form "states of affairs." A state of affairs that obtains is a "fact." Facts make up the entirety of the world. Facts are logically independent of one another, as are states of affairs.
Another view is that causes and effects are 'states of affairs', with the exact natures of those entities being less restrictively defined than in process philosophy.Armstrong, D.M. (1997). A World of States of Affairs, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, , pp. 89, 265.
He thereby argued that the universe is the totality of actual states of affairs and that these states of affairs can be expressed by the language of first-order predicate logic. Thus a picture of the universe can be construed by means of expressing atomic facts in the form of atomic propositions, and linking them using logical operators.
States of affairs which hold within one epoch may be completely absent, or carry opposite implications in another, according to these theories.
Descending the line furnishes justification for the claims of the dianoetic sciences and beliefs about the material world, including the states of affairs in actual cities.
Similarly, states of affairs have canonical designators, the imperfect gerundial nominals like 'a's being F', that display the things on which the state of affairs ontologically depends.
In the case of essential as opposed to accidental predications, truthmakers need not be taken to be concrete states of affairs, and so need not be taken as involving exemplifiable entities.
Central to Armstrong's philosophy is the idea of states of affairs ("facts" in Russell's terminology): in Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics, Armstrong claims that states of affairs are "the fundamental structures in reality". A state of affairs roughly put is an instantiation of a particular and a universal: a state of affairs might be that a particular atom exists, instantiating a universal (say, that it is of a particular element, if chemical elements are ultimately accepted as part of Armstrong's universals). The particulars in Armstrong's ontology must have at least one universal—just as he rejects uninstantiated universals, he also rejects "unpropertied particulars". Armstrong argues that states of affairs are distinct things in ontology because they are more than the sum of their parts.
Russell became an advocate of logical atomism. Wittgenstein developed a comprehensive system of logical atomism in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (, 1921). He thereby argued that the universe is the totality of actual states of affairs and that these states of affairs can be expressed by the language of first-order predicate logic. Thus a picture of the universe can be construed using expressing atomic facts in the form of atomic propositions and linking them using logical operators.
That is, one state of affair's (or fact's) existence does not allow us to infer whether another state of affairs (or fact) exists or does not exist. Within states of affairs, objects are in particular relations to one another. This is analogous to the spatial relations between toy cars discussed above. The structure of states of affairs comes from the arrangement of their constituent objects (TLP 2.032), and such arrangement is essential to their intelligibility, just as the toy cars must be arranged in a certain way in order to picture the automobile accident.
In a sense of "state of affairs" favored by Ernest Sosa, states of affairs are situational conditions. In fact, in the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy,Ernest Sosa, 1999. "Condition". Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. R.Audi, Ed. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. p. 171.
Alethic modal operators (M-operators) determine the fundamental conditions of possible worlds, especially causality, time-space parameters, and the action capacity of persons. They indicate the possibility, impossibility and necessity of actions, states of affairs, events, people, and qualities in the possible worlds.
Hardly ever is causality established more firmly than as more or less probable. It is most convenient for establishment of causality if the contrasting material states of affairs are precisely matched, except for only one variable factor, perhaps measured by a real number.
We have perfect duty not to act by maxims that create incoherent or impossible states of natural affairs when we attempt to universalize them, and we have imperfect duty not to act by maxims that lead to unstable or greatly undesirable states of affairs.
Their meaning can be grasped solely with an analysis of the signs they contain. They are analytical sentences, i.e. true by virtue of their logical meaning. Even though these sentences could refer to states of affairs, their meaning is given by the symbols and relations they contain.
Kotarbiński's ontological reism approach assumes that the only things that exist, and thus the only ontological category to be used, are individual, concrete objects (or bodies) in opposition to doctrines allowing for the existence of such categories as universals, states of affairs, properties, relations, sets, classes, mental constructs, etc.
