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27 Sentences With "momentariness"

How to use momentariness in a sentence? Find typical usage patterns (collocations)/phrases/context for "momentariness" and check conjugation/comparative form for "momentariness". Mastering all the usages of "momentariness" from sentence examples published by news publications.

Ratnakīrti also wrote the "Proof of Momentariness" (Kṣānabhaṅgasiddhi), where he defended the theory of momentariness, the view that dharmas last only for a moment.
Nothing is excluded, which aids in recreating a feeling of spontaneity and momentariness.
The world's very vividness and poignancy results from the momentariness of our experience.
The thesis of the momentariness of human existence has had a recent defender in Derek Parfit.
Together they create E, emotion, the implication being that this combination of momentariness and power are signs of deep passion.
The Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika proposed a fully-fledged doctrine of momentariness according to which all physical and mental phenomena are momentary.
Despite the extreme artificiality and banality of this Hollywood equation, he manages to convey some of the charged momentariness of a real-life encounter.
He argues that none could, and proposes that internalising the momentariness of our lives has a beneficial effect on how we should face our deaths.
Despite their momentariness within the whole work, it is probable that a late 15 th-century audience familiar with the chanson would have found these quotations striking.
The path of meditation leads positively toward the intuitive understanding of momentariness, the condition of existence or, to state it negatively, toward the total rejection of all notions of permanence.
The Yogachara Buddhist view that there are no external objects but only minds and their conceptions is refuted, as also the Buddhist doctrine of the momentariness of all that is.
The richness of the fantasy of all these edifying symbols is impossible to assess: a dancing skeleton reminds us about the momentariness of life, a butterfly, about resurrection to an unconceivable new life.
However, momentariness with regards to mental dhammas (but not physical or rūpa dhammas) was later adopted by the Sri Lankan Theravādins, and it is possible that it was first introduced by the scholar Buddhagosa.Von Rospatt, Alexander; The Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness: A Survey of the Origins and Early Phase of This Doctrine up to Vasubandhu, p. 36. All Abhidharma schools also developed complex theories of causation and conditionality to explain how dharmas interacted with each other. Another major philosophical project of the Abhidharma schools was the explanation of perception.
We write to negotiate our own relationships with momentariness and permanence, to speak with the dead, to bring them back to life, or try to, and of course we always fail to bring them back, and we call that failure art.
In the Abhidharmakośakārikā, Vasubandhu puts forth the Sarvāstivādin theory, and then in his commentary (bhasya) he critiques this theory and argues for the 'momentariness' of the Sautrāntika. He also later wrote the Karma-siddhi-prakaraṇa ("Exposition Establishing Karma") which also expounded the momentariness view (kṣanikavāda). Vasubandhu's view here is that each dharma comes into existence only for a moment in which it discharges its causal efficacy and then self- destructs, the stream of experience is then a causal series of momentary dharmas. The issue of continuity and transference of karma is explained in the latter text by an exposition of the "storehouse consciousness" (ālayavijñāna), which stores karmic seeds (bīja) and survives rebirth.
An important theory held by some Sarvāstivādins, Theravādins and Sautrāntikas was the theory of "momentariness" (Skt., kṣāṇavāda, Pali, khāṇavāda). This theory held that dhammas only last for a minute moment (ksana) after they arise. The Sarvāstivādins saw these 'moments' in an atomistic way, as the smallest length of time possible (they also developed a material atomism).
Dharmakīrti also defended the Buddhist theory of momentariness (kṣaṇikatva), which held that dharmas spontaneously perish the moment they arise. Dharmakīrti came up with an argument for the theory which stated that since anything that really exists has a causal power, the fact that its causal power is in effect proves it is always changing. For Dharmakīrti, nothing could be a cause while remaining the same, and any permanent thing would be causally inert.
During Vasubandhu's era, the philosophy of space and time was an important issue in Buddhist philosophy. The Sarvāstivādin tradition which Vasubandhu studied held the view of the existence of dharmas (phenomenal events) in all three times (past, present, future). This was said to be their defining theoretical position, hence their name Sarvāstivāda is Sanskrit for "theory of all exists". In contrast to this eternalist view, the Sautrāntika, a rival offshoot, held the doctrine of "extreme momentariness", a form of presentism (only the present moment exists).
Reconciling this theory with their eternalism regarding time was a major philosophical project of the Sarvāstivāda.Ronkin, Noa, "Abhidharma", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = . The Theravādins initially rejected this theory, as evidenced by the Khaṇikakathā of the Kathavatthu which attempts to refute the doctrine that "all phenomena (dhamma) are as momentary as a single mental entity."Von Rospatt, Alexander; The Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness: A Survey of the Origins and Early Phase of This Doctrine up to Vasubandhu, page 18.
The Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika also held an atomistic conception of time which divided time into discrete indivisible moments (kṣaṇa) and saw all events as lasting only for a minute instant (and yet also existing in all three times). Theravadins also held a theory of momentariness (Khāṇavāda), but it was less ontological than Sarvāstivāda and more focused on the psychological aspects of time. The Theravada divided every dhamma into three different instants of origination (uppādakkhaṇa), endurance (ṭhitikkhaṇa) and cessation (bhaṅgakkhaṇa). They also held that only mental events were momentary, material events could endure for longer.
The early Theravādins who compiled the Kathāvatthu rejected the doctrine of momentariness (Skt: kṣāṇavāda, Pāli: khāṇavāda) upheld by other Buddhist Abhidharma schools like the Sarvāstivāda. This theory held that all dhammas lasted for a "moment", which for them meant an atomistic unit of time, that is the shortest possible time interval.Ronkin, Noa, Early Buddhist Metaphysics: The Making of a Philosophical Tradition (Routledge curzon Critical Studies in Buddhism) 2011, p. 62. The idea that the temporal extension of all dhammas lasts only for a miniscule "moment" is also not found in the suttas.Karunadasa (2010), p. 234.
As has been noted above, in Theravāda, material dhammas last longer than mental ones. Karunadasa explains: > Thus, in introducing the doctrine of momentariness the Visuddhimagga says > that the cessation of matter is slow (dandha-nirodha) and its transformation > is ponderous (garu-parivatta), while the cessation of mind is swift > (lahuparivatta) and its transformation is quick (khippa-nirodha). > Accordingly the duration of matter in relation to mind is calculated to show > that during one moment of matter seventeen mind-moments arise and cease. The > moments of arising and ceasing are temporally equal for both mental and > material dhammas.
Aśoka and the elder Moggaliputta-Tissa, who is seen as a key thinker of the Vibhajyavāda tradition (and thus, of Theravada). An important Abhidhamma work from the Theravāda school is the Kathāvatthu ("Points of controversy"), attributed to the Indian scholar-monk Moggaliputta-Tissa (ca.327–247 BCE). This text is important because it attempts to refute several philosophical views which had developed after the death of the Buddha, especially the theory that 'all exists' (sarvāstivāda), the theory of momentariness (khāṇavāda) and the personalist view (pudgalavada)Kalupahana, David; A history of Buddhist philosophy, continuities and discontinuities, page 128.
The epistemology they developed defends the view that there are only two 'instruments of knowledge' or 'valid cognitions' (pramana): "perception" (pratyaksa) and "inference" (anumāṇa). Perception is a non-conceptual awareness of particulars which is bound by causality, while inference is reasonable, linguistic and conceptual.Tom Tillemans (2011), Dharmakirti, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy These Buddhist philosophers argued in favor of the theory of momentariness, the Yogacara "awareness only" view, the reality of particulars (svalakṣaṇa), atomism, nominalism and the self-reflexive nature of consciousness (svasaṃvedana). They attacked Hindu theories of God (Isvara), universals, the authority of the Vedas, and the existence of a permanent soul (atman).
Dhammajoti (2009), p. 75. The doctrines of Sarvāstivāda were not confined to 'all exists', but also include the theory of momentariness (ksanika), conjoining (samprayukta) and causal simultaneity (sahabhu), conditionality (hetu and pratyaya), a unique presentation of the spiritual path (marga), and others. These doctrines are all inter-connected and it is the principle of 'all exists' that is the axial doctrine holding the larger movement together when the precise details of other doctrines are at stake. In order to explain how it is possible for a dharma to remain the same and yet also undergo change as it moves through the three times, the Vaibhāṣika held that dharmas have a constant essence (svabhāva) which persists through the three times.
Some schools such as the Sarvastivadins explained perception as a type of phenomenalist realism while others such as the Sautrantikas preferred representationalism and held that we only perceive objects indirectly.Ronkin, Noa, "Abhidharma", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = The major argument used for this view by the Sautrāntikas was the "time lag argument." According to Mark Siderits: "The basic idea behind the argument is that since there is always a tiny gap between when the sense comes in contact with the external object and when there is sensory awareness, what we are aware of can't be the external object that the senses were in contact with, since it no longer exists."Siderits, Mark; Buddhism as philosophy, 132 This is related to the theory of extreme momentariness.
Some scholars disagreed with this view. Surendranath Dasgupta, for example, stated in 1922 that Samkhya can be traced to Upanishads such as Katha Upanishad, Shvetashvatara Upanishad and Maitrayaniya Upanishad, and that the 'extant Samkhya' is a system that unites the doctrine of permanence of the Upanishads with the doctrine of momentariness of Buddhism and the doctrine of relativism of Jainism. Arthur Keith in 1925 said, '[That] Samkhya owes its origin to the Vedic-Upanisadic- epic heritage is quite evident',Gerald Larson (2011), Classical Sāṃkhya: An Interpretation of Its History and Meaning, Motilal Banarsidass, , pages 31-32 and 'Samkhya is most naturally derived out of the speculations in the Vedas, Brahmanas and the Upanishads'.Gerald Larson (2011), Classical Sāṃkhya: An Interpretation of Its History and Meaning, Motilal Banarsidass, , page 29 Johnston in 1937 analyzed then available Hindu and Buddhist texts for the origins of Samkhya and wrote, '[T]he origin lay in the analysis of the individual undertaken in the Brahmanas and earliest Upanishads, at first with a view to assuring the efficacy of the sacrificial rites and later in order to discover the meaning of salvation in the religious sense and the methods of attaining it.

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