Bertrand Russell held that propositions were structured entities with objects and properties as constituents. One important difference between Ludwig Wittgenstein's view (according to which a proposition is the set of possible worlds/states of affairs in which it is true) is that on the Russellian account, two propositions that are true in all the same states of affairs can still be differentiated. For instance, the proposition "two plus two equals four" is distinct on a Russellian account from the proposition "three plus three equals six". If propositions are sets of possible worlds, however, then all mathematical truths (and all other necessary truths) are the same set (the set of all possible worlds).
In philosophy, a state of affairs (), also known as a situation, is a way the actual world must be in order to make some given proposition about the actual world true; in other words, a state of affairs (situation) is a truth-maker, whereas a proposition is a truth-bearer. Whereas states of affairs (situations) either obtain or fail-to-obtain, propositions are either true or false.Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online David Malet Armstrong is well known for his defence of a factualism, a position according to which the world is a world of facts and not a world of things.David Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 1.
Indeed, a logical analysis of those sentences proves that they do not convey the meaning of states of affairs. In other words, theses sentences are meaningless. Carnap explains that to be meaningful, a sentence should be factual. It can be so, for one thing, by being based on experience, i.e.
It is the relative frequency. Statements belonging to the second concepts are about reality and describe states of affairs. They are empirical and, therefore, must be based on experimental procedures and the observation of relevant facts. On the contrary, statements belonging to the first concept do not say anything about facts.
In this case—and according to independent claims by Graham Priest—trivialism is considered the complete opposite of skepticism. However, insofar as the trivialist affirms all states of affairs as universally true, the Pyrrhonist neither affirms nor denies the truth (or falsity) of such affairs.Empiricus, S. (2000). Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Scepticism.
Contemporary philosophers Joshua Hoffman and Gary S. Rosenkrantz take the first horn of the dilemma, branding divine command theory a "subjective theory of value" that makes morality arbitrary. They accept a theory of morality on which, "right and wrong, good and bad, are in a sense independent of what anyone believes, wants, or prefers." They do not address the aforementioned problems with the first horn, but do consider a related problem concerning God's omnipotence: namely, that it might be handicapped by his inability to bring about what is independently evil. To this they reply that God is omnipotent, even though there are states of affairs he cannot bring about: omnipotence is a matter of "maximal power", not an ability to bring about all possible states of affairs.
Most consequentialist theories focus on promoting some sort of good consequences. However, negative utilitarianism lays out a consequentialist theory that focuses solely on minimizing bad consequences. One major difference between these two approaches is the agent's responsibility. Positive consequentialism demands that we bring about good states of affairs, whereas negative consequentialism requires that we avoid bad ones.
" – Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. States of AffairsSee Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Proposition 2: What is the case—a fact—is the existence of states of affairs. Facts may be understood as information that makes a true sentence true."A fact is, traditionally, the worldly correlate of a true proposition, a state of affairs whose obtaining makes that proposition true.
J. Furner, Marx on Capitalism: The Interaction-Recognition-Antinomy Thesis, Brill Press 2018, p. 405. Furner emphasizes that the thesis and antithesis of this antinomy are not contradictory opposites, but rather "consist in the assertion of rights to states of affairs that are contradictory opposites".J. Furner, Marx on Capitalism: The Interaction-Recognition-Antinomy Thesis, Brill Press 2018, p. 125.
Peña's existence-oriented ontology identifies each entity with a fact, its existence. Ontological truth is also identified with existence, which is a reduplicative property. Ontophantics follows Frege's view of sentences as names of objects, but in this case the objects under consideration are states of affairs. From a linguistic perspective phenomena of nominalization are thus gone into from an outlook which eliminates any categorical cleavages.
A 1907 painting by Boris Kustodiev depicting Russian serfs listening to the proclamation of the Emancipation Manifesto in 1861. Tsar Alexander II relied on Maria Alexandrovna's judgment and serious nature to support his government, opening official documents and discussing states of affairs with her. She supported Alexander's ideals of introducing reforms. Two opposite philosophical currents divided Russian politics of their time: Westernizers and Slavophiles.
PropBank differs from FrameNet, the resource to which it is most frequently compared, in several ways. PropBank is a verb- oriented resource, while FrameNet is centered on the more abstract notion of frames, which generalizes descriptions across similar verbs (e.g. "describe" and "characterize") as well as nouns and other words (e.g. "description"). PropBank does not annotate events or states of affairs described using nouns.
In other words, these pseudo-problems concern statements that do not, in any way, have empirical implications. They do not refer to states of affairs and the things they denote cannot be perceived. Consequently, one of Carnap's main aim has been to redefine the purpose and method of philosophy. According to him, philosophy should not aim at producing any knowledge transcending the knowledge of science.
"Intentionality," to repeat, is the general term for all the various forms by which the mind can be directed at, or be about, or of, objects and states of affairs in the world." (p.85)Searle (1999, pp. 85–86) clarifies his usage: "Intentionality is an unfortunate word, and like a lot of unfortunate words in philosophy, we owe it to the German-speaking philosophers.
Moore insists that "good" is indefinable, and provides an exposition of what he calls the "naturalistic fallacy." He defends the objectivity and multiplicity of values, arguing that knowledge of values cannot be derived from knowledge of facts, but only from intuition of the goodness of such states of affairs as beauty, pleasure, friendship and knowledge. In Moore's view, right acts are those producing the most good.
In section 2.01 he claims that "states of affairs" are combinations of objects. In section 2.03 he explains that nothing is needed to link the objects, since the objects hang together. The arrangement of words that in the sentence corresponds to the arrangement or structure of objects in the state of affairs expressed by the sentence. This is the so-called picture theory of the proposition.
Cultural Theory is an alternative to two other prominent theories of risk perception. The first, which is grounded in rational choice theory, treats risk perceptions as manifesting individuals’ implicit weighing of costs and benefits.Starr (1969). Douglas and Wildavsky criticized this position in Risk and Culture, arguing that it ignores the role of cultural ways of life in determining what states of affairs individuals see as worthy of taking risks to attain.
A fact might be thought of as the obtaining state of affairs that Madison is in Wisconsin, and a possible (but not obtaining) state of affairs might be Madison's being in Utah. These states of affairs are made up of certain arrangements of objects (TLP 2.023). However, Wittgenstein does not specify what objects are. Madison, Wisconsin, and Utah cannot be atomic objects: they are themselves composed of numerous facts.
If some particular a has a non-symmetric relation R to another particular b, then R (a, b) differs from R (b, a). It may be the case that R (a, b) obtains in the world but R (b, a) does not. Without states of affairs instantiating the particulars and universals (including relations), we cannot account for the truth of the one case and the falsity of the other.
A hearer may reject the offering of a speech act on the grounds that it is invalid because it: # presupposes or explicates states of affairs which are not the case (IT); # does not conform to accepted normative expectations (WE); # raises doubts about the intentions or sincerity of the speaker (I). Of course, from this it follows that a hearer who accepts the offering of a speech act does so on the grounds that it is valid because it: # presupposes or explicates states of affairs that are true (IT); # conforms to accepted normative expectations (WE); # raises no doubts concerning the intentions or sincerity of the speaker (I). This means that when engaging in communication the speaker and hearer are inescapably oriented to the validity of what is said. A speech act can be understood as an offering, the success or failure of which depends upon the hearer's response of either accepting or rejecting the validity claims it raises.
Armstrong further rejects nominalisms that deny that properties and relations exist in reality because he suggests that these sorts of nominalisms, specifically referring to what he calls class nominalism, and resemblance nominalism, postulate primitives of either class membership or resemblance. This primitive results in a vicious regress for both kinds of nominalisms, Armstrong suggests, thus motivating his states-of- affairs based system that unites properties by postulating a primitive tie of instantiation based on a fact-ontology, called states of affairs. In terms of the origin of Armstrong's view of universals, Armstrong says his view of universals is "relatively unexplored territory" but points to Hilary Putnam's 1970 paper 'On Properties' :Reprinted in as a possible forerunner. He also says that "Plato in his later works, Aristotle and the Scholastic Realists were ahead of contemporary philosophy in this matter, although handicapped by the relative backwardness of the science and the scientific methodology of their day".
Anumana (inference or reasoning) for Dignāga is a type of cognition which is only aware of general attributes, and is constructed out of simpler sensations. Inference can also be communicated through linguistic conventions.Hayes (1982), p 143. A central issue which concerned Dignāga was the interpretation of signs (linga) or the evidence (hetu) which led one to an inference (anumana) about states of affairs; such as how smoke can lead one to infer that there is a fire.
209; McKim 2001, p. 101; Poston and Dougherty 2007, 195-196. Schellenberg has replied that philosophers have no reason to assume that the persons God would create would be human persons existing in a world like ours, and that there are various ways in which the same good states of affairs to which critics appeal would be capable of being experienced in the context of a relationship with God.Schellenberg 2007a, 202-203; Schellenberg 2010, pp. 515-516.
Devices that transmit multimedia messages can contain speech but also images and sounds that describe states of affairs with a richness not found before. Nyíri presents the mobile phone as the instrument which makes possible a new integration of imagery, orality and literacy, a new art of collective thought, and one that defines a new sense of space and time. Nyíri was also heavily influenced by the works of Wilfrid Sellars, Eric Havelock and Walter J. Ong.
Wittgenstein's initial conception of mathematics was logicist and even formalist. The Tractatus described the propositions of logic as a series of tautologies derived from syntactic manipulation, and without the pictorial force of elementary propositions depicting states of affairs obtaining in the world. Wittgenstein asserted that “[t]he logic of the world, which is shown in tautologies by the propositions of logic, is shown in equations by mathematics” (6.22) and further that “Mathematics is a method of logic” (6.234).
But they are, mostly, intended to be models of real world states of affairs. The value of a model is usually directly proportional to how well it corresponds to a past, present, future, actual or potential state of affairs. A model of a concept is quite different because in order to be a good model it need not have this real world correspondence.Gregory, Frank Hutson (January 1992) Cause, Effect, Efficiency & Soft Systems Models Warwick Business School Research Paper No. 42.
In philosophy, it's common to distinguish between three kinds of reason. Normative or justifying reasons are often said to be "considerations which count in favor" of some state of affairs (this is, at any rate, a common view, notably held by T. M. Scanlon and Derek Parfit). Explanatory reasons are considerations which serve to explain why things have happened—they are reasons events occur, or why states of affairs are the way they are. In other words, "reason" can also be a synonym for "cause".
In particular, G. E. Moore offered a thought experiment in criticism of pleasure as the sole bearer of value: he imagined two worlds—one of exceeding beauty and the other a heap of filth. Neither of these worlds will be experienced by anyone. The question then is if it is better for the beautiful world to exist than the heap of filth. In this, Moore implied that states of affairs have value beyond conscious pleasure, which he said spoke against the validity of hedonism.
One is the distinction between analytic statements (tautologies and contradictions) whose truth (or falsehood) is a function of the meanings of the words in the statement ('all bachelors are unmarried'), and synthetic statements, whose truth (or falsehood) is a function of (contingent) states of affairs. The other is reductionism, the theory that each meaningful statement gets its meaning from some logical construction of terms which refers exclusively to immediate experience. Quine's argument brings to mind Peirce's insistence that axioms are not a priori truths but synthetic statements.
One situation of affairs through objective acts of consciousness (acts of constituting categorially) can serve as the basis for constituting multiple states of affairs. For example, suppose a and b are two sensible objects in a certain situation of affairs. We can use it as basis to say, "aa", two judgments which designate the same state of affairs. For Husserl a sentence has a proposition or judgment as its meaning, and refers to a state of affairs which has a situation of affairs as a reference base.
An old, local riddle describes the somewhat unusual states of affairs: "The place which is Crewe is not Crewe, and the place which is not Crewe is Crewe." Until the Grand Junction Railway (GJR) company chose Crewe as the site for its locomotive works and railway station in the late 1830s, Crewe was a village with a population (c. 1831) of just 70 residents. Winsford, 7 miles (11 km) to the north, had rejected an earlier proposal, as had local landowners in neighbouring Nantwich, 4 miles (6 km) away.
The reality construct is produced by people and guides their activities in the world. Thus people are considered actors constantly influencing relations and intervening with the activities of other people: > “Although reality and world are related concepts and often used as if they > have the same meaning, they do not at all mean the same things and cannot be > used interchangeably without confusing theoretical consequences. The world > includes all things, events or states of affairs that exist, irrespective of > whether we know they exist or not. ... To be is to be in the world.
The assertion that a statement is a "necessary and sufficient" condition of another means that the former statement is true if and only if the latter is true. That is, the two statements must be either simultaneously true, or simultaneously false. In ordinary English, "necessary" and "sufficient" indicate relations between conditions or states of affairs, not statements. For example, being a male is a necessary condition for being a brother, but it is not sufficient—while being a male sibling is a necessary and sufficient condition for being a brother.
The or was a group of government-employed undercover agents (onmitsu), established by the 8th Tokugawa shōgun, Tokugawa Yoshimune (1684–1751). They were under the direct command of the shōgun and were in charge of undercover intelligence operations. In actuality, their work consisted more often of reporting any news about the city of Edo to the shōgun or remaining incognito to inspect and report on the states of affairs in the countryside. Their activities were comparable to those of the inspectors and general inspectors of the shogunate albeit under the direct orders from the shōgun.
For the sake of this analogy, the chess pieces are objects, they and their positions constitute states of affairs and therefore facts, and the totality of facts is the entire particular game of chess. We can communicate such a game of chess in the exact way that Wittgenstein says a proposition represents the world. We might say "WR/KR1" to communicate a white rook's being on the square commonly labeled as king's rook 1. Or, to be more thorough, we might make such a report for every piece's position.
Aristotle: if a sea-battle will not be fought tomorrow, then it was also true yesterday that it will not be fought. But all past truths are necessary truths. Therefore, it is not possible that the battle will be fought Future contingent propositions (or simply, future contingents) are statements about states of affairs in the future that are contingent: neither necessarily true nor necessarily false. The problem of future contingents seems to have been first discussed by Aristotle in chapter 9 of his On Interpretation (De Interpretatione), using the famous sea-battle example.
There are conflicting accounts as to who introduced epilogism. It has been, for instance, attributed to Menodotus of Nicomedia as well as to Heracleides of Tarentum, who was also a follower of Epicureanism. It is also said that the empiricists were said to have devised epilogism (epilogismos) in order to distinguish their kind of reasoning from the type used by the rationalists, which required an understanding of the underlying nature of things, including the link between consequence and exclusion drawn between states of affairs. It is said that epilogism was the considered the most extreme form of reasoning acceptable to the empiricists.
One study, which focuses on the usage of the Dutch suffix -heid (comparable to -ness in English) hypothesizes that -heid gives rise to two kinds of abstract nouns: those referring to concepts and those referring to states of affairs. It shows that the referential function of -heid is typical for the lowest-frequency words, while its conceptual function is typical for the highest-frequency words. It claims that high-frequency formations with the suffix -heid are available in the mental lexicon, whereas low-frequency words and neologisms are produced and understood by rule.BAAYEN, R. & NEIJT, A. (2009).
Research of sociological pathologies of Navajos on the reservation dates back to 1949, with research of domestic violence dating back to the 1970s. The majority of research involving domestic violence on the Navajo Reservation was done between the 1970s and 1990s and focuses on the impacts of colonization and industrialization effects on Navajo culture and family pathologies. Research today focuses on demographics where domestic violence is prevalent, in attempt to understand how to reverse societal infrastructures imposed on the Navajos to aid victims of abuse and works to educate the world on current states of affairs.
Virtually all modern philosophers affirm some sort of fact–value distinction, insofar as they distinguish between science and "valued" disciplines such as ethics, aesthetics, or the fine arts. However, philosophers such as Hilary Putnam argue that the distinction between fact and value is not as absolute as Hume envisioned. Philosophical pragmatists, for instance, believe that true propositions are those that are useful or effective in predicting future (empirical) states of affairs. Far from being value-free, the pragmatists' conception of truth or facts directly relates to an end (namely, empirical predictability) that human beings regard as normatively desirable.
Taking George W. Bush, for example. First (1) the thought-experiment must state that the name "George W. Bush" is the name used to describe the particular individual man that is typically meant. Then (2), the experimenter must imagine the possible states of affairs that reality could have been - where Bush was not president, or went into a different career, was never born at all, etc. When this is done, it becomes obvious that the phrase "President of the United States in 2004" does not necessarily describe George W. Bush, because it is not necessarily true in all possible worlds; it only contingently describes him.
One way to divide various consequentialisms is by the types of consequences that are taken to matter most, that is, which consequences count as good states of affairs. According to utilitarianism, a good action is one that results in an increase in pleasure, and the best action is one that results in the most pleasure for the greatest number. Closely related is eudaimonic consequentialism, according to which a full, flourishing life, which may or may not be the same as enjoying a great deal of pleasure, is the ultimate aim. Similarly, one might adopt an aesthetic consequentialism, in which the ultimate aim is to produce beauty.
Gottlob Frege, founder of the analytic tradition in philosophy, famously argued for the analysis of language in terms of sense and reference. For him, the sense of an expression in language describes a certain state of affairs in the world, namely, the way that some object is presented. Since many commentators view the notion of sense as identical to the notion of concept, and Frege regards senses as the linguistic representations of states of affairs in the world, it seems to follow that we may understand concepts as the manner in which we grasp the world. Accordingly, concepts (as senses) have an ontological status.
In September 2018, Jean Twenge saw smartphones and social media as raising an unhappy, compliant "iGen", which she described as the generation born after 1995. Mental depression has been said to be more common among Generation Z than any previous generation, with increased technological and online dependence and decreased face to face interaction as a key cause. According to the aforementioned study by the Varkey Foundation, youths were overall happy with the states of affairs in their personal lives (59%). The most unhappy young people were from South Korea (29%) and Japan (28%) while the happiest hailed from Indonesia (90%) and Nigeria (78%) (see right).
For example, when someone arrives at the belief that his or her floor needs sweeping, the representational theory of mind states that he or she forms a mental representation that represents the floor and its state of cleanliness. The original or "classical" representational theory probably can be traced back to Thomas Hobbes and was a dominant theme in classical empiricism in general. According to this version of the theory, the mental representations were images (often called "ideas") of the objects or states of affairs represented. For modern adherents, such as Jerry Fodor, Steven Pinker and many others, the representational system consists rather of an internal language of thought (i.e.
Seeking to account, beyond narrative syntax, for the content of literary works, Pavel became interested in the logic of possible worlds, as well as in the philosophy of art and literature. In Fictional Worlds (1986), Pavel pointed out that the general truth of a literary text is not dependent upon the truth of the individual propositions belonging to that text. Reflection on literary fiction doesn't need to identify and eliminate false propositions – as it is necessary to do in history or in science. Literary works are salient structures in which a secondary, fictional world includes entities and states of affairs that lack a correspondent in the basic, primary world.
Population ethics is the philosophical study of the ethical problems arising when our actions affect who is born and how many people are born in the future. An important area within population ethics is population axiology, which is "the study of the conditions under which one state of affairs is better than another, when the states of affairs in question may differ over the numbers and the identities of the persons who ever live." Moral philosopher Derek Parfit brought population ethics to the attention of the academic community as a modern branch of moral philosophy in his seminal work Reasons and Persons in 1984. Discussions of population ethics are thus a relatively recent development in the history of philosophy.
The truth predicate of interest in a typical correspondence theory of truth tells of a relation between representations and objective states of affairs, and is therefore expressed, for the most part, by a dyadic predicate. In general terms, one says that a representation is true of an objective situation, more briefly, that a sign is true of an object. The nature of the correspondence may vary from theory to theory in this family. The correspondence can be fairly arbitrary or it can take on the character of an analogy, an icon, or a morphism, whereby a representation is rendered true of its object by the existence of corresponding elements and a similar structure.
The first principle follows from Davidson's view of the ontology of events and the nature of the relationship of mental events (specifically propositional attitudes) with physical actions. Davidson subscribes to an ontology of events where events (as opposed to objects or states of affairs) are the fundamental, irreducible entities of the mental and physical universe. His original position, as expressed in Actions and Events, was that event-individuation must be done on the basis of causal powers. He later abandoned this view in favour of the individuation of events on the basis of spatio-temporal localization, but his principle of causal interaction seems to imply some sort of, at least, implicit commitment to causal individuation.
Discourses often occur within institutionalized forms of argumentation that self-reflectively refine their procedures of communication, and as a result, have a more rigorous set of presuppositions in addition to the ones listed above. A striking feature of discourse is that validity claims tend to be explicitly thematized and there is the presupposition that all possible interlocutors would agree to the universal validity of the conclusions reached. Habermas especially highlights this in what he calls theoretical discourses and practical discourses. These are tied directly to two of the three dimensions of validity discussed above: theoretical discourse being concerned with validity claims thematized regarding objective states of affairs (IT); practical discourse being concerned with validity claims thematized concerning the rightness of norms governing social interactions (WE).
Natural evil (also non-moral or surd evil) is a term generally used in discussions of the problem of evil and theodicy that refers to states of affairs which, considered in themselves, are those that are part of the natural world, and so are independent of the intervention of a human agent. Both natural and moral evil are a challenge to religious believers. Many atheists claim that natural evil is proof that there is no God, at least not an omnipotent, omnibenevolent one, as such a being would not allow such evil to happen to his/her creation. However, the deist position states that intervention by God to prevent such actions (or any intervention) is not an attribute of God.
''''' or ''''' is a Latin phrase meaning "other things equal"; English translations of the phrase include "all other things being equal" or "other things held constant" or "all else unchanged". A prediction or a statement about a causal, empirical, or logical relation between two states of affairs is ceteris paribus if it is acknowledged that the prediction, although usually accurate in expected conditions, can fail or the relation can be abolished by intervening factors. chapter 2 A ceteris paribus assumption is often key to scientific inquiry, as scientists seek to screen out factors that perturb a relation of interest. Thus epidemiologists, for example, may seek to control independent variables as factors that may influence dependent variables—the outcomes or effects of interest.
Cooke explains: :"when we adopt an objectifying attitude we relate, in the first instance to the objective world of facts and existing states of affairs [IT]; when we adopt a norm-conformative attitude we relate, in the first instance, to the social world of normatively regulated interactions [WE]; when we adopt an expressive attitude we relate, in the first instance to the subjective world of inner experience [I]". (Cooke 1994) This is fundamental to Habermas's analysis of communication. He maintains that the performance of any speech act necessarily makes reference to these dimensions of validity, by raising at least three validity claims. One way to grasp this idea is to take an inventory of the ways in which an attempt at communication can misfire, the ways a speech act can fail.
Ontophantics is the system of philosophical conceptions developed by Peña in the years 1974–1995 (which do not necessarily coincide with those he has developed in recent years). Although ontophantics is essentially a metaphysical doctrine, its starting point was a methodological approach through the philosophy of language, based on a realist semiotic theory to the effect that what is shown by language is also said (as against the Tractarian dichotomy), namely reality or being. Rather than regarding sentences and states of affairs in a static way, as logical atomists have done, ontophantics looks upon them dynamically, as transitions or processes. To utter a statement is not a mere series of successive actions of uttering the sentence's components but a transit from one saying into another along a temporal dimension.
In his Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein explains his version of logical atomism as the relationship between proposition, state of affairs, object, and complex, often referred to as “Picture theory”. In view of Russell's version, the propositions are congruent in that they are both not convoluted statements about an atomic entity. Every atomic proposition is constructed from “names” that correspond to “objects”, and the interaction of these objects generate “states of affairs,” which are analogous to what Russell called atomic facts. Where Russell identifies both particulars and universals, Wittgenstein amalgamates these into objects for the sake of protecting the truth- independence of his propositions; a self-contained state of affairs defines each proposition, and the truth of a proposition cannot be proven by the sharing or exclusion of objects between propositions.
As phrased in Immanuel Kant's 1780s characterization of Hume's thesis, and furthered in the 1930s by the logical empiricists, Hume's fork asserts that all statements are exclusively either "analytic a priori" or "synthetic a posteriori," which, respectively, are universally true by mere definition or, however apparently probable, are unknowable without exact experience.Georges Dicker, "Hume's fork revisited", History of Philosophy Quarterly, 1991 Oct;8(4):327–342. By Hume's fork, a statement's meaning either is analytic or is synthetic, the statement's truth—its agreement with the real world—either is necessary or is contingent, and the statement's purported knowledge either is or is . An analytic statement is true via its terms' meanings alone, hence true by definition, like Bachelors are unmarried, whereas a synthetic statement, concerning external states of affairs, may be false, like Bachelors age badly.
Borrowing a style of phrase from Kant, Hartmann characterizes values as conditions of the possibility of goods; in other words, values are what make it possible for situations in the world to be good. Our knowledge of the goodness (or badness) of situations is derived from our emotional experiences of them, experiences which are made possible by an a priori capacity for the appreciation of value. For Hartmann, this means that our awareness of the value of a state of affairs is not arrived at through a process of reasoning, but rather, by way of an experience of feeling, which he calls valuational consciousness. If, then, ethics is the study of what one ought to do, or what states of affairs one ought to bring about, such studies, according to Hartmann, must be carried out by paying close attention to our emotional capacities to discern what is valuable in the world.
The Ancient Greek infinitive is a non-finite verb form, sometimes called a verb mood, with no endings for person or number, but it is (unlike in Modern English) inflected for tense and voice (for a general introduction in the grammatical formation and the morphology of the Ancient Greek infinitive see here and for further information see these tables). It is used mainly to express acts, situations and in general "states of affairs" that are depended on another verb form, usually a finite one. It is a non declinable nominal verb form equivalent to a noun, and expresses the verbal notion abstractly; used as a noun in its main uses, it has many properties of it, as it will be seen below, yet it differs from it in some respects:Kühner, Raphael. Grammar of the Greek language for the use in high schools and colleges.
Moreover, the type of variation which characterizes a certain species in a certain historical moment is "to a large extent accidental" He writes: > Periodically a biological species might be characterized by one or more > characters which are both universally distributed among and limited to the > organisms belonging to that species, but such states of affairs are > temporary, contingent and relatively rare. Hull reasons that properties universally shared by all members of a certain species are usually also possessed by members of other species, whereas properties exclusively possessed by the members of a certain species are rarely possessed by all members of that species. For these reasons, Hull observes that, in contemporary evolutionary taxonomy, belonging to a particular species does not depend on the possession of any specific intrinsic properties. Rather, it depends on standing in the right kind of relations (relations of genealogy or interbreeding, depending on the precise species concept being used) to other members of the species.
Dr = Derivatives: concepts which, unlike the two categories above, do not have a direct connection to behavior but are defined by their reference instead to dispositions and powers. These include states (states of affairs in which there is a systematic difference in the ordinary powers or dispositions of a person, such as being sick or exhausted or drunk); capacities (the potential to acquire personal characteristics, such as a capacity to acquire mathematical skills or to learn languages; and embodiment (the physical characteristics of a person, such as being six feet tall, weighing 180 pounds, or having brown eyes). In essence, individuals characterize what kind of person John Smith is by giving values to these parameters. When they describe John as "honest," they commit to (one value of) the trait parameter; when "flamboyant" to the style parameter; when "obsessed with making money" to the values parameter; when "very good with numbers" to the ability parameter (of course, all of these parameters will have multiple values—honesty will not be John's only trait).

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